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ABSTRACT

These free papers presented at an International Committee on Family Research (CFR) seminar include (1) Frances E. Baum's "There's No Room in the Nuclear Family: Sharing As an Alternative Housing Option"; (2) Paula W. Dail's "Parental Role Perceptions among Young, Dual Parent Families in America: Family Policy Implications for the Future"; (3) Daniel B. Hunter and Edna J. Hunter's "Mandated Visitation for Grandparents in Custody Disputes: Will Little Red Ridinghood Visit Grandma?"; (4) Fumie Kumagai's "Aging and Social Policies in Japan"; (5) Renata Siemienska's "Patterns of Polish Families and Their Determinants: Continuity and Change"; (6) Oded Stark's "Migration, Remittances and the Family: A Theory"; (7) Helmut Willems and Roland Eckert's "Youth Protest in Western Europe: Four Case Studies"; (8) Peggy G. Koopman-Boyden's "Mothers, Fathers, and 'Big Brother' in New Zealand: Change in New Zealand Families and the Policy Response"; and (9) Graeme Russell's "Changing Patterns of Divisions of Labour for Paid Work and Child Care." (RH)

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PART

4

SOCIAL CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES

FREE PAPERS

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There's no room in the nuclear family: sharing as an alternative housing option

by FRANCES E. BAUM

INTRODUCTION

Housing policies, house design and most housing initiatives in Australia are aimed at the traditional family unit. This is just one reflection of the dominance of the nuclear family in both public and private ideologies in western societies (1). This dominance is primarily a relic of the post-war consensus on the 'ideal' type of family. This consensus has given way to an increasing diversity of views on the family and related issues. In the abstract this diversity is reflected in differences in values and attitudes towards sex, marriage and gender roles (Glezer, 1984), and in concrete terms it is reflected in changes in types of families and patterns of family lifestyles, such that there are now a range of family types that do not conform to the traditional patterns (Macklin and Rubin, 1983; Institute of Family Studies 1984). In fact, a cross-sectional view of Australian society shows that only about 26 percent of families conform to the traditional image of two-parent, one-earner families with dependants (ABS, 1979). Non-traditional families do not necessarily have the same needs, including housing needs, as traditional families. However, to date, their particular needs tend to be ignored or treated as marginal and transient and comparatively little provision is made to satisfy them, particularly relative to that aimed at the nuclear family.

There are a number of groups (e.g. young people, singles, single parents, the aged) who have become increasingly prominent in recent years, for whom conventional housing solutions are not always suitable. One housing option that has become relatively common is shared housing. This type of housing may be viewed as long or short term. Some people see shared living as an alternative lifestyle and envisage it as permanent. For others, it is a life-stage option, used for

relatively short periods between other lifestyles (for instance, a person may be part of a couple, separate, move into a shared house, then move out to form a couple again). Sharing is a housing solution that is particularly relevant to young single people, a group whose housing problems and needs have attracted attention recently (see, for example, Hancock and Burke, 1983; Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare, 1982; South Australian Department of Industrial Affairs and Employment, 1980). This paper presents preliminary research findings from an empirical study of shared houses in Adelaide, South Australia.

Shared houses are a feature of contemporary life in most Australian cities, although it is difficult to say precisely how widespread house sharing is (2). Newspaper classified columns, universities', colleges' and shops' noticeboards and certain housing agencies (3) offer shared accommodation. Shared living in communes has been researched extensively (for example, Fairfield, 1972; Rigby, 1974; Robertson, 1974; Cock, 1979), but urban shared houses that do not have the ideological commitment that is typical of communes have not been the subject of much investigation (4). This is probably because shared houses are not particularly visible in cities and have not been the subject of special policies or social concern in the way that other non-traditional lifestyles like single-parent families have. The present study is, to the researcher's knowledge, the first of its kind in Australia. Important aims of the study were to obtain a profile of the types of individuals who live in shared houses, to study patterns of everyday life in these houses, to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of shared living and to compare it with other housing options. The research is policy-oriented and suggests ways in which shared housing could achieve

respectability as a housing option. An assumption underlying the research is that shared living offers one, alternative, solution to the problem of providing adequate housing and also makes a positive contribution to individuals' quality of life.

RESEARCH METHOD

The study is based on interviews with 126 individuals living in 39 shared houses (5). It was conducted between June and September, 1983. Attempts to obtain a random sample proved unsuccessful, as the Electoral Commissioner was unable to grant permission for access to the street order roll because "Electoral information of this nature may only be released if there is direct and discernible benefit to electors or the electorate in general" (letter from the Commissioner, May 1983). The sample was obtained by placing an advertisement in the Adelaide Advertiser. It briefly explained the project and asked those interested to obtain further details by completing and returning a form at the bottom of the advertisement. Other households were contacted through a shared register maintained by the S.A. Housing Trust Emergency Housing Office and through a snowball technique of referral from households that had been interviewed.

A shared house was defined as a household of at least two people who shared facilities. If just two people were sharing they were included in the sample only if they were not related by familial or sexual relations.

The interview schedule was semi-structured and contained a mixture of closed and open-ended questions. It was piloted among residents in an experimental shared-house scheme for young people in an area south of Adelaide. The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to two hours, but mostly lasted for around an hour. The majority were carried out by a male interviewer, experienced in social science interviewing techniques, who had himself lived in

shared houses for a number of years. The remainder were conducted by the researcher. All the members of 36 households were interviewed. In the remaining three, it proved impossible to arrange a suitable time for an interview in one household, and in the other two households, some members did not want to be interviewed. The personal interviews were divided into three sections:

1. Personal details
2. Details of the running of the household and everyday life in the house
3. General comments on sharing and other housing options.

The respondents were also asked to complete a short list of attitude statements relating to perceptions of marriage and the family. The atmosphere at nearly all the interviews was rated as 'very cooperative, friendly' by the interviewer.

All the interviews were tape-recorded. The open-ended responses were transcribed, and the closed and those open-ended amenable to classification were analysed using the SPSS package (Nye et al., 1975). The study produced a considerable amount of data, only part of which is used in this paper.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLDS AND INDIVIDUALS

Households

A summary of the data detailing the characteristics of the 39 households in the study shows that two-thirds of the houses were rented, 2 (5%) were owned by the South Australian Housing Trust, 2 (5%) were owned by all the occupants and 11 (28%) by one member. A quarter of the homes had 4-5 rooms, 24 (62%) had 6-7 and 5 (13%) had 8 or more. Table 1 shows how many adults were in each house. The modal size was three adults, the largest had 6 adults. 7 of the households included children. Of these, 4 had one child, 2 had two and 1 had four. 3 households were composed of men only, 10 of women only and 26 were mixed.

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TABLE 1: Number of Adults in Sample Households

Number of Adults	Frequency	
	N	%
2	5	13
3	20	51
4	9	23
5	3	8
6	2	5

Individuals

Age, Sex and Marital Status. Most of the respondents were young and currently single. 54 (43%) of the sample were men and 72 (57%) were women. All the respondents except one were less than 40 years old. 13 (10%) were 20 years old or less, 86 (68%) were between 21 and 30, and 26 (21%) were aged between 31 and 40. 100 (79%) were living as singles, 18 (14%) in a de facto relationship and 8 (6%) were married. 73 (63%) had lived with a partner or been married in the past.

Employment and Income. Approximately a third of the sample (n=43) were in full-time employment. 11 (8%) were working part-time. 22 (18%) were both working part-time and a student, 21 (17%) were students, 26 (21%) were unemployed and 3 (2%) were receiving a supporting parent's benefit. Over half the sample (n=74) had an annual income of less than $8,000. 8 (6%) earned over $22,000. Where possible, the present or most recent occupation of the respondents was classified according to whether it was manual or non-manual. 45 (36%) could not be classified, 59 (47%) were in non-manual, and 22 (17%) in manual occupations.

Educational Level. The respondents were well-educated. 92 (72%) completed year 12 or the equivalent. Over a quarter (n=33) had a degree and only 48 (38%) had no tertiary qualification.

Religion and Politics. Half the sample (n=63) stated that they were atheists or had no religion. A third of those stating a religion, stated it as "other", frequently describing it as a "general spiritual

belief", 10 (8%) were Roman Catholics and 12 (10%) were Protestant. 87 (69%) voted for the A.L.P. at the last election, 12 (10%) for the Liberals, 9 (7%) for the Democrats and 15 (12%) did not register any vote.

Experience of sharing houses. Eleven of the respondents had not lived in any other shared house. Table 2, showing the length of time they had lived in a shared house, illustrates that this sample had considerable experience of sharing houses. 66 (55%) had lived in shared houses for more than 3 years before moving into their present house.

TABLE 2: Years Respondents had spent in shared houses (before present one)

No. of Years	N	%
Less than 1	15	11.9
Between 1 and 2	17	13.5
Between 2 and 3	17	13.5
Between 3 and 5	28	22.2
Between 5 and 10	35	27.8
Eleven or more	3	2.4
None	11	8.7
TOTAL	126	100

Table 3 shows how long each person had been living in the house at the time of their interview. There was a considerable difference in the length of time people had been in their houses and therefore in the stability of the houses. Only 21% had lived in their current house for more than three years.

TABLE 3: Length of time Respondents had been in current shared house

Months/Years	N	%
Less than 3 months	22	17.5
Between 3 and 6 months	30	23.8
Between 6 months and 1 year	28	22.2
Between 1 and 2 years	14	11.1
Between 2 and 3 years	5	4.0
Between 3 and 5 years	17	13.5
6 years or more	10	7.9
TOTAL	126	100

Sexual Relations. 27 people (22%) stated that they had a sexual relationship with another member of the household. 26 of these were coupled, the other one had an occasional sexual relationship with one member of a couple. So, contrary to what may be a popular image of shared houses, as places where "free love" is the normal behaviour, there appeared to be an incest taboo on sexual relationships between people unless they were coupled.

WHY DO PEOPLE LIVE IN SHARED HOUSES:

Three main reasons explain why most people live in shared houses. These are: because they cannot afford to rent or buy a house on their own or as part of a couple; because they have made a positive decision to live a cooperative way of life; and, for a lesser proportion, because they want to avoid loneliness. The distribution of these is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4: Number and Percentage of Respondents responding positively to reasons for living in a shared house

Reason	N	% of Respondents *
Economic necessity	69	54.8
Wish to live in a cooperative way	68	54.0
To avoid loneliness	45	35.7
Chance	27	21.4
Other	18	14.3

* Respondents were permitted to give more than one response.

For most people their reasons for sharing represented a combination of these three factors. Some, however, stated just one, and there was a division among these between those who had a commitment to shared living and those who were motivated by economic factors. These two quotes illustrate these different perspectives:

> The reason I choose to live in a shared house is that I like the company and the interchange, the sharing of ideas, and having a group gives some sense of belonging.....
>
> ...I'm basically only living here now because it's all I've got and it's cheap.

The desire to live in a cooperative way was often linked with a concern for resource conservation (put into practice, for instance, by sharing energy, consumer durables and transport) and a rejection of the nuclear family way of life. Many of those motivated by the relative economy of shared living said that as soon as they could afford to, they intended to move out to their own accommodation or to share with a partner. High rents mean that sharing is the only viable option for individuals on a low wage or social security. Average rents in Adelaide in 1983 were around $60 per week for a flat and $86 for a house (National Shelter, 1984). In other capital cities, rents are higher and sharing likely to be even more of a necessity for economic survival.

More specific reasons for sharing that respondents mentioned were: that they had just left a marital or de facto relationship and wanted to rebuild a life; that as a single-parent they wanted adult company without having to leave home to find it; a couple had moved into a shared house because they believed doing so would "lessen the pressure" between them; and some had wanted to move in with friends. Of those who could envisage what they would be doing in five years (n=101), 64 (51%) stated that they still wanted to be sharing and 37 (29%) that they saw sharing as a transient arrangement and they hoped to be living on their own or with a partner in the future.

DAILY LIFE IN SHARED HOUSES

Domestic Organisation

The household organisation of traditional families has evolved over many centuries and individuals in these families can draw on traditional role models. The division of labour between husbands and wives in traditional families generally follows sex-segregated lines (Blood and Woolfe, 1960; Bell and Newby, 1976; Edgell, 1980; Williams, 1981). Women perform most of the domestic tasks and men are primarily responsible for providing the household's income. The successful operation of this system largely depends on an unequal balance of power between men and women. In shared houses gender patterns of power are far less clearly defined than they are in conventional marriages. Patterns of dependence and exploitation that are often characteristic of such marriages (Barker and Allen, 1976) are not represented in shared houses. Shared houses are, most typically, composed of individuals who are not related economically or sexually; so patterns of organising day to day life differ from those established in conventional nuclear families. While the patterns established are by no means uniform, a common theme is that they all have had to develop systems of organising their households. The main issues discussed in the interview were: domestic tasks, money and meal arrangements. The solutions evolved ranged from laissez-faire approaches to highly organised systems where very little was left to chance.

'Doing the chores' This seemingly mundane topic proved to be a crucial determinant of household success. If a workable system for doing the household chores is not organised, then the prognosis for success is not good.

Just about every household interviewed reported current or past conflict over organising chores. Problems are worst where members of the same household have different ideas about standards of housekeeping. Some households that did not place much importance on vacuuming, doing the dishes regularly or cleaning the bathroom, for example, could be successful, if all the members of the household agreed that the status quo was satisfactory. By contrast, some households had higher overall standards yet experienced more conflict because the house-sharers differed in their assessment of satisfactory levels. A typical expression of this problem was given by a 30 year old man who noted,

> One of the big problems in shared houses is who does the cleaning. You get the situation where someone doesn't mind being a slob, living in a dirty house and then another who is neat. Neither one is happy or wants to compromise.

Several methods of coping with the almost inevitable conflict that crops up over chores were encountered. The main dichotomy is between those who had worked out a roster system and those who had not. Two-thirds of the households worked to an ad hoc system. In some cases this worked, in others there was evidence of dissatisfaction. In the latter households, members frequently felt that a roster should be instituted because it was believed this would solve the problems. For instance, a 22 year old woman whose household worked to an ad hoc system stated that it basically did not work very smoothly, and added:

> It works in the sense that we tend to blow up once a fortnight and I suffer incredible guilt....We've talked about rosters pretty seriously in recent weeks but I think we are going to have to instigate that because I'd rather work to deadlines.

This pattern of resentment of tasks not done building up to an explosion of frustration, a massive clean-up, then a gradual return

to mess and resentment again was reasonably common in households that had no roster system. Some of those interviewed were unsure how to resolve this problem, but it had not been systematically discussed.

Conversely, for certain people the idea of rostering tasks was not well received, as this was perceived as involving too much regimentation:

> Rosters are too regimented - like brownies and guides. (23 year old woman)

> I've always found that rosters, although some of them do work, there's always that feeling there 'I have to do this, so I'm not going to do it properly' sort of thing. I find it's much better if someone does it when they really feel like doing it and they want to do it. (26 year old man)

Among those households (n=13) that did use rosters, there were a variety of arrangements. Some had been adopted in response to conflict over who did the tasks, others were imposed by one member of a house (usually in those owned by one of the household) as a condition of entry into it, and some had been worked out jointly by people when the household was established. Rosters differed according to whether they worked on a rotation system or involved specialisation of tasks by particular individuals. In some houses rosters had been established but had fallen by the wayside. Others found them an indispensible way of overcoming conflict. They were most commonly established in those houses where the sharers had a relatively powerful commitment to shared living, and so a greater interest in resolving conflicts. In one such household that initially had not had a roster the situation had been,

> .....chaos and everyone felt uncomfortable about whether they should be doing it or not. They just didn't know. It was dreadful. I think if we didn't have a roster it would cause a lot more hassles. You'd end up having a lot of crazy bitterness about doing dishes.
> (32 year old man)

Once a complicated and encompassing roster was worked out, the whole household reported that the resentment, frustration and conflict was dramatically reduced. One of the women commented:

> It's just easier to know that you only have to think about doing this this week, and forget about the rest and you don't have to think about should I have done more.
> (29 year old woman)

A further example of how a roster had resolved problems was given by a man who explained how he had "detested" the idea of a roster.

> .....because I hated the idea of that regimentation, but I eventually tried at Mary's insistence and would never live any other way now.....you can all agree in the first place on what constitutes the responsibility and when they are going to be done and then it's out of the way.
> (28 year old man)

Despite these positive views, rosters are not necessarily a successful method of conflict resolution. They still depend on a certain level of commitment and if that is missing, difficulties still occur. Impressionistically, I concluded that rosters are the 'safest' means for organising a household. They ensure that everyone knows what they should and should not be doing, that a basic level of household tasks are completed, and that guilt and resentment have a basis in fact (x has not done the bathroom floor this week even though she/he was rostered to do so) rather than imagined shortcomings resulting from an unstructured system. However, some houses without rosters appeared to function very well. The key to success appears

to be that all household members should be content with the system and that any problems are discussed and satisfactorily resolved before resentment builds up. The households where there was the greatest dissatisfaction were also those where there was little communication about the problems. An extreme example was a 26 year old woman who owned the house she was sharing and who expressed considerable dissatisfaction with her sharers, feeling that they did not do enough in the house, that they were thoughtless and irresponsible. After listening to her irritations, I asked her if she had ever talked to the other people in the house, and she replied that she had not because she found it too difficult and stressful to do this. Instead, she was building up resentments and bitterness that, as became clear from their interviews, her housemates were unaware of.

It has already been noted that shared houses have to develop patterns of domestic organisation that differ from those in traditional families. Studies of communes have suggested that sex roles still remain traditional, with women doing most of the domestic chores (Abrams and McCulloch, 1976). In this survey, women also did more of the traditionally female jobs and men the masculine ones, but the division was rarely rigid and both sexes typically did chores traditionally associated with the other sex. It is not surprising that rigid sex roles in these houses were rare as most occupants were middle class, young, childless and did not adhere to a religious doctrine. All these factors have been associated with egalitarian attitudes towards sex roles (Glezer, 1984; Thornton and Freedman, 1979).

When tasks were segregated according to traditional definitions

of sex roles the respondents expressed regret about this, but felt it was efficient to organise things that way. The rationale for this belief was that childhood socialisation had conditioned them for traditional sex roles. A female respondent explained her feelings thus,

> You don't expect the same behaviour from a male, you let him off in a way you don't do with your own sex. I used to get annoyed with the guys when they didn't pull their own weight, but less irritated than with women because of my own conditioning. Pretty pathetic!
> (35 year old woman)

There were a few households where there was no reported division of labour along sex-segregated lines, and some houses operated a deliberate policy of breaking down sex role stereotypes and saw living in a shared house as one way of achieving this. One commented,

> It causes people to look at traditional structures because when you are in a shared house your roles don't necessarily automatically fall into the wife does this and the husband does that.
> (24 year old man)

Finally, this perceptive comment neatly summarises the reality of sex roles in shared houses as it emerged in this survey:

> The sexual politics of living in a house are really important and you come face to face with that. Generally shared houses are good, but there are some shared house situations where the bad patterns we are brought up with are perpetuated.....and the sexual division of labour remains, but I still think that's less likely to happen in a shared house situation than in a nuclear one.
> (28 year old man)

Money. With the exception of one household that shared their income equally, all others operated financially as individuals or couples. Only three individuals mentioned money when asked about problems in their house. There was practically no concern over people not paying bills or rent. Occasionally the person responsible for

collecting money to pay bills or the rent complained about this responsibility but usually in terms of the time it took up, rather than because of the difficulty of obtaining money from the others. Nearly all the houses adopted the same system for organising financial matters. The rent and all bills, except the telephone bill, were divided equally. Telephone bills were divided according to recorded usage. The majority of the sample (approximately 80%) used a kitty system to buy most of their food.

I suspect that absence of serious conflict over money may reflect the concern that many people have when they enter a shared house that money will become a problem. This expectation means that the issue is clarified and discussed in a way that, for instance, tasks are often not. When money was a problem, this seemed to be in houses where there was a considerable difference in income levels, for instance, when unemployed people and full-time workers shared a house. In these cases people's perspectives on the value of money can diverge significantly. One unemployed person commented on this problem,

> I think there can be real problems if one person is unemployed and the others quite well off. Just the fact that your perspective in money is different. For example, I've been coming home this year and finding lights left on and that annoys me, and that can be a problem..... The other two think I'm being finicky.
> (29 year old woman)

Food. Meal times are traditionally a focus of family life. In shared houses while breakfast and lunch were typically eaten separately, a majority of sharers prepare and eat their evening meal together more often than not (when they eat at home). For these people, then, sharing a house implies more than just a shared roof. Shared meal times were viewed by a considerable number of

the sample as a crucial component of successful cooperative living, an aspect of sharing that creates cohesiveness and camaraderie. It is the time when household members find the time to share experiences, sort out household management and interact together, in their often very busy lives. Typical comments about sharing meals were:

> It increases the community feeling in the house, which is very important. People feel they are together and that nobody's left you.
> (40 year old man)

> Well, it keeps the household together. We are all extremely busy in this household. We are shooting off all the time and meals are times when you can sit down, relax and enjoy each other's company and maintain that social contact.
> (21 year old woman)

> I think it's a good thing, our family's always done it, a good communal meal, ask how the day's been, talk about funny things that have happened. It's a time you can talk.
> (21 year old woman)

Other reported advantages of eating together were that it is efficient in terms of costs, fuel, food and labour. Another frequent comment was that joint cooking provides a motivation to eat nutritionally well-balanced meals and to experiment with recipes and so adds to the quality of life. One difference between sharing and living alone was felt to be that on your own you tend to neglect nutritional concerns and not eat 'as well'. Most respondents felt very positively about sharing meals, and expressed regret if they did not do so regularly.

Eating together can have disadvantages. For example, problems were posed where meals had to accommodate a vegetarian, a macrobiotic diet and an omnivore. Sharing meals could also be problematic in households where the individuals had different time schedules or widely differing cooking skills.

Social Interaction

Most of the households in the sample were more than just a living arrangement and fulfilled social functions. In fact, 50 (40%) rated the people they shared their house with as 'among the most important people' in their lives. 87 (69%) reported that, on the whole, they got on well with their housemates. Only one person had problems with all the people in the house and 37 (29%) with some or one of the others. Some households were composed of extremely close friends who shared a social life and regarded one another as very important. In others, sharers had relatively little to do with each other. These two quotes illustrate the difference, although the latter quote is an extreme:

> One of the things that really bothers me is that it is sad to think that finally we are going to move on, we've shared a lot of things together, like when we went to Kangaroo Island together - no partners or anything. We had a great time - it's little things like that that make it good....I would say the people in this house would be my primary group, not my parents.
> (33 year old woman)

> Peter and I see very little of each other. We live very separate lives. I've lived a month without seeing either. I've seen John once in the last three weeks. Sometimes you just don't see Peter and you begin to wonder if he is dead or what.
> (23 year old man)

The questions relating to the amount of social interaction in the houses demonstrate the social role shared houses fulfil. Most of the sharers (n=101, 80%) reported that they had, at least, occasional social events in which all members of the household participated. Approximately 40 percent of the respondents "often" went out socially with at least one of the others in their house, and the remainder, with a few exceptions, went out sometimes with one or more. 47 individuals (37%) said that they shared other

aspects of their life apart from the house with people in the household. These ranged from sharing a car, working or studying at the same place or, in one instance, having a joint interest in a business.

Handling Conflict

Conflict of some degree and at least minor dissatisfaction featured in all the accounts of life in shared houses, but these factors were most likely to be stressed by those people who were sharing primarily for economic reasons. Such people tended to emphasise what they saw as the insurmountable difficulties of shared living, while people who had a commitment to sharing accepted conflict as inevitable, and its resolution as part of the challenge of successful sharing. That successful shared living requires skills of negotiation and compromise was noted by a substantial number of respondents. Many expressed the view that living in a shared house was a valuable life experience:

> It teaches you the basics - learning how to live with other people and compromise and it's good training for other aspects of your life.
> (23 year old woman)

> There is a lot we can learn from shared housing, just in terms of personal relationships, like cooperation and caring, that you don't get in single houses or couple situations.
> (20 year old woman)

> I think if people share experiences there would be less aggression, less competition, more compromise.
> (30 year old woman)

> I've learned an enormous amount from living communally, I think now I'm quite a good communal liver, whereas when I first started living in communal houses I certainly wasn't.
> (28 year old man)

The discussion of domestic organisation in shared houses illustrates

that conflict is not an unusual feature of shared living. This, in part, reflects the fact that the domestic side of life in a shared house is more complicated than in a conventional household. Sharing housework and cooking is not easy, especially for people brought up in families where most of this was controlled by one woman.

Research on other variant lifestyles has suggested that they may be associated with more conflict than traditional lifestyles, primarily because individuals in them have to find solutions to dilemmas and circumstances that are relatively novel, and so cannot rely on established norms to provide precedents for the resolutions of problems (Hicks, Hansen and Christie, 1983; Scanzoni and Szinovacz, 1980; Conolly, 1983). However, it should be noted that studies of the most typical lifestyle in our society, heterosexual marriage, have shown it may be characterised by conflict, dissatisfaction with the roles it traditionally imposes on people, and an absence of meaningful communication (see, for example, Burns, 1983; Eastman, 1983; Barker and Allen, 1976). Given this, it is reasonable to conclude that the difficulties associated with sharing are unlikely to be more severe than those associated with other lifestyles.

SATISFACTION WITH SHARED LIVING: COSTS AND BENEFITS

Satisfaction with shared living varied tremendously from those individuals who would not consider any other lifestyle to those who put up with sharing under sufferance and looked forward to the time when they could afford their own home or one shared with a partner. Table 5, shows that most sharers (90%) are satisfied with their lot. Of course, this represents a crude summary of individuals' feelings, and does not mean that all these did not face problems and have some misgivings about the lifestyle.

TABLE 5: Responses to 'How favourable are you towards living in a shared house'

	N	%
1 (Very Favourable)	40	32.0
2	58	46.4
3	15	12.0
4	6	4.8
5	4	3.2
6	2	1.6
7 (Very Unfavourable)	-	-
TOTAL	125 *	100

* One respondent felt unable to answer this question

Only 12 people, however, (9.5%) reported serious problems. One woman complained: "I could just go on for hours. There are just so many things that really annoy me". 73 (58%) reported minor problems and 41 (32.5%) saw no problems that they considered worthy of mention. Of those who mentioned problems (n=82), the most prominent was household mess which was cited by 45 people. The only other factors mentioned by more than 10 percent of the 82 individuals who experienced serious or minor problems in their house, were personality problems (cited by 17) and difficulties stemming from the physical design of the house. A small number mentioned noise, too many visitors, clashes over smoking and pets, different time schedules (for example,

if individuals were working different shifts), problems over food and meals, and lack of consideration from other house members.

The sharers' assessments of the best and worst aspects of life in a shared house (Table 6) reveals a contradiction. On the one hand, the most valued aspect is the company and emotional support shared living offers; on the other, the lack of privacy emerges as the worst feature. Achieving a balance between these two conflicting factors can be difficult, as this comment comparing two shared houses demonstrates:

> The house I lived in before no-one cared about anyone, people just wandered in and out any time. In this house it is almost too much the other way. I feel everyone lives in each other's pockets a bit too much and knows too much about another person's business.
> (21 year old female)

The advantages that came from companionship in a shared house were cited as the best thing about sharing by 79 (64%) of the respondents, and another 18 (15%) cited the stimulus that shared living gave them.

TABLE 6: 'Best' and 'Worst' thing about living in a shared house (mentioned by more than 5% of sample)

'Best thing'	N	%
Company/emotional support	79	64.3
Stimulus to do other things	18	14.6
Relative Cheapness	15	12.2
'Worst thing'		
Lack of privacy	44	35.5
Need to compromise/restrictions on lifestyle	26	20.9
Coping with other people's moods	11	8.9
Doing household chores	8	6.5
None	8	6.5

Typical comments in response to the question "What's the best thing about living in a shared house?" were:

> It takes you out of yourself, so you don't get totally wound up in yourself and your own perspective on things.
> (28 year old woman)
>
> It has its advantages economically, but that's not a big one. Probably just the company, the warmth of the place, having people in it, having different people and that helps...Everyone brings in a bit of touch - pot plants in the kitchen, people doing things, nice cooking smells, comfortable place...
> (25 year old man)
>
> It's like a substitute family in a way.
> (24 year old woman)
>
> The companionship is good, it's not much fun being on your own each evening.
> (24 year old single mother)
>
> .....being involved in some sort of non-demanding support network and stuff like that - it's not as insular as living by yourself.
> (34 year old man)

It is precisely these sorts of advantages that create the two most commonly stated 'worst' aspects of sharing: a lack of privacy and the need to compromise and restrict your lifestyle. For some people the restrictions in lifestyle and lack of privacy were insurmountable problems. One woman, for example, in explaining why she was unhappy sharing stated:

> A lot of it's got to do with privacy, you haven't got your own privacy, you're restricted in what you want to do and what you can do. If you're in your bedroom in your pyjamas, you've got to get your dressing gown to go to the toilet because there's someone else here...it's just privacy not being able to do what you like in your own house.
> (21 year old woman)

Others, by contrast, recognised that lack of privacy was the main drawback to sharing, but accepted this as a necessary corollary of the benefits of companionship. Take, for instance, the following observation:

> I guess there's not a hell of a lot of privacy, when you're living with three people and others popping in, and if you want to be on your own it's not always possible, but usually that's overcome. It's not a great big deal.
> (30 year old woman)

CONCLUSION

To conclude this paper, three issues will be addressed. The first is a discussion of the factors that make for a good shared house. The second, the advocacy of shared housing as a housing option, and the third, a consideration of the ways in which policies could be adapted to encourage this.

Some shared houses are successful even though the odds seem set against them (unsuitable physical design, unlikely combination of people, for example). However, such houses are rare and the study suggests certain factors that increase the chances of a shared house running smoothly and satisfying the needs of the occupants. Three such factors are highlighted below:

Characteristics of sharers. People who positively want to share a house are likely to be more satisfied with sharing than those who are forced to share because it is the only housing they can afford. Individuals who feel negatively about sharing, yet feel they have little choice seem less willing to make the compromise and commitment necessary to make the house work. The importance of these factors was stressed by a woman who believed the essential ingredients for a good shared house were,

> Tolerance, patience and a bit of understanding, willingness to compromise because everyone wants something different and no-one can have that when you are living together and if you can't compromise the household won't work.
> (20 year old woman)

> The most important is when people can actually sit down and talk and come to compromise and if that's lacking no matter what else happens, there is not much you can do if you can't talk about it, it's useless.
> (22 year old woman)

Obviously shared houses work best when there are no major personality clashes. These are hard to predict prior to living with other people, and several of those interviewed commented that you only

really get to know people when you live with them. Discovering such clashes appears to be largely a matter of trial and error, but success is more likely when the people sharing have a basically similar value system and outlook on the world (morals, politics, etc.) and share at least some characteristics or interests in common. Individuals in the survey stressed factors they felt were important for them (living in a mixed or single sex house, living with people in roughly the same age group, living with friends or people from whom you can keep a distance, living with people who have the same taste in music), but these reflect personal preferences rather than generalisable factors. There were, however, two situations about which several people related difficulties. The first of these related to any situation in which the power balance of the household was uneven. This could happen because one person held the lease, had lived in the house longer than the others, or even just owned the furniture. It was most common when one of the sharers owned the house. There were eleven such houses in the study. Some of these worked well, but others seemed particularly problematic. The difficulties this situation can lead to are illustrated by the following comments by two people living in the same house:

> The difficulty with our situation here is that Jen owns the house and so it's really sometimes a bit, a kind of situation where we feel we want to do things but can't.... we don't own it. Her expectations can be a lot higher of us, but we don't have any share in it, I sometimes think if we had shares in it and we would all get benefit out of it when eventually it got sold, it would sometimes help.
> (32 year old woman)

> I think it does cause a bit of a problem with Jen being landlady and simultaneously a household member, because there's a definite role separation by those two things and I think Jen oscillates between those two roles depending on the situation. She owns a high percentage of the household possessions, so she tends to set the tune as to what's acceptable and what isn't.
> (27 year old man)

Similar themes were reiterated by other people where there was a power imbalance. Such an imbalance is potentially destabilising.

The second situation mentioned by a number of people is the mix of problems that arise when people in a house have different levels of income. The monetary problems that can occur when unemployed people share with wage earners has been noted earlier. Six people specifically mentioned that similar income levels among sharers was a prerequisite for a successful house, as one explained,

> If one person has an excessive income compared to the rest, it would show in their lifestyle and in the things they wanted to do. It would be jarring.
> (22 year old woman)

In fact, different rent levels generally ensure that occupants in a house have a roughly similar income, and this was usually the case. Problems can also occur when the unemployed and employed have different time schedules, as this description illustrates:

> I also find it very difficult if your lifestyles are very different. For example, in the last household I was very busy, one of the people was unemployed and one was a student and our different energy levels caused problems.....I used to get uptight, always coming home to someone in the house and knowing I'd be really hyped up and knowing they'd be there and I would have appreciated sometimes coming home to an empty house.
> (20 year old woman)

Sorting out expectations. Sharing a house will generally be unsuccessful if the people sharing have significantly different expectations of one another. We saw, in an earlier section, how this could be the case with regard to household chores. This match of expectations can extend to more basic assumptions about the purpose of the house. Witness this comment from a man sharing a house with a couple:

> I'm fairly happy about it, but it's taken a couple of months for it to shake down. They had different expectations to me. Clare wanted to have an extended family, very close, sort of thing. I found I couldn't become part of that.
> (34 year old man)

Other people were disappointed because their shared house did not live up to their expectations - possibly they had hoped it would be more sociable in terms of joint meals and closeness of friendships or, as in one case, the ethos of the house demanded more involvement than one woman was prepared to give. She was expected to ring if she was going to be late for a meal or away overnight and resented this, feeling it to be undue interference. The key point is that for a successful house, potential sharers should, as far as possible, find out if their expectations match. One respondent recommended,

> It's really important for anyone who lives together to do quite a bit of sorting out about what they are wanting and what they are expecting from each other, not only in practical ways, but also in interpersonal ways.
> (29 year old woman)

Physical design of a house. Physical features of a house can have a powerful influence on the success of the social aspects of a house as this perception illustrates:

> The living environment won't be the most significant thing but if the house is designed in a way that allows you to have enough shared area and enough private area, then I think that's very helpful. One of the big problems is the closeness/distance issue, as to whether you are treading on each other's toes.
> (31 year old woman)

Unfortunately, most 'standard' houses in Australia are built with a family of two parents and children in mind. Usually, for example, they have one master bedroom and two smaller ones. This arrangement is very functional for the family but not for three adults sharing. Similarly, shared houses function best with two communal living

areas, as this allows flexibility of activities (Baum, 1984). An ideal shared house design would seek to reconcile the demands of social interaction and individual privacy. A solution popular with many of the respondents was a hybrid structure between units and a house, in which individuals or couples could have their own private space, in the form of a bedsitting room, or two rooms, possibly with an en suite bathroom, but also have access to communal areas that would be shared by perhaps 5 or 6 people.

Opportunities for shared housing should be increased. The introduction stressed the uniformity of housing in Australia and suggested that non-conformist housing initiatives are a necessary development to cater for diversity in housing needs. There is recognition that Australia faces a housing crisis (National Shelter, 1984) and that a crucial part of poverty alleviation is the provision of adequate housing. This has led to debate over housing policies. This debate often gets bogged down in the economics of housing and the human side of the story is lost. Yet ultimately this is the most vital component of the debate. Sharing offers an attractive housing option that should be considered seriously in the housing debate. It could be beneficial to a number of groups who are excluded, by circumstance or choice, from the nuclear family. Indeed, it could be said that these houses act as a safety valve, relieving a variety of social and economic pressures. They bring high rents down to an affordable level for those on low incomes. They provide companionship for people who may otherwise have to live in isolation (some unemployed and aged people, for instance). They offer a very viable alternative lifestyle for people who are disenchanted

with the way of life offered by the nuclear family. Experimental schemes are determining if a sharing arrangement would be a suitable environment for particular groups like the aged and physically and intellectually handicapped (6). Of course, not everyone is attracted by the prospect of living in a shared house, but there is undoubtedly a proportion of the population who, for some period of their life will want to share. Hancock and Burke (1983) report that 49% of the young people they surveyed stated their ideal housing option as sharing with friends.

The uniformity of housing design in Australia encourages people to adapt their living situation to suit the available housing stock. Ideally, things should be the other way around. Existing shared houses have the effect of reducing the pressures on people to conform to traditional lifestyle models. Presuming the desirability of individual freedom to choose from a range of lifestyles, provision for shared housing widens the feasible choices. Barrett and MacIntosh (1982, pp.141-142) advocate shared housing as a positive move towards reducing the dominance of the ideology of the nuclear family on our society. They comment:

> Households can break up amidst resentment and recrimination. Yet living these various ways that challenge the family is often rewarding and enjoyable...

Certainly, this study shows the latter is often the case, and that shared houses are currently widening individuals' housing choices.

Expanding the provision of shared housing is not just desirable on the grounds that a certain section of the population wants to live in shared houses. A further argument relates to the role shared houses could play in promoting the ideal of community (7). It has been noted that the ethos of privatisation has a strong

hold on Australian society (Stretton, 1974; Kemeny, 1977; Hancock and Burke, 1983). This ethos has some negative consequences. It encourages the suburban isolation of those people, primarily women, who are not in the paid labour force. Excessive privatisation has been said to encourage domestic violence (O'Donnell and Craney, 1982). It also acts to promote individual interests rather than communal interests. Criticisms of urban life dating back to those of Durkheim (1951) have often been based on the tendency for urban life to isolate people from one another and, in extreme cases, to result in social anomie (Weinberg, 1970; Porteous, 1977). Shared houses have the potential to play a role in reversing the negative aspects of privatisation. This would mean a minimisation of social isolation and, along with it, a reduction of the mental and physical health problems it can give rise to. More positively, shared housing could enhance the quality of life in the community, encouraging those virtues that the sharers in this study suggest shared living fosters (cooperation, respect for others, communication, effective conflict resolution). This is not to say that shared housing will effect a miraculous transformation of our society, but it could, in the right context, alleviate a range of social problems and make a positive contribution to the quality of individuals' and the community's life. As Stretton (1974, p.77) maintains, ".....home and neighbourhood are where almost all human capacities for cooperation are born and nourished - or aborted and blighted".

This, the final section of the paper, *gives consideration to the ways in which policies and attitudes could be adapted to legitimise the status of shared houses* and to make life easier for people who are or who want to live in shared houses.

The first set of policy suggestions relate to legislative changes that could make the establishment of shared houses easier. Present planning regulations were not designed with shared houses in mind. In South Australia, the Planning Development Act, 1966-1978 laid down that Residential Zones were primarily built to 'accommodate single family dwellings' (South Australia, 1966-1978). The only stipulated alternative to these is residential flat buildings that usually provide accommodation for single people or couples. These regulations mean that many shared houses in South Australia are outside the criteria laid down by the planning legislation (unless shared houses were to be considered as coming under the term 'family'). Their existence is rarely challenged. However, a youth housing scheme in South Australia did apply for a change of use of a house in order to establish a shared house for young people who could not afford private rent levels. The scheme faced stiff opposition from the neighbours in adjoining houses who objected to the idea of the establishment of a household that did not conform to the family model. These objections were strengthened because they had backing from the planning legislation.

This is just one example of a way in which legislation is out of step with the realities of the housing market. It also demonstrates how structural biases in favour of traditional family types act to discourage the establishment of non-traditional households.

It is relatively easy to point to biases in legislation, however highlighting prejudices in attitudes is less straightforward. But there is some evidence that these do exist and may have an adverse effect on the establishment of shared houses. It has been suggested that sharers are the least preferred tenants. Real estate

agents in Melbourne claimed they were "more likely to cause trouble, less likely to be regular with rent and were less deserving than families, elderly people and single parents" (Simons, 1984). It is questionable whether these prejudices have any basis in fact. A likely cause of such attitudes towards shared houses is the fact that most sharers are young. Community attitudes towards youth are often negative (Hancock and Burke, 1983, p.249). A further cause could be the association that exists in some people's minds between shared houses and hippy-style communes. Inevitably, this conjures up (misplaced) notions of 'sex, drugs and rock and roll', not ideal anticipated behaviour for prospective tenants.

The private rental market is regulated by tenancy legislation. While this does make provision for sharers in that a group of people can be named on the lease, landlords do not favour this. Usually when a group of people share a house one of them has to be nominated as the leaseholder, pay the bond money and take all the associated responsibility. This may cause problems in the internal dynamics of the house (for example, it may create an unequal power relationship in the house), and may cause problems if the leaseholder wants to leave the house but the other sharers do not. A preferable system would enable all sharers to be leaseholders, contribute equally to the bond money and allow one or more of the sharers to move out of the house and be replaced by new occupants on the lease. Residential tenancy officials should publicise the means by which this can be done and the potential advantages of such tenancy arrangements.

Another example of suspicion towards shared houses relates to those people who want to buy a house jointly. Some of the individuals

in this study who had done so, or had investigated the possibility of doing so, reported that they had been regarded with suspicion by representatives of financial institutions they had negotiated with. One woman recalled how she had been advised against entering into such a scheme because 'they always fall apart'. She pointed out that a married couple are unlikely to receive the same advice despite rising divorce rates. Individuals who want to joint-purchase a home can do so with relative ease by becoming tenants-in-common. The obstacles are those 'gatekeepers' who control mortgage funds. It seems there is a need for publicity/education programmes that increase community and professional awareness of the viability of non-conventional housing options.

A prominent theme that emerged in this study of shared houses was that shared living was regarded by a sizeable proportion of the respondents as an education for life through, for example, helping people to develop valuable communication skills. It was also clear that some people do not possess the necessary skills for successful shared living. A recent report on youth housing policy recommends that 'housing skills should be encouraged as part of the CYSS program of life skills' (Hancock and Burke, 1983, p.288).

Similarly, the need for young people, in particular, to develop 'living skills' that would help them when sharing was stressed at a youth housing seminar held recently in Adelaide. The concept of 'living skills' is somewhat vague and undoubtedly difficult to teach in an effective and relevant way; nevertheless, such courses, run perhaps by educational institutions, youth groups, or by any other organisations dealing with human relationships, have a potentially important role to play in helping individuals overcome some of the problems they may face in sharing a house (8).

Finally, shared housing could be legitimised and brought into the mainstream of housing options if housing design were modified to suit the needs of sharers, and if public housing authorities made provision for shared accommodation in plans for new housing stock and in the allocation of existing stock. There is some indication that this latter point is being acted on by some housing authorities. In South Australia, for example, the Housing Trust has made available 150 houses to groups of young people who want to share a house. While problems have been encountered in this scheme (for example, establishing groups of people to be on the waiting list, and the fact that the houses allocated are standard three-bedroomed family homes), it has at least established a principle. Public housing authorities, in particular, should consider what types of houses would best suit the needs of the potential occupants. This consideration would almost certainly lead to the development, with the aid of research, of innovative designs that marry the often conflicting demands of sociability and privacy. The solutions arrived at are likely to be varied, and so cater for individual preferences. Based on the findings from this study, I would suggest that one of the most popular design solutions would be the 'hybrid' outlined earlier in the paper. This has the potential to provide accommodation that ensures quality of life as well as meeting the basic need for shelter, for those who find there is no room in the nuclear family. I will conclude the paper with an extract from a contemporary novel, 'The Women's Room', that sets out a vision of an ideal housing development. This vision is very close to that most frequently voiced by the respondents. It also suggests that, with imagination and original thinking, we can improve our experience of life:

> Suppose we built houses in a circle, or a square, or whatever, connected houses of varying sizes, but beautiful, simple. And in the middle would be a garden with benches and trees and people could grow flowers, it would be a common.....At the other side of the houses, facing them, would be a little community center. It would have a community laundry - why does everybody have to own a washing machine? - and some play rooms and a little café and a communal kitchen.....the dwellings would be priced according to size. Each would have a little kitchen, in case people wanted to eat alone, a good-sized living space, but not enormous, because the community center would be there.....(French, 1977, p.539-540).

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NOTES

(1) For details of these ideologies see Alexander (1983) and Barrett and MacIntosh (1982).

(2) There are indications that the number of shared houses is increasing. For instance, the accommodation columns of city newspapers include a considerable number of 'wanted to share' advertisements. However, it is difficult to produce precise figures. Census data are not very helpful as they are based on family units and households; the definitions used mean that shared houses could be classified in a number of different ways. Three single people living together could be defined as three separate 'head only' families within the same household or as three separate households.

(3) For example, the South Australian Housing Trust funds a share-register, "Whereabouts", and the Service to Youth Council runs "Trace-a-Place".

(4) One study has been published in the U.S.A. (Raimy, 1976; 1979).

(5) Another household was also interviewed but excluded from this sample because the members were aged pensioners.

(6) For example, The Brotherhood of St. Laurence in Melbourne has set up several shared houses for older people, and is monitoring their progress. A charity in Adelaide has established a shared house for physically disabled people.

(7) While it is acknowledged that a whole branch of sociology is devoted to community studies (see, for example, Bell and Newby, 1971), here it is accepted that an integrated community is desirable and the notion has an accepted meaning in our society.

(8) The N.S.W. Consumer Unit (1977) has produced a course designed to teach living skills that uses, as a basis for doing this, the example of five young people sharing a house.

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Parental role perceptions among young, dual parent families in America: family policy implications for the future

by PAULA W. DAIL

ABSTRACT

The study being reported in this paper was designed to ascertain parental role perception among young, dual-parent families having one or two children, with one child being under age five years. Using the Perception of the Parental Role Scales (Gilbert and Hanson, 1983), both mothers and fathers were asked to reveal their perceptions of their role. Overall, mothers were found to be both more instrumental and more expressive than fathers. It appears that the total family role for mothers is increasing, and parental role responsiblities remain primarily female work. Data are interpreted in reference to the complex inter-dependency between internal family role structure and outside social supports as manifest through family policy.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the world the family has been studied from without as concerns its effect, as an institution, upon the larger society. There has been lesser attention directed toward learning more about the family as it functions from within, and virtually no consideration of the effects of the internal family functioning (e.g. roles and responsiblities) as it impacts upon the family as a unit fitting within a larger society.

Most recent observations about both the structure and the character of the American family suggest that, while there will be growing diversity in family forms in the future, for at least part of the family life cycle, a sizable number of households will consist of two parents and, most likely, two children (Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1983). The most notable shift among this population group concerns female employment: In the majority of these families (75%) mothers will be employed as contrasted to 1950 when 14% of married women were employed. Female employment is expected to continue to rise into the foreseeable future.

The argument that the American family is disintegrating as a result of mothers moving into roles outside of the family appears to be obsolete. Since the mid 1970's the rate of change has slowed, the divorce rate leveled off, and the birth rate stabelized (Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1983). Family ties seem to have remained central to American life. Thus, it is germane to look most carefully at the family from within, to consider the character of the family roles for mothers and fathers in traditional, dual parent families, and to address the policy implications of the contemporary structure of the parental role for young, dual parent households.

Overview of the Parental Role

In essence, a role is a task that one is supposed to perform (Biddle and Thomas, 1966). As such, roles are defined, perceived, and performed in conjunction with other roles and influences, and within a societal context. The origin and evolution of human societies has focused on the family as a group consisting of a mother, a father, and children. The traditional sociologic definition of the family has been a structure-functional one, describing the role of mother as expressive and nurturing and the role of father as instrumental (Parsons, 1955). This concept further characterizes family roles as oriented toward simultaneous maintenance of the group as both autonomous and belonging within the larger society. Children are necessary to continuity and maintenance of both the family system and the social system, and the dependent character of the young child necessitated the designation of a caretaker, and this function fell to the mother. Her role became the perservation of the internal family

structure while the father provided for the external needs and in so doing contributed to the functioning of the society. This describes an ongoing pattern of reciprocal influence between the family, the social system, and social policies, and seems to rest at the foundation of the American concept of family.

As a result of the trend toward urbanization over the last century there has been a shift in the family roles in the United States. The cost of raising two children from birth through four years of college is between $80,000 and $150,000 (Yankelovich, et al., 1977). Assuming a conservative average of six percent per year inflation rate since 1972, two children born today would cost between $123,000 and $231,000 to raise through four years of college. In terms of a simple cost-benefit analysis, children today appear to cost the family more in actual dollars than they are able to produce during their growing up years, and this is an economic reality for most families today.

There is demographic evidence of the effects of this economic shift. Census data indicate that the labor force participation of women is increasing, both for women with children and those without (U.S. Census Bureau, 1979, 1980). These same data also indicate a trend toward smaller families. As regards postponed parenthood, couples who postpone having children report economic concerns as primary in their decision (Young, 1977), and economics remain of major concern for most adults throughout their lives. Thus, a woman's career orientation may have an economic and practical basis. Given the reasonable expectation that inflation will continue, two incomes may be an absolute necessity for most couples. This growing economic need will cause some renegotiation of the structure and function of the parental role for both mothers and fathers. Speculatively, the trend may be toward greater androgeny and egalitarian role performance. However, preliminary research is conflictual in this regard. Most of the evidence to date indicates that mothers becoming more instrumental in their role performance has not influenced fathers to become more expressive.

Careful analysis of the parental role as regards instrumentality of males and expressivity of females has not been systematically investigated in the context of contemporary American families. Most of the recent research has focused upon more global styles of parenting and has drawn conclusions base primarily upon responses from mothers (Gilbert and Hanson, 1983). A void also exists within the context of our perceptions of the role of mother and father. To the extent that perceptions influence attitudes and behavior, it is critical to understand how parents perceive their role. This provides a measure of the reality of the role for young parents which guides family policy regarding the need of young families.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The study being reported attempted to obtain a comprehensive measure of parental role perceptions among young, dual parent families having one or two children under age five. Responses are considered to be appropriate for children of either gender, and to be reflective of both male and female parents. The perceptions of the parental role which these parents indicate reflect a robust set of beliefs which characterize parenting in contemporary American society. The data also reflect the American cultural biases and societal influences upon the parental role as well as our uniquely American ideal of what a parent "ought to be."

The study hypothesized differences between mothers and fathers, with mothers expected to be more expressive than fathers, and fathers more instrumental than mothers. The study was also interested in possible differences between rural and urban parents.

METHOD

Sample

Table 1 describes the population sample for this study, which consisted of young parents (n = 249) from a midwestern area of the United States. The sample represents both rural and urban parents, as defined by the U.S. Census population and geographic criteria. The sample is random within the population universe of parents meeting the criteria of age ($\bar{X}$ = 27.43), marital status (presently married), and number of children (< 3; at least one under age 5 years). The sample was generated from county birth records. In reference to female employment, 47% of urban mothers and 53% of rural mothers were employed outside the home, yielding an overall rate of 50% female employment. According to Hollingshead (1975) scales of socioeconomic status, these families fall within the mid range.

Insert Table 1

Instrumentation

The Perception of the Parental Role Scales (PPRS) (Gilbert and Hanson, 1983) was used as the measuring instrument for the study. This is a 78 item Likert-type rating scale which has been designed to measure both instrumental and expressive characteristics of the parental role. Identical forms are used for both mothers and fathers, thus enabling comparisons between each.

RESULTS

When initially contacted by telephone, 86% (n = 328) of the sample of available parents agred to participate in the study. Seventy-five percent (n = 249) of those parents provided usable data. The composition of the final sample was 59 urban and 71 rural mothers (n = 130, 52% of the total sample), plus 53 urban and 66 rural fathers (n = 119, 48% of the total sample).

Based upon the response rate and the characteristics of the sample which were controlled in this study, there is sufficient reason to accept that respondents and non-respondents do not differ appreciably, and that the data generated are representative of the population universe of parents fitting into the categories previously described.

The data from the Perception of Parental Role Instrument was divided into the appropriate scales for that instrument first of all by separating the parent population by location and by sex. Tables 2 and 3 describe the means and standard deviations for rural mothers and fathers respectively on the Perception of Parental Role scales. Total instrumental and expressive scores were calculated by combining appropriate scales using the criteria for instrumentality and expressiveness previously established for this study and for the development of the instrument.

Insert Tables 2 and 3

Overall, rural mothers had higher mean scores for both instrumentality and expressiveness than did rural fathers. Mothers had higher total instrumental scores than did fathers, although the difference was small. For the total expressive score, mothers scored considerably higher than did fathers.

Urban mothers obtained higher mean scores for all scales than did urban fathers. In addition, urban mothers had higher total instrumental and total expressive scores than did urban fathers.

Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed on each of the 13 scales of the PPRS. The instrumental variables are represented by scales 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12 and the expressive variables are represented by scales 2, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13. Table 4 illustrates the results. Statistically significant differences were found on scales 2, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13 representing expressivity, as well as scales 3, 4 and 12 representing instrumentality. Differences in total scores for instrumentality and expressiveness were also statistically significant. For the ten scales in which there were differences, in all cases both rural and urban mothers scored higher than rural and urban fathers, indicating greater maternal concern in these areas. In addition, mothers were shown to be both more instrumental and more expressive than fathers.

Insert Table 4

Post hoc comparisions using the t-test were performed on those scales where significant differences were found. Space does not permit table illustration of these results. Those scales having the most differences present within them included Scales 2: Teaching the Handling of Emotions, Scale 4: Teaching Norms and Values, Scale 8: Basic Needs: Health Care, Scale 9: Basic Needs: Material, Scale 10: Basic Needs: Meeting the Emotional Needs of the Child, Scale 11: Basic Needs: Child Care, Scale 12: Interface Role: Between the Child and Social Institutions and Scale 13: Interface Role: Between the Child and the Family. The remaining scales had fewer differences within, but nevertheless had overall mean scores indicating that mothers scored higher than fathers in each category. T-values reported are separate variance estimate t-values.

Tests of correlation between sex and both instrumentality and expressiveness were performed. Cramers ϕ indicated a .54 correlation between sex and expressiveness, indicating that 29% of the variance for this variable can be accounted for by sex. The correlation between instrumentality and sex, again using Cramers ϕ, was .55, allowing for 30% of the variance on this variable to be accounted for by sex.

Tests of reliability for the sample for this study were performed on each scale of the Perception of Parental Role scales. The overall standardized alpha reliability for this population was .97.

DISCUSSION

Overall, it was found that, while mothers and fathers differed significantly in their perception of their roles, mothers were significantly more expressive and more instrumental than were fathers. It was expected that mothers would be more expressive than fathers, but not more instrumental. Further, rural and urban parents did not differ with regard to their perception of their parental role. For both categories parents were not entirely traditional in their role perception. For rural parents, this less traditional perception of the role might be understood within the context of the overall character of the family. On farms, for example, there is considerable role sharing between males and females, thus women might be expected to score high in instrumentality, but it is curious that they scored higher than males. The most plausible explanation is that, in addition to the potential for role sharing, the rural families had a 53% rate of female

employment outside of the home. These mothers appear to be functioning, to a high extent, in areas external to the family, and which are, by definition, instrumental.

For the urban sample of parents, the more androgenous perception of the role is less readily understood. The female employment rate was at 47%, likely presenting fewer opportunities for role sharing which would lead to high female instrumentality for this group. The educational level of urban parents is not sufficiently high to explain some possible androgeny in roles that may occur in families having dual career parents (Bird, 1979). It is possible that urban families are having to make greater efforts than rural families to maintain themselves as economically functional, as reflected by the Hollingshead score, and are using whatever means available, and which would not necessarily include opportunity for female employment. Thus urban mothers may be exhibiting instrumental characteristics in ways that are not immediately discernable by these data, but nevertheless do exist.

Another clue to the high instrumental scores for mothers may lay in the nature of the expressive role itself. Some behaviors or perceptions characterized as nurturant actually have a strong instrumental quality existing concurrent to the nurturant or expressive quality, and is maybe difficult to differentiate between the two. Those areas in which mothers were significantly more instrumental than were fathers included the teaching of social skills, teaching of norms and values, meeting the basic material needs of the child and the interface between the child and social institutions.

It is possible that for those scales regarding teaching social skills and teaching norms and values fathers scored lower than mothers because males perceive the teaching role as primarily a female one and thus relegate it to the mother as an expectation for her role, particularly for thos skills falling within the affective domain.

Notably, while not statistically significant, mothers nevertheless had higher mean scores than did fathers in all areas of "teaching" the child.

The area concerned with basic material needs of the child is another one in which mothers were significantly higher than fathers. This is interesting in that meeting basic material needs of the family is one of the more clearly defined instrumental qualities. While, in general, providing for basic material needs is an instrumental function, those criteria for measuring this aspect of instrumentality seem to have a highly nurturant character, and thus it may not be too surprising that mothers scored significantly higher than fathers in the areas that they did.

The area of instrumentality concerning the interface between the child and social institutions showed mothers to be significantly more concerned than fathers about the child's development in the school setting as well as academic progress and outside activities in which the child participates.

While within each of the scales measuring instrumentality there were areas in which there were no significant statistical differences between mothers and fathers, overall, in every case mothers had higher mean scores than did fathers. This indicates a high concern for instrumental functions being expressed by

by mothers may be interpreted to suggest that the female role may indeed be changing, moving toward more instrumentality, than previously described.

These data do not suggest that fathers are not instrumental, and cannot be viewed as implying a change in the male role. To the contrary, the male role definition of instrumentality seemed to hold up as quite secure.

Those results concerned with the expressive nature of the parental role are as was expected. Overall, mothers are shown to be more expressive than are fathers, and further, there was no difference between rural and urban mothers on this variable. Those scales concerned with measuring expressivity included the teaching of the handling of emotions, teaching personal hygiene, meeting basic health care needs, meeting basic emotional needs of the child, meeting basic child care needs of the child and the interface between the child and the family. For all of these scales mothers scored significantly higher than did fathers.

In all areas of the interface between the child and the family except one, mothers scored higher than did fathers. Both parents manifested equal concern for the development of a sense of the importance of family obligations. This is not too surprising in that family obligations have strong instrumental as well as nurturant components. It is notable that, for this scale, mean scores indicate that fathers do have a strong concern for the family, even though the mothers' scores were significantly higher. The scores for this scale, taken together give some indication of the view of the family that this population of parents has, and it is impressive that overall the scores are high. Recent indications, from various sources, suggest rather dramatic changes in the structure, functions and meaning of the family (cf. Trost, 1980). However, this sample seems to hold the traditional concept of family in rather high regard and is highly committed to it, somewhat refuting those who take an opposite position.

Overall, in terms of expressivity, mothers and fathers in this sample have held to the traditional roles. some may view this as surprising, particularly in view of the seeming increase in attention being paid to the development of greater expressivity in males. In true indication of a change toward more expressivity in males would be equal scores with mothers in those areas designed to measure expressivity. These data do not indicate that and while it is possible that males may be more expressive than in the past, they are not as expressive as females. However, there are some areas of expressivity in which males do have equal concern with females. Because in all areas of the perception of the parental role mothers scored higher than fathers, it appears that mothers are more concerned with the parental role than are fathers, but possibly not to the extent that might be hypothesized if the strict definitions of family roles are interpreted to mean that fathers function primarily outside of the family. Fathers in this study were showing high concern for their paternal role, nevertheless, the concern was not equal to that of mothers.

From the point of view of the female role in the family, these data suggest that mothers, by becoming highly instrumental as well as highly expressive may be increasing their overall role obligations in the family. Thus the balance of family roles, from the structure/functional perspective, may be tilting toward the female role, rather than toward androgeny in the roles. In terms of sex role socialization, this apparent shift has some interesting implications. The immediate issue concerns the quality of this shift in sex role behavior. It is possible that this evidence of high female instrumentality is a response to a

contemporary need or social expectation, and thus may be a temporary "accommodation technique" adopted by some women. The critical question surrounds the sex role socialization which occurs in childhood and adolescence, and whether it is powerful enough to eventually overtake this "accommodation technique." In other words, is the change that these data suggest evidence of an actual trend toward increase in female role responsibility in the family, or is it merely an artifact of a need in present time?

Last, these findings which address sex role definition do allow for reconsideration of the meaning of the terms "instrumental" and "expressive." The terms, as Parsons (1955) has defined the, do not appear to soundly apply to the current behavioral and perceptual manifestations of the parental role in the family.

Family Policy Implications

For this audience it is important to briefly consider the structure and nature of the democratic system presently operational in the United States. The orientation is one approaching a true democracy whereby government is designed and philosophically committed to self governance by and for the people. This implies that the government serves the people; the people do not serve the governing system. Therefore, theoretically, policies are determined by the needs of the populus.

In reality, our democracy is operational on a two party level, and as such has representation from philosophically opposing viewpoints. The party in power has automatic opportunity to change every four years. Policies which are enacted during any particular time most likely reflect the beliefs and orientation of the majority party, and are subject to reevaluation with each change in administration. This structure lends an instability to policies which are formulated and enacted. While our democracy in its ideal is designed to serve the people it only does so within the confines of the political party in power. This has significant implications for families because of the sacrosanct ideal which surrounds the American concept of the family, and the unresolved dilemma regarding the extent to which government can or should transgress the invisible family boundary. Any formation of an official family policy would impact upon these boundaries.

Barring some major unforeseen disruption small dual parent families with working mothers are likely to comprise a significant number of all families far into the future. It is unlikely that either the economy or technology will sufficiently alter this family structure permanently. Thus, two familial concerns become evident: one refers to child care and the other is female role strain. Even those children growing up in a stable, dual parent family are going to experience less care from mothers. Since these data indicate that fathers are not assuming a more nurturant, expressive role in the family, institutional care is the obvious solution to the child care dilemma, particularly since extended family is no longer available to fill the void. Government at all levels will be pressured to respond to this need. This is highly problematic in the United States. Earlier studies (Dail, 1981, 1982) suggest that the United State government is quite reluctant to develop operational policies in response to this family child care need. This reticent stance reflects a philosophical dilemma regarding the extent to which government should "interfere" in family life by providing support for a role heretofore regarded as solely the family responsibility. These data define a clear policy directive within the domain of the parent child relationship as well as the performance of the parental role. Mothers are assuming more role responsibility and need assistance with child care. An area of apparent direct need, according to these data, is the teaching role. Mothers are assuming this to a high extent. It would be possible to allow institutions

which provide child care to ssume a significant responsiblity for the teaching of social skills, norms and values, cognition, physical health, survival skills and the like.

It appears that fathers are not changing in their role to a sufficient extent to provide this child care assistance, thus the society may have to respond. However, providing institutional child care or policy support for institutional child care is, at best, risky and controversial in the United States, and not likely to be met with enthusiasm, despite the ideology of our democracy which dictates that the government respond to the needs of the people.

A second policy implication of these data concerns the family stress level when needs are not being met. It is not possible to fully discuss this issue in this space, but the role strain being experienced by the mothers in this sample is likely to be significant, and of itself has implications for structural changes in the family. Eventually it may be impossible to be married, have children and to work both inside and outside of the family. There is little doubt that both child care and more equitable sharing of housework will be prominent issues for the 1980's and 1990's. However, this change will be difficult and require assistance in the form of policies which would support fathers' efforts to work at jobs whose structure would allow time for house and child care. This might follow the example of Swedish law which allows fathers work leave when a child is born. However, the critical issue for this type of change is one of societal and cultural norms and values more than policy.

It also bears mentioning that many mental health diseases are presently thought to be stress related (e.g. alcoholism, drug abuse, spouse abuse, etc.). Policies oriented toward stress reduction for families may, in turn, alleviate some of these societal concerns.

A third policy implication which is worthy of consideration concerns direct development of social programs which would relieve the economic strain present for families and which often force mothers into employment. This might take the form of child allowances provided by the government and designated as monies to assist in meeting the basic costs of rearing a child. This could be money directly allocated to families or given through housing, public utility, food, clothing and educational rate reduction. The present tax structure provides a meager deduction for each dependent child, but that cannot be viewed as money available to families.

At present we have no laws or policy statements regarding parental responsibilities for rearing children, other than requirements that citizens attend school until a certain age, child protection laws regarding abuse and neglect, child labor laws, and parental responsibility for damages done by a minor child. None of these directly address parental responsibility for providing the best possible environment for the growth and development of the child.

The most obvious question concerns the probability and/or necessity of formulating a national family policy in the United States. This is theoretically viable, but realistically problematic under the present structure of our governing system. Since the government potentially changes every four years, it is almost impossible to develop a secure family policy. However, the real issue is a philosophic one which concerns the propriety of having an official policy for families in America. We have not resolved the government role in family life, or the degree to which the society can rightly accept responsibility for the

rearing of the children and supporting the parental effort. Over legislation, particularly in reference to the family group, approaches a more socialistic orientation which is in fundimental conflict with our democratic ideals, and not likely to be readily acceptable to the more conservative element of the population.

CONCLUSION

These data have given insight into how contemporary parents in America are perceiving their parental role. The data do not allow for direct inference about the actual parental behavior within the role. The measuring instrument used to learn about parental role perceptions is a scaled one, thus it logically may be assumed that the distance between perception and actual behavior is not too great.

This paper has clearly identified areas of need for family policy action. Others (c.f. Bernard, 1977) have suggested that unless there is some change in family policy and societal support for the family, the family will change itself as an automatic response to its own needs. This proposes a dilemma in regard to the governmental function as a system to support the family structure, or to fail to support it, and in so doing cause it to change itself. Policies oriented toward assisting the family in maintaining itself as the society continue to increase in complexity are controversial and risky, yet possibly necessary. It is difficult to know whether the present form of government in the United States will be able to respond and assist the family in maintaining the traditional, dual parent structure.

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Table 1

Demographic Description of Parent Sample (n = 249)

Urban Mothers (n=59) and Fathers (n=53)			Rural Mothers (n=71) and Fathers (n=66)		
Age $\bar{X}$	27.12	(S.D. 4.45)	Age $\bar{X}$	27.75	(S.D. 3.55)
Years Married			Years Married		
$\bar{X}$	5.67	(S.D. 2.55)	$\bar{X}$	6.07	(S.D. 2.64)
Children			Children		
$\bar{X}$ age	1.59	(S.D. 1.535)	$\bar{X}$ age	2.83	(S.D. 1.7)
$\bar{X}$ number	1.84	per family	$\bar{X}$ number	1.12	per family
Religion			Religion		
Protestant	49		Protestant	50	
Catholic	47		Catholic	66	
Jewish	0		Jewish	0	
Other/None	15		Other	21	
Ancestry			Ancestry		
German	58		German	77	
Scandinavian	17		Scandinavian	24	
Other N. European	23		Other N. European	20	
Italian	5		Italian	4	
Other	9		Other	12	
Educational Level (Hollingshead)			Educational Level		
$\bar{X}$	4.97	(S.D. 1.23)	$\bar{X}$	4.80	(S.D. .911)
Total Hollingshead Score (n=51 families)			Total Hollingshead Score (n=65 families)		
$\bar{X}$	33.69	(S.D. 10.48)	$\bar{X}$	36.03	(S.D. 9.25)

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Table 2

Perception of Parental Role Scales
Rural Mothers and Fathers

Scale		Mothers (N=71)	Fathers (N=66)
1. Teaching Cognitive Development (max. possible score: 30)	$\bar{X}$	26.01	25.43
	S.D.	3.38	3.66
2. Teaching Handling of Emotions (30)	$\bar{X}$	26.74	25.62
	S.D.	3.45	3.8
3. Teaching Social Skills (35)	$\bar{X}$	30.73	29.58
	S.D.	3.27	3.71
4. Teaching Norms and Values (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.56	29.60
	S.D.	3.62	2.90
5. Teaching Physical Health (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.56	23.34
	S.D.	3.62	4.06
6. Teaching Personal Hygiene (25)	$\bar{X}$	22.64	21.86
	S.D.	2.54	3.20
7. Teaching Survival Skills (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.11	23.37
	S.D.	3.99	3.94
8. Basic Needs: Health Care (35)	$\bar{X}$	32.45	30.63
	S.D.	2.44	4.10
9. Basic Needs: Material (Food/Clothing/Shelter) (25)	$\bar{X}$	22.62	21.87
	S.D.	2.15	2.48
10. Basic Needs: Meeting Emotional Needs of Child (35)	$\bar{X}$	33.84	31.78
	S.D.	2.04	3.64
11. Basic Needs: Child Care (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.1	22.30
	S.D.	3.65	3.74
12. Interface Role: Between Child and Social Institutions (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.71	23.66
	S.D.	2.90	3.28
13. Interface Role: Between Child and Family (25)	$\bar{X}$	21.62	20.66
	S.D.	2.87	3.20
*Total Instrumental Score (210)	$\bar{X}$	176.96	171.43
	S.D.	18.26	20.08
**Total Expressive Score (180)	$\bar{X}$	162.25	153.25
	S.D.	13.15	18.23

*Instrumental scores = Scales 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12
**Expressive scores = Scales 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13

Table 3

Perception of Parental Role Scales
Urban Mothers and Fathers

Scale		Mothers (N=59)	Fathers (N=53)
1. Teaching Cognitive Development (30)	$\bar{X}$	26.35	25.88
	S.D.	3.54	3.89
2. Teaching Handling of Emotions (30)	$\bar{X}$	27.23	25.07
	S.D.	3.19	4.02
3. Teaching Social Skills (35)	$\bar{X}$	30.66	29.61
	S.D.	3.70	3.86
4. Teaching Norms and Values (30)	$\bar{X}$	27.91	26.58
	S.D.	2.53	3.46
5. Teaching Physical Health (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.50	24.67
	S.D.	4.12	4.51
6. Teaching Personal Hygiene (25)	$\bar{X}$	22.46	21.79
	S.D.	2.71	3.06
7. Teaching Survival Skills (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.34	23.54
	S.D.	3.68	4.45
8. Basic Needs: Health Care (35)	$\bar{X}$	32.08	30.58
	S.D.	2.91	3.66
9. Basic Needs: Material (Food/Clothing/Shelter) (25)	$\bar{X}$	22.83	22.01
	S.D.	2.25	2.50
10. Basic Needs: Meeting Emotional Needs of Child (35)	$\bar{X}$	34.16	31.92
	S.D.	1.38	3.06
11. Basic Needs: Child Care (30)	$\bar{X}$	24.81	22.90
	S.D.	4.52	4.04
12. Interface Role: Between Child and Social Institutions (30)	$\bar{X}$	25.37	23.79
	S.D.	3.30	4.41
13. Interface Role: Between Child and Family (25)	$\bar{X}$	22.12	20.48
	S.D.	2.40	3.22
*Total Instrumental Score (210)	$\bar{X}$	178.17	172.74
	S.D.	18.56	22.69
**Total Expressive Score (180)	$\bar{X}$	163.17	152.62
	S.D.	14.26	18.18

*Instrumental scores = Scales 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12
**Expressive scores = Scales 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13

Table 4

ANOVA Results for Perception of Parental Role Scales
(Rural and Urban Mothers and Fathers)

Scale	Female $\bar{X}$	Female S.D.	Male $\bar{X}$	Male S.D.	F Value	Sig.
1. Cognitive Development	26.13	3.42	25.66	3.78	1.03	.31
2. Handling Emotions	26.91	3.35	25.42	3.90	10.18*	.001
3. Social Skills	30.64	3.48	29.65	3.75	4.51*	.034
4. Norms and Values	27.65	2.57	26.78	3.17	5.39*	.02
5. Physical Health	24.50	3.83	23.97	4.31	.996	.31
6. Personal Hygiene	22.57	2.60	21.82	3.14	4.16*	.042
7. Survival Skills	24.21	3.82	23.44	4.18	2.20	.13
8. Basic Health	32.30	2.65	30.58	2.48	16.58*	.0001
9. Basic Material Needs	22.73	2.18	21.92	2.48	7.21*	.007
10. Basic Emotions	33.98	1.77	31.82	3.39	39.78*	.000
11. Basic Care	24.42	4.06	22.60	3.89	12.3*	.0005
12. Interface Child and Social Institutions	24.96	3.08	23.75	3.85	7.35*	.007
13. Interface Child and Family	21.82	2.67	20.59	3.21	10.46*	.001
**Instrumental Total	177.33	18.24	172.16	21.35	3.86*	.05
***Expressive Total	162.55	13.57	153.00	18.23	20.34*	.000

**Instrumental scores = Scales 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12
***Expressive scores = Scales 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13

Mandated visitation for grandparents in custody disputes: will little red ridinghood visit grandma?

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LAW, SOCIAL POLICY AND GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS

Tradition, social policy, and the law have led to a panoply of conflicting rights and responsibilities for parents. In recent years there has also been an emerging concern for the rights of children, although those rights often conflict with their parents' right to parent.

Even more recently, with increasing divorce rates in the United States, changing roles for women and men, longer life expectancies, and burgeoning numbers of single-parent families, headed by both men and women, the issue of mandated visitation rights for grandparents is being given more attention.

In earlier times, reliance on the extended family was the norm. Members of the family typically lived in close proximity to each other, and they cared for and supported one another. Consequently there was little need for the law to take into account such things as grandparents' rights in regard to mandated visitation with their grandchildren. True, fathers and mothers were less likely to divorce, and even if they did, grandparents did not enter into the custody battle, since they probably were either deceased or senile. They certainly were not out in the workworld, traveling, or active in Senior Citizens' activities.

Over the years, increasing life expectancies and better health protection have resulted in an increasing population of physically and mentally vigorous grandparents, many of whom are financially independent. They have become an increasing force in the political arena and no longer are they content to be ignored by society and their own children. Nor are they content to be used, abused and discarded by their children when their perceived usefulness to the children is ended. They are physically, mentally and financially able to finance the fight for their rights.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and report upon one aspect of this conflict, the area of court mandated grandparent visitation with the grandchild.

In the popular childhood tale of *Little Red Ridinghood*, it was the mother who consented to allow Red Ridinghood to visit Grandma. Today the Court might be the party making that

decision. Unfortunately, at the present time the courts are far from reaching a consensus regarding visitation by grandparents, and the issue is being decided on a State-by-State and case-by-case basis, although the trend is favorable to court ordered rights of visitation by the grandparents.

THE RIGHT TO PARENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The rights of parents with regard to their offspring have been zealously supported by the law through history, although the law is continually evolving and changing. Historically these rights primarily belonged to the father (and still do in many cultures throughout the world). Only when the "tender years doctrine" held sway in recent decades did American mothers' rights to custody of young children supercede those of the fathers'. Still more recently, with the recognition that children too have rights, the doctrine of "the best interest of the child" has brought grandparents and other significant persons into the litigious battle for mandated visitation in custody disputes.

Law and Parental Rights Through History

The first written laws concerned with the rights of parents over their offspring appeared in the Code of Hammurabi in 1964 B.C. According to that Code, parental rights did not exist in their own right, but only as they related to the laws of property or inheritance. During the time of Hammurabi's Code, the power of life and death over children was allowed a father. He could also sell his children into slavery, either to pay off debts or merely because a child had displeased him in some way. He could also redeem the child at a later time, if he so chose. He was the only member of the family who could conduct business since he controlled all family wealth (Johnson, 1984).

During that period the father was supreme head of the household. However, just as he had absolute authority, all rights, and power over his children, he was also totally responsible for their conduct in the community. If they incurred debts, he paid them; if they injured someone, he adjudicated the matter. These duties were, for the most part, for the protection of others and not specifically for the protection of the child.

Chronologically between the Code of Hammurabi and Roman Law (which began with the Roman tablets of 485 B.C.) were the Hebrew laws which are contained in the Old Testament (Exodus 20-22).

The origin of Roman law is enigmatic. It may have come to Rome by way of its colonies in Greece, who got it from the Hittites, who in turn had received it by way of Babylonia. Other scholars cite the Cretan Code of Gortyn as a source. However, since Rome had colonies all over the world, its laws

may have had multiple origins. Out of Roman Law came the doctrine of paterfamilias which, with modifications, dominated family law for centuries, and was a characteristic which distinguished English Common Law from American Colonial Law.

Under Roman Law, although fathers still had the power of life and death over children, the law could nevertheless restrict this right, which was perhaps one of the very first intrusions of the State into the domain of family relationships. A father might still be able to kill his own child, but only with the consent of the Tribunal. Primarily, however, Roman Law was concerned with the distribution and inheritance of property as they related to children, rather than with the rights of children per se. But by that time in history, less was left to the whim of the father, and more to a benevolent Court (Johnson, 1984).

In the English Common Law of the 13th Century, for the first time parental rights were treated as an individual part of the law in and of themselves, and not merely as related to property, inheritance, or marriage laws. One specific change in the law in regard to children and their parents is noteworthy. English Common Law added parental duties. Previously only children had had obligations to parents; parents now had obligations toward children--the duties to maintain, educate, and protect their offspring (Blackstone, 1765).

Laws in Colonial America followed fairly directly from English Common Law, and the interference from the State continued to pervade more and more insistently into parental rights, as they had been delineated by earlier laws. At that time the State gave itself the power to work in its own behalf for the common good. Although parents' rights were thus diminished by the State's interventions, children's rights did not necessarily increase immediately.

By the end of the Colonial period in America only four parental rights remained more or less intact from earlier times: (1) the father still had the right to educate the child as he saw fit; (2) he had custody of his children; (3) he had the right to profits from the child's estate; and (4) he had a right to discipline his child as he saw fit. Thus, although the State could and did intercede, the father was still pretty much in total command of his offspring. (Johnson, 1984). He was also exempt from some of his former duties; he was no longer bound by the debts of his son, nor was he obliged to leave an inheritance to his child. Father could now leave everything to a stranger, if he so chose.

Only in this century have children's rights come to the forefront. Actually, even the first law concerning compulsory education for children which came at the time of the Industrial Revolution, grew out of a concern for the common

good of society, rather than from any concern for the "best interest of the child."

Later, restrictions on child labor were framed in terms of the principle that "*the supreme right of the State to the guardianship of children controls the natural rights of the parents when the welfare of society or of the children themselves conflicts with parental rights* (Abbott, 1938; 325; *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 1944).

Finally, both the welfare of society as well as of children themselves was considered. Surprisingly, it was not until 1960 that a full recognition of the rights of children was made with the issuance of a document by the United Nations which has been particularly relevant to the field of domestic law in subsequent years, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1386, XIV, November 20, 1959, Supplemented 1960).

Case Law and the Rights of Parents

The right to conceive and raise children is a fundamental right protected by the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Federal Constitution of the United States (*Stanley v. Illinois*, 1922; *Carmel-by-the-Sea*, 1970). In the United States, the interest of parents in the care, custody and management of their child has been deemed to be a "fundamental liberty" (*Santosky v. Kramer*, 1982). The parents' interest in their child has been deemed an interest deserving greater protection than many other personal interests (*Stanley v. Illinois*, 1970). The critical importance of the right to parent has repeatedly been affirmed by California courts (*In re Carmaleta B.*, 1978; *In re B.G*, 1974; *Stewart v. Stewart*, 1953; *Adoption of D.S.C.*, 1979).

An award of custody to a nonparent, even though temporary, is considered a deprivation of the right to parent (*Perry v. Superior Court*, 1980; *In re Robert D.*, 1984; *Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller*, 1978). In California, the right to parent can only give way upon a showing of parental unfitness which is judged detrimental to the child's welfare (*In re Marriage of Jenkins*, 1981). However, parental unfitness may not be shown by a mere preponderance of the evidence. It must be evidenced by clear and convincing proof (*Santosky v. Kramer*, 1982; see especially Footnote 3 reporting that 15 States, by statute, require "clear and convincing evidence," and 15 States, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, by court decision, require clear and convincing evidence).

Nevertheless, the standard set for allowing visitation rights to a grandparent, or to a person other than a natural or adoptive parent or a grandparent (signifiant other) is a more lenient standard. The courts generally regard "the best

interest of the child" to be the ultimate criterion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated the proposition as follows:

> *"...in a dispute between a parent and a third party including a relative such as a grandparent, the parent has a prima facie right to custody, which will be forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child's best interest will be served by an award to the third party....Since visitation is correlative to custody, a similar test should apply when a third party seeks visitation, athough the burden on the third party should not be so heavy, for an order granting visitation is a far lesser intrusion or assertion of control than is an award of custody" (Com. ex rel. Williams, 1978).*

At the current time at least 17 States in the United States and the District of Columbia recognize the general principle that the right to visit with a child depends upon whether such visitation is in the best interest of the child (*Annotation, Grandparents Visitation Rights*, 90 ALR 3d 222, 232).

WHERE DO GRANDPARENTS FIT IN?

For many years society has invested grandparents with an aura of love and kindliness. Their continuing relationship with their grandchildren has always been with society's approbation. In the last 25 years or so, sociologists and psychologists have discovered what society always knew at an intuitive level, that "*...most children are fond of their grandparents and know they are loved by them...[and]...gain the security for wholesome development*" (*Family Law Quarterly*, 1983).

Today, our peripatetic population, coupled with lessening of family bonds, has resulted in adult children who find grandparent visitation with their own children, an interference. Grandparents, more and more, are turning to the courts and to the legislature in order to preserve access to their grandchildren.

Because of society's traditional view classifying grandparents up there with "apple pie, baseball, and motherhood," their efforts are meeting with success. No one seems willing to speak out against them. But from a legal point of view, it must be noted that grandparents have no legal rights to visit their grandchildren, <u>other than those rights which derive from the rights of children themselves.</u>

Children's rights include, among others, the right to be loved and cared for, the right to be socialized into the culture, and the right to continuity and stability with

regard to family environment. With divorce rates now at an all-time high, it would appear that, more than ever before, grandparents are desperately needed to assure certain basic rights of children. The grandparent's right to visit their grandchildren and thereby to infringe upon the rights of parents to parent, however, rests purely upon the issue of whether grandparent visitation is indeed "in the best interest of the child." Having laws on the books that recognize that significant relationships do exist between grandparents and grandchildren is an important and necessary first step, but they are no guarantor that the grandparents will be permitted to visit the grandchild. What are some of these laws which have grown out of current social policy?

STATUTORY BASIS FOR GRANDPARENT VISITATION

Currently 42 States within the United States permit some form of grandparent visitation (*Family Law Quarterly*, 1983). In California, a specific section of the Civil Code (197.5) awards visitation to grandparents where the grandparent's child (the natural parent of the child) is deceased. Thus, mandated visitation is possible with the child of a deceased child; the application of this statute, however, has usually been applied strictly to that particular situation and that situation alone.

In England, the court appears to have power to grant access (visitation) to anyone; for example, a grandparent, under the Matrimonial Causes Act, Sections 42(1) and 52(1) (Bromley, 1976).

A section of California's Civil Code (Section 4351.5), until its recent amendment, permitted visitation with a child by a stepparent, but this visitation had to be judged to be in the best interest of the child. There have been no cases decided in California under this Code Section which involve visitation by a stepparent. Prior to being amended, this particular section of the Civil Code made no reference to "grandparents." There are those who would conclude that since the statute omitted the issue of visitation rights for grandparents, the law never intended grandparental visitation to be available in the first place. (See *In re Marriage of Jenkins* (1981), which held the court lacked jurisdiction to award visitation to grandparents under this section as it existed prior to the amendment, effective January 1, 1984.)

As stated previously, California Civil Code 4351.5 permitted visitation with the child by a stepparent. The recent Amendment to that Code (AB 300, 1983) provides that grandparents, upon application to the Court, are entitled to reasonable visitation rights. It also provides, however, that where both parents of a child oppose grandparent visitation rights, there is a *presumption that visitation is not in the best interest of the child.* Until recently California courts have been antagonistic to grandparent rights; that now

appears to be changing.

Some courts have considered the existence of great animosity between the custodial parent and the grandparents to be sufficient to demonstrate that it would not be in the best interest of the child to visit with the grandparents (*Goodwin v. Goodwin*, 1963). Others rely upon the concept that visitation, in fact, is a division of custody and the parents have the paramount right to sole custody unless forfeited by conduct rendering them "unfit." Absent proof of unfitness, the parents do not forfeit the custodial rights so as to permit visitation by grandparents (*Ex parte People ex rel. Cox*, 1953).

In a case involving foster parents (significant other) who had raised a child for four and one-half of its five years, the court reversed the lower court's grant of visitation by invoking the general principal that while the State can modify or even abrogate a parent's rights to raise their child under exigent circumstances, the parents' perogative of freedom of choice in matters of family life should be maintained or restored unless there is strong reason for interference (*Re M*, 1979. Note also the quote from *Com. ex rel. Williams v. Miller*, 1978, above).

The view of the majority of the States, though, is that a determination that grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the child is sufficient (*In re Robert D.*, 1984). In the case of *Sparks v. Wigglesworth* (1979), a Kentucky court granted visitation rights to the paternal grandparents as a way of continuing the child's relationship with the father who was on active duty overseas. These grandparental rights were continued even over the natural mother's protest after the father returned and would have nothing further to do with the child. The court decided the grandparents had not conspired with the father to avoid his parental obligations and the grandparents had given the child excellent care during her previous visits.

A serious problem this kind of situation raises for the courts is the difficulty in determining what limits should be fixed on such visitation when the natural parent has strenuous objections, and where the emotional toll on the child could outweigh any benefits derived from the visitation with the grandparents.

The English rule also appears to be the same; i.e., the welfare of the child is to be regarded as the first and paramount consideration whether the dispute over visitation is between the parents or between one or both parents and a stranger (*J. v. C.*, 1969; Bromley, 1976).

BENEFITS DERIVED FROM GRANDPARENT VISITATION/CUSTODY

There are a number of court decisions which point to the

benefits derived from grandparent visitation or custody as the basis for the courts' decisions.

The one single fact of most importance in swaying the courts in grandparents' favor is whether or not they have been custodians of the child after the death or separation of the child's natural parents and for how long a period. For example, see *In re Robert D* (1984).

Illustrative, although not precisely on point, is the case of *In re Geoffrey G.* (1979). The child was taken into custody by the maternal grandparents after the father proved himself unfit because he had strangled the mother. Because Geoffrey was subsequently judged by the court to be in a loving environment and flourishing "*as a well-adjusted, happy child*," he was allowed to remain with his grandparents who were permitted to adopt him.

Another factor courts have considered to be of importance occurs where grandparents occupy such an important place in the life of the child, that emotional harm may occur upon a sudden severing of the close ties of love and affection (*Benner v. Benner*, 1952; *Bookstein v. Bookstein*, 1970).

Still another factor considered by the courts in making a decision is continuity and stability in a child's environment, which occurred in the case of *In re Adoption of Tachick* (1973), a decision by a Wisconsin court. In that case, not a visitation case, the paternal grandparents had taken care of the child since birth. The Trial Court denied the petition for adoption by the grandparents, citing several reasons based on the traditionally accepted rights to parent. Later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's decision, emphasizing the importance of continuity and stability in the child's environment.

California case law has been firm in holding the right to parent can only give way upon a showing of parental unfitness detrimental to the child's welfare. Parental unfitness, moreover, may not be shown by a mere preponderance of the evidence; it must be evidenced by clear and convincing proof (*In re Carmaleta B.*, 1982; *Santosky v. Kramer*, 1982). Also, where the other natural parent of the child is alive, California Civil Code 197.5 awarding visitation does not apply; California Civil Code Section 4351.5 as recently amended to allow stepparent and grandparent visitation does apply.

Regardless of California's previous firm adherence to parental rights, the recent case of *In re Robert D.* (1984), seems to indicate the court views "visitation" as not equated with "custody." The view of the court appears to be that a simple finding that the best interest of the child will be served by an order of visitation is sufficient.

It has been shown that over 80 percent of the elderly in the United States see their children on a weekly, sometimes daily basis, and generally live within easy distance of each other (Hendricks & Hendricks, 1981). Thus grandparents appear to be in a unique position to provide continuity and stability to the family structure, considering today's high divorce rate. When an award of visitation to grandparents is to be decided, in addition to the issues of unfitness of natural parents, and continuity and stability of environment, other variables often considered by the courts are:

. *AGE OF GRANDPARENTS:* Are they advanced in years so their own deaths may soon create more loss for the child?

. *HEALTH OF GRANDPARENTS:* Is there a history of health problems that might prevent them from carrying out their parental duties?

. *HISTORY OF THE GRANDPARENTS' OWN CHILDREN:* What kind of people did the grandparents raise? Are they educated? Have any been in trouble with the authorities? Etc.

. *EMOTIONAL CLIMATE:* Can the grandparents provide a setting that is stable and psychologically healthy for the child? (Anderson, 1983).

Grandparents must realize they have no assured legal rights to their grandchildren, and only by the grace of the legislature and the courts will they have visitation if that becomes an issue. Having laws on the books that recognize the significant relationships which may exist between grandparents and grandchildren is an important and necessary first step. But even where the law recognizes these relationships, it is still no guarantee that visitation for grandparents will always be granted. The touchstone to which the courts always turn is, "*Is such visitation in the best interest of the child.*"

If grandparents have established meaningful relationships with their grandchildren and keep communication channels open with their own children, if grandparents are reasonable, pleasant people, who strive to be nonjudgmental even amid the turmoil of dissolution proceedings, and make sincere efforts at not alienating others in general, their chances of gaining rights in visitation proceedings become more viable, even without the intervention of the legal process (Anderson, 1983).

Grandparents, parents, and the courts must recognize that the role grandparents play in the family system can be significant, either positively or detrimentally, and, probably most often, a little of both. The choices grandparents make will affect the entire family system. Grandparents can be instrumental in the success or failure of

their child's single parenting, post-divorce life, and eventual remarriage. Grandparents are capable of putting a wedge between the husband and wife (Kalish & Visher, 1982).

However, to maintain perspective, we should note that one study of grandmother's perceptions following their child's divorce found only ten percent reporting a substantial negative change in number of contacts with their grandchildren; a similar percentage reported a negative change in their relationship with their grandchildren. The majority reported their relationship with their granchildren had not been changed by their child's divorce; and of those identifying changes in their relationships, roughly one-half reported positive changes (Ahrons & Bowman, 1982).

CONCLUSION

The State is increasingly intervening in family relationships; e.g., compulsory education, child labor laws, child discipline as related to current report requirements in instances of child abuse and neglect, and now mandated visitation for significant others. Despite the examples of decisions in favor of grandparents presented in this paper, custody or mandated visitation to grandparents continues to be the exception rather than the rule in most contested court cases. Issues which were once only moral or social concerns have become legal issues. No longer is it "*all in the family.*"

Will Little Red Ridinghood get to visit Grandma? Possibly not, if her natural parent objects, but the jury is still out.

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Aging and social policies in Japan

by FUMIE KUMAGAI

In an analysis of the cohort data of the Japanese, American and Canadian family cycle over the last century, Kumagai (1984) notes a dramatic change of the Japanese population especially after World War II. With the modernization of society, various changes in life styles of the Japanese people also emerged. And, overall pattern of the family career of the Japanese woman today has a close affinity to their American as well as to their Canadian counterparts.

This paper discussed three major characteristics concerning the changing pattern of the elderly population in Japan. They are aging of the Japanese population, extension of life of the Japanese, and aging of the elderly population. These new trends in the Japanese population, in turn resulted in the emergence of various problems of the elderly today.

The problem of aging in Japan is so pressing that effective policies must be proposed immediately. A policy direction suggested in the present paper to reduce the age pressure in Japan is to modify the age-group classification method. More specifically, it is recommended to shift the concept of working age group from the present practice of 15-64 to the newly categorized group of 20-69.

Social policies for the elderly, however, should consider four basic needs of each individual. That is, need for social interaction, financial assistrance, health services, and housing assistance. Furthermore, each of these policy programs should be based on the four principles for social policy development: the importance of relying on the community; programs in harmony with the traditional institutions of society; policies should be sensitive to the diverse needs of different age groups and they must be orchestrated harmoniously; and the central importance of humanistic concerns as the guiding force in confronting the challenges of aging.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely known that reverence toward the elderly has been a distinctive characteristics of China and Japan. This traditional attitude toward aging is probably derived from the common philosophical background of Confucianism. That is, Confucianism has promoted the position of the old man in both societies, and older people have been accorded mumch respect by younger generations.

Recently, however, the elderly in Japan have lost their power in society as well as in the family. In an analysis of the cohort data of the Japanese, American, and Canadian family cycle over the last century, Kumagai (1984) naotes a dramatic change of the Japanese population especially after World War II. The modernization of Japanese society resulted in the maturation of social, economic, and cultural development on one hand. On the other hand, various changes in life styles of the Japanese people emerged. And, the overall pattern of the family career of the Japanese woman today has a close affinity to their American as well as to their Canadian counterparts. Kumagai emphasizes the fact that the two most important factors which contributed to the changes in the Japanese family cycle are the extension of life, and rather dramatic drop in fertility (Kumagai, 1982; 1984).

CHANGING PATTERN OF THE ELDERLY POPULATION IN JAPAN

1. Aging of the Japanese Population:

The Japanese population has been aging due to the decline in both birth rates and death rates. In 1982, the proportion of older people 65 and over to the total population was 9.6 percent (Health & Welfare Statistics Association:HWSA, 1983a; 1983b). It has been projected that by

the year 2000 it will increase to 15.6 percent, and that in the year 2020 the Japanese elderly population will hit its peak of 21.8 percent. The dependency ratio of the elderly population, which indicates how many older people depend on 100 members of the working age population, was 13.5 in 1980, and will increased to 23.3 and 35.5 in 2000 and 2020 respectively (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 about here

Although the proportion of the elderly in Japan today is moderately above the world average (9.6 percent vs. 6.0 percent of the world average) the rate of increase is remarkable and rapid. In fact, it will take only 30 years for the older population to double from 5 percent to 10 percent in Japan (about 1955-1985) as opposed to 150 years in France (1790-1940), 120 years in Canada (1890-2010), 100 years in Italy (1865-1965) and in Australia (1925-2025), 90 years in Sweden (1855-1945) 65 years in the FRG (1890-1955), 50 years in the U.S.A. (1925-1975), in Greece (1915-1965), in the GDR (1890-1940), and in the USSR (1930-1980), and 40 years in the U.K. (1910-1950). From these statistics it is apparent that the process of aging in Japan will be more rapid than any other nation in the world has ever experienced. Therefore, it is correct to state that no country will be able to offer an appropriate model for the Japanese in preparing for her serious problems of aging which she will confront in the very near future.

2. Extension of Life of the Japanese:

Figure 2 about here

The life expectancy at birth of both Japanese men and women are one of the highest in the world today. It is true that the life of the Japanese has been extended continuously ever since the turn of the century except during the war-time (see Figure 2). At the turn of the century, when the census data on this item became available in Japan for the first time, both men and women were expected to live about the same length of

time (male: 44.26 years vs. female: 44.25 years). Since then, however, the Japanese women have begun to live longer than men, and today the difference between the sexes is approximately 5.4 years.

In 1950 the life expectancy at birth of the Japanese men and women were 57.91 and 61.13, and it increased to 74.22 for men and 79.66 for women in 1982 (HWSA, 1983a:89). During the first 50 years of the 20th century, the life expectancy of the Japanese increased 13.65 years for men and 16.88 years for women. During the next 30 years it increased 15.64 years for men and 17.84 years for women. The rates of increase from 1950 to 1955 were so remarkable (5.72 years for men and 6.63 years for women) that these five years were almost equivalent to the half of the increase rate during the entire period of the firstr 30 years.

Figure 3 about here

Thus, it must be said that one of the most significant influences on the family life and marital relationships of the Japanese people today is the extension of life. As a consequence, various changes in the timing of the events in a family life cycle, women in particular, have been affected (Kumagai, 1984). (See Figure 3 which has been adopted from Figure 1 in Kumagai, 1984.)

3. Aging of the Elderly Population:

Another demographic characteristic concerning older persons in Japan comes from the fact that the elderly population has constantly been gaining age, mainly because of the rising life expectancy of the Japanese people. At the same time, it is also important to keep in mind that the age structure of the elderly population is affected by the sex differences. It has always been true that the proportions of the elderly men in "the younger old" groups are greater than their women counterparts.1/

However, the older old groups tend to be over represented with women.2/ Although more elderly men live longer today, it is still true

that the higher the age of the elderly, the greater the proportion of the elderly women. Not only will there be more elderly women in Japan, but they are likely to be older than elderly Japanese men. This fact indicates that the impact of aging in general is more severe upon women than men. Therefore, elderly women are more likely to face the various problems inherent in aging.3/

PROBLEMS OF THE JAPANESE ELDERLY

1. Marital Status of the Japanese Elderly:

Table 1 about here

Since the turn of the century there has been a consistent shift in the marital status of the Japanese elderly (see Table 1). The proportion of married elderly men has increased significantly, and elderly Japanese, both male and female, are now more likely to be married. This pattern holds true for both sexes. Marital status, however, differs sharply between the sexes. Almost twice as many men as women in the age group 65 to 74 in 1980 were married and four times as many in the elder group. In 1980 approximately 7 out of every 10 Japanese men over 75 were married compared to only two of every 10 women of the same age.4/

Aothough the proportions of the elderly women who are married has been increasing over time, the majority of the elderly women in Japan fall into the widowed/divorced category. This in turn poses significant problems for them in their daily lives, especially with regard to financial matters and living arrangements.

It is commonly known that the amount of the pensions, social security, and other retirement benefits which the elderly receive is not sufficient for them to live on, especially for the widows who receive benefits only indirectly after the death of spouses, i.e. the survivor's benefit. Usually it is not possible for a widow to maintain her own household if she has never held a full-time job and is not qualified to receive any sort of retirement pension from her work. Therefore, it

becomes an acute necessity for many of the Japanese elderly widows to adopt the coresidence housing arrangement.

2. Living Arrangements of the Japanese Elderly:

The coresidence rate, by which is meant the proportion of the elderly over 65 who reside with their children and/or other relatives, has always been high in modern Japan compared to that of the Western societies,5/ mainly due to the traditional values accorded to the family and household in Japan. Although the rate has been declining over time, the majority of elderly over 65 (i.e., more than 7 out of every 10 elderly person in Japan) still adopt coresidence housing arrangements (see Table 2). The decrease in the coresidnece rate resulted in the increase both in the proportioan of the elderly who live alone and of those who live with spouse only. The rate of increase from 1960 to 1980, however, is slightly more significant for the latter type of the household (elderly couple only: 26.8%) than the former type (elderly living alone: 22.6%).

It should be noted that the coresidnece rate of elderly women has always been higher than that of men. This is mainly due to the fact that the women live longer than men and that they tend to marry men older than them. As was discussed earlier, the older the elderly woman, the greater the likelihood of her being a widow. Of the coresiding elderly, 84 percent reside with the son's family, whereas only 13 percent do so with the daughter's family (Economic Planning Agency, 1983). Therefore, the most common type of intergenerational conflict in the Japanese household today is expected to occur between yome (a son's wife) and shutome (a son's mother). The nature of this type of intergenarational conflict in Japan was discussed elsewhere by the author (Kumagai, 1982).

3. Health and Adjustment to Aging of the Japanese Elderly:

Health is one of the most significant factors to affec a person's satisfaction with life. This is especially true for the elderly

in the later years of life cycle stage. In fact, it has been asserted that health is the major factor in determining an elderly person's satisfaction with life (Mancini, 1978).

The importance of the health of an older person is not limited to that individual alone, for it has a direct impact on the family. This is especially true in the case of the Japanese elderly. As we have seen earlier, the proportion of the elderly not in households is practically nill (0.14% in 1981), and most of the elderly in ill-health are confined to their house or bed at home. Furthermore, the majority of the people who take care of the elderly in ill-health are women (86.9%). Of these women 37.0 percent are daughter-in-laws, 24.7 percent elderly wives, and 17.8 percent daughters (Prime Minister's Office, 1980:107). These statistics incidate that the major source of help for the elderly in ill-health is the family.

Another problem related to health and adjustment to old age of the Japanese elderly is the high rate of suicide, especially of the elderly women. Although the suicide rate of the elderly group over 65 is not the highest in Japan (5-14 years of age group: 1.0%, 15-24:12%, 25-44:36%, 45-64:27%, 65 and over:24% of the total suicide incidents; Japanese Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, 1982), the suicide rate per 10,000 elderly population was 46.0 in 1979. According to the World Health Statistics, the suicide rate of the Japanese elderly 75 and over in 1978 was 75.4 for men and ranked at the 5th from the top highest, and was 64.3 for women, the second highest rate in the world (HWSA, 1983a:68).

Older people's satisfaction with life depends on primarily two factors: the individual's confidence about ability to adjust to various changes in life cycle, and his capacity to cope with the changes as an individual. And, therefore, failure to adjust to aging can lead to depression, which in turn results in a high rate of suicide amaong the

elderly.

4. Labor Force Participation of the Elderly in Japan:

Table 2 about here

It has been normatively implied that the Japanese elderly are accorded higher status in society than those of the Western societies. Scholars, however, give opposing interpretations. For example, some point out the negative aspects of the life of the elderly in Japanese society (Plath, 1972), and others emphasize on the positive sides of the identical phenomenon (Palmore, 1975). The rate of participation in the labor force of the aged population could be interpreted as evidence for the recognition of social status of the elderly on one hand, however, it is more likely that these rates reflect the financial needs of the elderly.

The proportion of the Japanese elderly over 65 who are in the labor force is considerably higher than other industrialized nations (see Table 2). This pattern holds for both sexes. Even though the rates have been declining over time, 4 out of every 10 men and 3 out of every 20 women over 65 were in the labor force in 1980.6/

One possible reason for this high rate of labor force participation of the Japanese elderly would be that a significantly high proportion of the people 55 and over are either self-employed, work on the family farm, or engaged in the family business. According to the recent report on aging in Japan, of the working population of 55 and over in 1981, 33.4 percent were self-employed, 17.1 percent were engaged in the family farm or in the family business, and the remaining 49.5 percent were employed workers (Office for Aging, 1982). Those who are self-employed or engaged in the family business do not practice the so-called retirement system, and they can continue to work as long as they are willing and able.

Another reason for this high rate of labor force participation of older people in Japan would be that these elderly possess a strong

motivation. Not only do they feel the necessity to acquire economic means, but also the Japanese elderly seek for a sense of purpose in life (ikigai) and personal satisfaction in their work. In fact, a greater proportion of the Japanese, men in particular, wish to continue to work as late as possible in their life cycle. When older persons 60 and over were asked as to the ideal timing for retirement, 28.3 percent answered at age about 65 (33.6% for men, and 16.1% for women), 23.1 percent about 70 (30.5% for men, and 16.1% for women), and 18.8 percent about 60 (14.3% for men, and 23.1% for women) (Office of Aging, 1982:24). The idea of early retirement is practically unheard of in Japan.

A POLICY DIRECTION FOR THE JAPANESE ELDERLY

Now that we have examined the present status as well as the future outlook for older persons in Japanese society through several aspects, it would be appropriate to consider some possible measures to alleviate their problems. The problems are so diverse and we have to investigate into economic, social, and political avenues coherently. At the same time, we must take a realistic approach toward a new pattern of age relations. That is, according to Binstock, "we must recognize and emphasize the diversity of older persons and the life cycle contexts in which each of us is shaped for old age" (Binstock, 1983).

It is true that no nation in the world has ever established a perfect social policy for older persons. Japan is no exception. Social policy on aging in Japan is still in its infancy. Until recently aging has not been regarded as serious problem in Japanese society. Moreover, the traditional nature of Japanese society including group-orientation, hierarchical-vertical structure, and seniority-based ranking system has discouraged the intervention of the state in family policy. The government, by failing to take the lead in providing for social welfare, has encouraged private organizations to establish their own welfare programs for employees. This private system of welfare has, in turn,

reinforced traditional values of group cohesiveness and loyalty to the organization among employees, and it has been a strong force for Japan's economic success.

As is always the case with social and family policies, a variety of programs are needed to meet a diversity of needs. It is necessary to identify accurately the needs of the elderly in Japan, so that appropriate policies may be formulated. The demographic approach to the family life cycle provides a theoretical framework which offers a more realistic picture of the nature of the Japanese elderly than the treatment of the aged as an aggregate. The social services appropriate to the individual will vary with his stage of aging as well as with his needs as an individual.

Most elderly, however, face with the same four basic problems: social limitations or the need for social interaction; financial problem or the need for financial assistance; health problem or the need for health services; and housing problem or the need for housing assistance. Of these four basic problems inflicting upon the Japanese elderly, let us focus our present discussion primarily on the need for financial assistance.

In Japan there is no nation-wide fixed mandatory retirement age. The retirement age varies from one organization to the other. Since retirement age for the governmental employees has been set at 55 years old for more than half a century, most organizations normally set retirement at age 60. The retirement age of 55-60 was acceptable fifty years ago when the life expectancy of both Japanese men and women was below 50. However, it is not appropriate today when their lives have been prolonged considerably. Moreover, the pensionable age in Japan is 60 for men and 55 for women. Thus, the majority of the Japanese, especially men, are obliged to work at another job after their first retirement. Jobs after first retirement usually offer a much lower income and lower social status

than the first jobs.

As a consequence, a considerably haigh proportiona of the Japanese over 60, especially men, is in the labor market (see Table 2). There are three reasons for this high rate of labor force participation. First and most important is the fact that the Japanese elderly are financially obliged to continue to work. Usually, pensions are not sufficient for the elderly to live on. Second, among the Japanese elderly there exists a high motivation to work, and the early retirement option is not yet widely practiced in Japan.7/ Third, jobs suitable for older persons are available. Although the amount of income will be reduced, it is most likely that the new jaobs are not demanding for the elderly. Therefore, the elderly can continue to work without experiencing much frustration.

One way to alleviate the financial problem of the elderly in Japan would be to extend the retirement age of the governmental employees from the current 55 to 60 as has been discussed recently among concerned officials and the public in general. Should this proposal be put into effect, private corporations will follow governmental practice and will extend their retirement age from 60 to 65 or so.

In light of the rapid progress of aging in Japan, and especially of the prolonged life expectancy of the Japanese, it may not be sufficient to extend the retirement age to 60 for the governmental employees and to 65 for the others, but it would help to alleviate the financial plight of the elderly. Another possibility would be to establish special job programs for those 60 and over depending on the abilities and capabilities of the individual.

It would not be desirable, however, to extend the retirement age beyond the level which has been discussed above. Retirement at the age of 60 to 65 means that young people who enter the job market will continue to have appropriate job opportunities. Jobs for the younger generations

should be offered on full-time basis, but on part-time basis where necessary for the older population. The valuable talents of the elderly should not be wasted. Appropriate programs should be established to make the best use of their talents at such places as the government subsidized institutions and foster-homes.

As it has been discussed by Kuroda (1983), it might be better for us to modify the standard method of classifying the population into the three age groups. That is, to change from the current three age groups of 0-14, 15-64, and 65 and over to the newly calculated ones of 0-19, 20-69, and 70 and over.

Reasons for expanding the age span of the dependency ratio of the child population from 0-14 to 0-19 are twofold. Firstly, the recent census survey in 1980 revealed that 97 percent of junior high school graduates advance to senior high school (Japanese Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, 1982). Of all the high school garaduates 37 percent enter accredited higher educational institutions including junior colleges, and a significantly large proportion enrolls in the so-called vocational schools, similar to jinior colleges but non-accredited. Therefore, it would be realistic to consider the working age for the case of the Japanese population to be over 20. Secondly, the entrance to adulthood in Japan is legally at age 20. And, it is true that the majority of the Japanese people of 15-19 age group is still dependent on their parents financially and psychologically.

The age span of the dependency ratio of the elderly population, on the other hand, be reclassified as 70 and over instead of the conventional age grade classification of 65 and over. Firstly, as has been discussed earlier a greater proportion of the older Japanese, men in particular, are in the labor force (Table 2). When older persons are further brokendown, it is found that a strikingly high proportion of the 70-74 age group of the Japanese men, i.e., 64.5 percent, are still in the

labor force (Japanese Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, 1982). And, therefore, it would be appropriate to extend the working age by 5 years, that is from current 64 to 69. Secondly, the longevity revolution in industrial societies has been progressing steadily, and Japan is not an exception. In fact, the Japanese are one of the peoples in the world who live longest today. Furthermore, it is a national character of the Japanese to desire to work as long as possible.

The proposal to increase the working age by 5 years for the purpose of dependency ratio calculation does not necessasrily conflict with the earlier suggestion to increase the retirement age to 65, but not beymond that age. Altering the retirement age for older persons to 65 does not mean that everyone must stop working at the age of 65. Instead, it suggests that older persons can be employed full-time until the age of 65. Beyond that age job opportunities on the part-time basis should be extended to those who desire to engage in the paid work. It is true that their income level will be reduced when these older persons take part-time jobs. It would be possible, however, to compensate this reduction in income with pensions that older persons are entitled to collect in full amount when they retire from their full-time jobs at the age of 65.

The policy direction to alter the working age group from 15-64 to 20-69 suggests that we modify our concept about the onset of aging to the age of 70 rather than the current practice of 65. This policy direction does not suggest any radical modification, but indicates that we respect later years in our life as well as to recognize eternal human resources of older persons.

CONCLUSION

The problem of aging in Japan is so pressing that effective policies must be proposed immediately. Although it is easy to suggest possible solutions for this problem, they will not be easily implemented. Such social programs should attempt to meet the needs of the individual,

such as social interaction, financial assistance, health services, and housing assistance. And, it would be most appropriate to conclude the present discussion on the Japanese elderly and social policies by referring to the four principles for social policy development proposed by instock (1983).

A first principle is the importance of relying on the community--its social structure, its values and culture--as natural resources for the development of programs. A second principle is the need to design demonstration, experimental, and model programs in a fashion that is in harmony with the traditional institutions of society. A third principle is the need to undertake programs that are sensitive to the diverse needs of different age groups, and to orchestrate them harmoniously. And, a final principle is the central importance of humanistic concerns as the guiding force in confronting the challenges of aging.

It is encouraging to note, however, that there is some hope for the future of the elderly in Japan. They are still blessed with the Confucian ideology of respect for the elderly, and the social influence of the elderly has persisted. The traditional virtue of filial piety should be cultivated among the young. It is hoped that the recognition for the above-mentioned social policy direction and principles for older persons will bring about positive attitudes toward the issue of aging in Japan.

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1890, of the total population of elderly men 47.84 percent were in 65-69 age group as opposed to 42.41 percent of the elderly women, and 24.39 percent vs. 28.76 percent for the 70-74 age group. As time progresses this difference becomes more prominent. For example, those proportions in 1980 were 38.74% vs. 36.14% for the 65-69 years of age group, and 29.32% vs. 27.53% for the 70-74 group respectively. By the year 2075 these proportions will be 28.64% vs. 24.38% for the former age group, and 27.38% vs. 24.75% for the latter group.

2. Changes over time in the elderly population of 85 and over from 1890-1980-2075, for example, are 1.50%-3.93%-9.97% of the total elderly men compared to 5.09%-5.93%-15.22% of their women counterparts.

3. Concerning the age and sex distribution of the elderly population similar characteristics are found in the American data. The proportions of the total elderly women are always larger than those of men (59.0% for females vs. 41.0% for males in 1975 and 60.4% vs. 39.6% in 1995). In addition, the proportions of the elderly 85 and over are higher for women than for men (9.3% of the total elderly women vs. 6.5% of the total elderly men in 1975 and 6.7% vs. 11.3% in 1995) (Moroney, 1980:59).

4. Overall characteristics of the marital status of the American elderly for both sexes are similar to the Japanese case. However, the proportion of the American elderly women who are married is higher than for their Japanese counterparts. In 1975, of American elderly men in the age group 65 to 74, 83.9 percent were married, and of those older than 75, 70.0 apercent were married. Among women, 49.0 percent of the younger group and 23.4 percent of the older group were married (Moroney, 1980:60).

5. A classic study on the elderly in three industrialized societies conducted by Shanas and her associates reports that the coresidence rates in 1965 in Denmark, the USA, and the UK were 21%, 32%, and 41% respectively (Shanas, et al., 1968:151-158). The statistics for the

elderly individuals living alone in these three societies were 28%, 22%, and 22%, and for the elderly couples living alone with spouse present were 45%, 43%, and 33% respectively. More recent statistics on the coresidence rates of the American elderly reveal that in 1979 only 9.8 percent of the men and 21.9 percent of the women lived with someone other than their spouses, most commonly with their children (Statistical Abstract, 1980:34).

6. Statistics for the American counterparts are as follows: Proporftions of the elderly over 65 employed in 1960-1979-1981 were 30.9%-19.0%-18.5% for males and 9.9%-8.3%-8.1% for females (Statistical Abstract, 1980:34; US News & World Report, 1982; 1984). Figures for the proportions of the elderly men over 65 in the labor force in various industrialized countries about a decade ago are as follows: France (1968):19.3%; Italy (1971):13.4%; Canada (1961):28.5%; the Netherlands (1971):13.1%; Sweden (1970):15.2%; UK (1971):15.8%; USA (1970):24.8%; FRG (1973):15.1% (Maeda, 1978:55).

7. Although the mandatory retirement age in the United States was set at 70 in 1978, the normal retirement age is 62 to 65 at most organizations, and the prevailing trend is still toward early retirement. The majaor factors which contribute to this trend are: attractive fringe benefits, career frustrations, tiring work, high rate of unemployment, and poor health (US News & World Report, 19822; 1984).

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Patterns of Polish families and their determinants: continuity and change

by RENATA SIEMIENSKA

Polish society has often been at the centre of the stormy events sweeping Europe in the 20th century. So, the five generations making up contemporary Polish society have amassed many and quite different experiences.

Between the two world wars Poland was a predominantly agricultural country. For example in 1938 72.6 per cent of the population lived in the countryside which was greatly overpopulated and only 27.4 per cent in towns.

In cultural terms two traditions predominated and moulded the most common personality anf family patterns: the class tradition of the workers, peasants and the gentry and the Roman Catholic Church tradition. Roman Catholicism has had a special place in the cultural and psychological make-up of the Poles.

The unique economic and political history has, in the past, prompted particular classes and strata to view the role of the woman and family differently, even though her actual social place had common elements throughtout of Polish society.

First of all, women were the housewives and mothers, charged with looking after the home and children. However, among the landed gentry, women were also responsible for the patriotic upbringing of the younger generation and often ran the estate alone while their husbands and brothers went off to fight and very often die in uprisings against the occupational forces (Prussian, Austrian and Russian) or were exiled by them as often happened during the 19th century.

Among the peasants, women did a lot of the farm work, being resposible for its traditionally "female" areas. Young women often left the countryside to take up work in the city, primarily as household help as few jobs could be found for them in the underdeveloped industry.

Many working-class women jointed their husbands and brothers as workers in the industrial sectors. In 1931, 33.6 per cent of all workers were women.

Following World War II, under the country's new political and economic system, the landed gentry and the bourgeoisie lost their predominant position in national life. In the 1950's, rapid industrialization and urbanization, modelled on the Soviet pattern, were initiated, leading to large-scale migration to the towns from rural areas. Between 1950 and 1970,-the urban population increased by 9J per cent while the rural population showed negligible growth.

Poland's new socio-economic system offered and offers by virtue of its considerable centralization - greater opportunities for manipulating society than other systems do. With economic planning and decision-making concentrated at the top, there are and were many possible ways for directly influencing the extent of men's and women's participation in different spheres of social life and in consequence - patterns of family.

Centralization permits:

-the creating of employment opportunities for men and women;
-the determining of the pay structure in the predominant public sector,
-the creating of amenities and services to help the working women including care and education for children,
-the providing educational opportunities for women and
-the creating of stereotyped images of women and propagation of them through mass media etc.

The spheres of life listed above operate in a manner predetermined by the functions assigned to them. Although it is true that their subordination to those functions is not complete and some factors modify their realization.

As in other Easteuropean socialist countries, sex equality has been invested in Poland's post -World War II social and economic system with both its political and ideological significances. However , the women's real status in society differs from that of the men.

The succesive crises of 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980 marked the turning points of Poland's post-war history, leaving imprints of varying depth on the nation's political, economic and social life and affecting status of family, women's status and approaches to their role in social life in various ways. Below, we will deal with effects these. In describing the family, its situation a couple of aspects have to be considered: the legal status of family (spouses, children), services which have to help family, dissiminated patterns of family in mass media and real patterns of family and their perception by members of society.

LEGAL STATUS OF FAMILY

Marriageable age. The legal marriageable age is 18 years for women and 21 years for men.

Property Rights and Division Between Spouses. A common property system operates in Poland so that when two people get married, they own their combined properties jointly. Property not covered by this system is owned separately by the each spouse. Such a system also covers property acquired in the course of married life by either spouse and by them jointly.

Individual separate property of each spouse includes:

- property acquired before marriage;
- property received as a legacy;
- objects serving solely the spouse's personal needs;
- instruments or tools used by a spouse in his/her job, if they were bought out of the separate property of the spouse performing the job;
- objects received as damages for bodily harms;
- objects or funds received as reward for a spouse's personal achievement;
- royalties received as an artist or inventor.

Common household furnishings or appliances used by both spouses are common property, also when received as a legacy, inhe

ritance or gift, unless the devisor or donor specifies otherwise. Both spouses share equally in common property. In estimating the contribution each spouse has made in bringing up the children or in keeping the house (Family and Guardianship Code, Articles 31, 33,35, 43).

Support Obligations of Family Members. Earnings for work or other funds due to one spouse can be partly or wholly transfered, by a court order, to the other spouse if the former neglects his/her financial support obligations (article 28). This order remains in force even if spouses become separated or divorced at any time after it is issued. However, a judge may, on the appeal of one of the spouses, change or lift the order. So, the spouses have financial support obligations to each other, as well as to their children and if need be their parents (Article 87). Working children living with their parents should contribute to the cost of running the household (Article 91).

Residence. Because of a chronic housing shortage, it is stated that spouses should live together. Permission for a family to have two separate homes is granted only in exceptional cases.

Separation and Divorce. Each spouse may file for divorce. Even despite a complete and lasting breakdown of the marriage, divorce is inadmissible if it proves harmful to the interests of the spouses' common children under age or if it should run counter to the norms of social life.Under the law, divorce is granted only if both spouses seek on the grounds of a incompatibility. In some cases divorces can be granted as a result of one spouses request if the norms of social life demand it.

When dissolving a marriage the court also rules which spouse is at fault. However, it may refrain from doing so if both spouses so desire.

The court rules on which of the spouses will have custody of their common children under age and determines the contribution each spouse should make to the upkeep and education of the child-

ren. In ruling on the rights to the apartment, the court is guided primarily by the interests of the children and the spouse who is given custody of them.

The court may at the request of either spouse, rule on the division of their common property as long as the actual distribution of property will not unduly delay the proceedings.

Within three months of the granting of the divorce decree, the spouse who changed his/her name on entering matrimony may return to his/her old name.

In the case of equal responsibility for the dissolution of the marriage , the spouse who suffers want may demand that the other spouse support him/her to the extent of the resources available and his/her needs.

If one of the spouses is declared fully responsible for the breakup of the marriage and the divorce involves the substantial impoverishment of the spouse who was not at fault, the court may, if asked by the latter, rule that the former contribute to the justified needs ofthe other spouse even though he/she may not be destitute.

The obligation to support the divorced spouse expires when the latter married again. However,it also expires five years after divorce if the spouse who provides support was not at fault, unless the court extends that period because of special circumstances and at the request of the other spouse (Articles 56-60).

Illegitimate children are equally entitled to support by their parents as legitimate ones. After divorce, custody of children is most frequently given to mothers.

SERVICES AND PUBLIC SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR FAMILY

Day Care Facilities for Children. Care for preschoolers is provided by creches (for children under 3 years of age) and kindergartens (for children of 3 to 6 years of age).

Many créches were built in Poland in the post-war years, with their number growing fastest between 1945-1955 (period of rapid industrialization) and then again in the early seventies. At other times, the growth rate was much slower (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980:126). This was tied to the varying growth rates of industrial development at various times. When industry showed slower growth, the view prevailed that women, particularly younger ones, should look after their children themselves.

Créches are maintained either by municipal authorities or by work places. In 1960 2.6 children below three out of a hundred went to créches, while 1979 that figure had grown to 5.4 (Rocznik Statystyczny 1980:443).

The number of kindergartens has also grown. In 1979 341 children between 3 and 6 out of 1000 and 340 children of 6 and more out of 1000 went to kindergartens - a little less than in 1978.

They are usually maintained by local governments and work places. Very expensive private kindergartens also pperate but their capacity is negligible.

The capacity of both créches and kindergartens falls far short of what is needed, both in terms of working mothers'needs and as far as their essential preparatory role in preschool education is concerned. They are usually overcrowded. There were 109 children for 100 places in kindergartens in 1970 and 123 in 1979 (Rocznik Statystyczny 1980: 415). In the countryside, the proportion of children attending kindergartens is considerably lower than in towns.

Older children going to school can take advantage of facilities where they can stay before and after classes. They are run by the schools themselves but usually have separate staffs. Many schools have like work places their canteens.

Homes for the aged and bedridden patients offered very often inadequate facilities and consequently care for senior citizens fell mainly upon their families.

Entitlement to Public Support . Practically everyone in Poland is eligible for social security benefits. They include financial benefits such as old age and disability pensions, social insurance allowances, scholarships for students and loans available to them, as well as social benefits in kind much as free education at all levels, health care and social welfare.

The system of social insurance covers practically everyone in Poland, some 99.7 per cent of the population in 1978 including private farmers and their families. Housewives, too, are entitled to old age pensions.

Other forms of financial assistance include care allowances and maternity allowances. All regular employees receive family allowances for each child and for a non-working wife. The allowances are quite small but by the beginning of the eighties size was the subject of a heated debate.

Under regulations introduced in the mid-seventies, working women received a 16 week maternity leave after the birth of the first child, and an 18-week maternity leave after the birth of all subsequent children. In case of twins, triplets etc , the leave was extended to 26 weeks. On maternity leave , the women receive a social security benefits for the full amount of her wage. However, generally it was thought that benefits did not go far enough. Therefore so called "Gdansk agreement" of August 31, 1980 between the government and striking workers included a demand for a paid three-year maternity leave. Under a Cabinet decree issued in fall of 1981 benefits of varying amount had been introduced for emplyees in the lower income brackets if a mother or a father decided to stay home to look after child during three years.

WOMEN'S ROLES AND FAMILY PATTERNS PROPAGATED BY THE MASS MEDIA

Polish textbooks and the content of mass media have, over time, reflected the changing development strategies pursued by the authorities and the place they have assigned to women and family in social life. Accordingly, they created different images of women and families at different times which paralleled the changes in the officially promoted personality patterns (Jasinska, Siemienska ,1978; Jasinska,Siemienska, 1983). Below we describe in their socio-economic context the main personality patterns and family patterns which predominated in textbooks and the mass media at various times following World War II.

1.Between 1944 and 1949, the media spread quite similar male and female patterns with the stress on their involvement in promoting the new political system and rebuilding the war-torn economy.

2.In subsequent years under the "Six-Year Plan of Industrialization" when the country was building the economic basis of its new socio-economic system, the official female personality pattern focussed on the women's participation in that process. It took for granted that women were working and showed their family status as determined by their occupational roles. In that pattern, the role of the family was cofined to a few basic functions, with its traditional functions taken over by kindergartens youth organizations, work or school canteens etc.(Kloskowska, 1959)

3.The late fifties was a time for reappraisal. The media concentrated on women as wives, mothers or fiances, with little stress on their occupational roles. Love and emotional relationships among family members was often emphasized (Kloskowska, 1959), though novels written at the time showed many tensions and conflicts within the family when husband or wife engaged in extra-marital relationships (Paszkiewicz, 1975).

4.By the early sixties, Poland had transformed itself from mainly agricultural into an industrial-agricultural country. Rapid industrialization, however, had resulted in an imbalance between the development of heavy industry and the an inadequate cutput of consumer goods. Economic development was realigned, therefore, to put stress on production for the market and on raising living standards. The role of the family in personal life was then given considerable emphasis. Women's occupational roles were accorded some attention in the media but on the whole the image of women was confined to their roles as wives and mothers (Adamski, 1970).

5.Towards the end of the seventies, growing social tensions and a new socio-economic policy modified this female personality pattern. A content analysis of some radio and television programmes has shown that women were then encouraged to consider their careers and family obligations as equally important, with the latter sometimes given precedence over everything else. The Polish mass media laid a heavy stress on family life as offering the fulfillment of women's ambitions. This was symptomatic of a period when the policy of rapid economic development had failed; when demographic forecasts had been proved mistaken and real growth population was smaller than expected; and a deepening economic and political crisis was throwing society into growing chaos (Jasinska,Siemienska, 1980).

ACTUAL FAMILY PATTERNS AND THEIR CHANGES OVER TIME

The described above factors connected with the change of the political system, the type of industrialization and also strong economic pressure (low wages) determined women's occupational activity and reshaped family patterns.

The proportion of women in the total labour force rose from 31 per cent in 1950 to 33 per cent in 1954 and to 46.1 in 1980.

In line with traditions and customs prevailing in Poland and in other countries, women tend to marry younger than men. In 1978 52.2 per cent of women but only 25 per cent of men in the 20 to 24 age group were married; 46.3 of men and 25.1 per cent of women waited to get married until they were between 25 and 29 years old.

A comparison of figures for 1970 and 1978 shows that the seventies did not manifest any great changes in the marriage patterns presented above (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980:37).

In 1978 29.2 per cent of men and 21.8 per cent of women at legal age were unmarried , an average of 2 per cent less than in 1970. In 1978 66.8 per cent of men and 61.8 per cent of women were married. The proportion of widowers and widows had grown very little by 1978 standing at 2.4 per cent of all men and 13.8 per cent of all women respectively. The same is true of divorced persons who were 1.6 per cent of all men and 2.6 per cent of all women in 1978 (Rocznik Statystyczny , 1978:37).

These quite limited changes had been produced by changes in the population's age structure.

Fertility Rates. Before World War II Poland had a relatively high fertility rate - 24.6 per cent in 1931. After the war ended, reached a high of 31 per cent in 1951. It subsequently dropped to 16.6 per cent in 1970 and has since begun to rise again to 19.5 per cent in 1979. Among the factors that account for this trend is the persistense of the large family model particularly characteristic of the countryside, the influence of the Church which is strongly opposed to family planning and current effects of economic crisis. The fertility rate is much higher in the countryside (21 per cent in 1979) than in towns (18.5 per cent in 1979).

If the rate has varried, it is because of both psychological factors and the government economic and demographic policies. On the one hand there was a natural post-war boom because

many people put off having children during the war and many couples separated by the war were reunited. While on other hand, in the early post-war years the government actively encouraged high birth rates for reconstruction and rapid industrialization, similarly in the seventies for economic modernization. At other times, it sought to spread the model of a small family, often portrayed as facing the choice of either having children or bettering the families standard of living. In addition to that, the growing birth rate in the seventies was an "echo" of the post-war baby boom. People born then were now having children of their own.

In general terms, however, the birth rate has been falling in this century, and accordingly the model of the family has been changing.

Illegitimate births constituted 5.9 per cent of all births in towns in 1969 and 4.3 per cent of all births in the countryside. In the fifties, those figures were higher, a consequence of the imbalance between the number of men and women in the post-war years (Rocznik Demograficzny, 1976). Population registers were deliberately designed to hide the fact of illegitimacy.

Research conducted in 1972 showed that 15.9 per cent of women had four or more children. Families with two children predominated (35.9 per cent), followed by those with one child (23.1 per cent) and those with three children (19.2 per cent). There were proportionaly speaking more families with four and more children in the countryside (25.4 per cent of all rural families) than in the towns (8.5 per cent of all urban families). Their mothers were most often older women near the end of their reproductive age (Smolinski:204-209). Research carried out in 1983 - 11 years later- gave different results showing an influence described above factors. Only 3.8 per cent of women had four and more children. Families with one child predo-

minated (25.2 per cent), followed by those with two children (23.4 per cent) and those with three children (7.8 per cent). Single mothers constituted 5 per cent of the total number of women having children(Zycie Warszawy, November 19-20, 1983).

Family Structure and Size of Household. The difference between urban and rural families is that the latter are usually more numerous. Rural families are larger because they usually have more children, and they are frequently three-generation families also including members of the extended family living in the same household.

In 1970 the average size of the urban family was 3.03 persons compared with the 1931 figure of 3.66 persons. Generally it means that Polish families are much smaller that they have been before the World War II.

In 1974 the composition of households numbering more than one person was as follows:

a. In the towns 100 household included - 84.2 spouses, 148.4 children, 4.8 grandchildren, 8.3 grandparents and 8.3 others.

b. In the countryside 100 households included - 86.3 spouses, 188.5 children, 15.3 grandchildren, 15.5 grandparents and 15.7 others (data from a representative census of the population and households, conducted on March 30, 1974).

Types of Families and Their Functions.

The Polish families are differentiated by type and by place of residence. Rural families constitute about 47 per cent of the total number and the rest are urban. Among rural families we can distingush modern rural families (27 per cent of the total number of families in Poland), part-time farm families (11to 13 per cent), and rural nonfarm worker families in which the heads of families are employed in nonagricultural occupations but live in the villages. Urban families are divided into three main groups: worker families (32 to 34 per cent of the total number of families in thecountry), white-collar and small bourgeois families (11 per cent), and the intelligentsia families (7to 8 per cent).

Family type depends on the social stratum to which the head of the family belongs, the type of region, type of local community and the degree of acceptance of the patterns of the family propagated by the different institutions (state, church etc.).

One of the common elements running through the various theories of change in the family is the assumption that industrialization has caused a transformation of the family so that it has become a nuclear family with reduced traditional functions. These traditional functions are mainly performed , in industrialized society, by specialized institutions instead of by the family and local community.

Polish studies showed an intensification of some functions of the family, although the functions themselves have changed. (Turowski, 1975: 246; Hodoly, 1971). An analysis of 5,000 diaries written in 1959-60 by youths living in rural areas demonstrates the intensification of the integrative-expressive function of the family. Actually, members of families, especially youths, aspire and also strive in life practise to deepen emotional relationships between husbands and wives, to use leisure time together, etc;

This intensification is aresult of the consciously oriented activity of family members to gather resources, to save time, etc.

At the same time the educational function of the family is more intensive than previously. Despite the activity of many specialized state institutions, the full reward of education is not realized without material help from parents such as help in preparation of assignments required by the school etc. This process of intensification of educational effort is related to the isolation of education in terms of both time and special space. This phenomenon is very apparent in peasant families where, previously different kinds of activities could be combined (Markowska , 1964; Dobrowolski , 1966; Siemienska, 1964). A similar process is going on in urban families due to the employment of women (Lobodzinska, 1970). Thus the thesis assuming the reduction of historical and basic family functions is not applicable to Polish society although it must be agreed that the economic function is now less important than it was in the traditional family.

The traditional form of the family in Poland, both in urban and rural areas, was the extended family consisting of three generations. This doesn't mean there was no such thing as a nuclear family. As a matter of fact it appeared fairly often in the lower strata in villages and in small towns. Now, three generational families are the mode and 67 per cent of old people (over 65 years) are living with their children. This number is much higher than in other developed countries. This form of family is more frequent in rural areas than in cities.

The existence of a three-generational family is only somewhat the result of the influence of tradition; more important are economic conditions. Occupationally active women need help in performing household duties (Piotrowski, 1963; 1969), and very often grandmothers or grandfathers take care of children. A

study carried out in Warsaw of engineers' families had demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish two periods in the life cycle of a family. In the first, young couples try to be independent; and in the next, they live more often with parents who help them to educate their children. This second form of family persists because young couples want to take care of their old parents. Some students of family problems assume that the existence of the three-generation family is the consequence of influences from rural traditions brought by peasant immigrants to the cities. However, the explanation that describes how economic conditions can make it necessary for a woman to work when she has small children seems to be more tenable. In some cases it may be no more than a matter of the unwillingness of a young, highly- educated mother to interrupt a professional career (Graniewska, 1971).

Relationships within the modern three-generation family are different than before. It is no longer a patriarchal family with power concentrated in the hands of old parents, especially the male(s). Now the woman's position in the family depends on her employment activity. Moreover in rural families her position is now raised because many women manage farms alone while men work in other occupations (Tryfan, 1968).

The degree of children's independence is high, and they usually decide alone about the choice of occupation, marriage partner etc. Alienation of the young generation from the family is fairly rare. Young people were asked in a study to indicate their perception of prestigious personalities, their sets of values and whose personality patterns they would like to follow. The results contradicted with the widespread myth that parental authority was in decline. Some 95 per cent of high school students mentioned their parents as persons they felt closest to (Nowak, 1976). In other studies, college students pointed to

their parents as people they respected most (Wilska-Duszynska, 1975). So, parental prestige does not seen be in decline. But more and more frequently it has to be won by parents who can not count on the uncritical admiration of their children, but on love and respect arising out of relations of equality and partnership.

Division of Household Duties . Research shows that household work remains the domain of women, as it always has, regardless of whether the woman holds down a job or not. Among rural dwellers, the traditional division of labour remains in force with the women solely responsible for running the home, cleaning and decorating it, cooking, care for the children, washing, etc. The same situation prevails also in working-class families, with the husband often joining in more strenuous chores like scrubbling the floor. Families which most often deviate from this pattern are these where both spouses are college-educated and are both working. In these families, household work is more often considered the joint duty of both spoudes, with chores done by the person happening to have more time at a certain moment or who is better prepared for them.

Studies conducted in the early sixties showed that blue-collar women devoted 5 hours 38 minutes daily to household work, while white-collar women apent only three hours 43 minutes (strzeminska, 1966:216, Strzeminska, 1970). This was confirmed in studies on the share of leisure time in the daily time budget of male and female blue- and white-collar workers. Data from 1969 and 1976 were compared and once again, female blue-collar workers proved to be the most hard-working of all the categories mentioned above. However the share of leisure time in the daily schedule was found to grow over those years (the change took plac in the early eighties). Towards the end of the seventies men devoted thirty minutes less a day to housework while women only

10 minutes less.

Differences in division of household duties between male and female in various socio-occupational groups shows table 1. The data were collected on Warsaw in 1978-79 by the present author as part of a larger cross-national project comprising research in Canada, Italy, Poland and Rumania.

The following questions have been asked:

"We would like to know how much you and your spouse share the following domestic chores:

1) who cooks?

2) who washes the dishes?

3) who goes for daily shopping?

4) who does the washing?

5) who cleans the house?"

and "In your opinion, who should .. cook.." etc.

with a score from 1 - "the husband always" to 5 - "the wife always"

Table 1. Actual and ideal distribution of domestic chores

	cooking		washing the dishes		shopping		washing		cleaning	
	A	I	A	I	A	I	A	I	A	I
M blue collars	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.5	3.3	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.3
F blue collars	4.2	3.6	4.2	3.5	4.1	3.4	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.4
M white collars	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.3	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.2
F white collars	3.9	3.3	3.8	3.2	3.7	3.1	4.1	3.5	3.8	3.2
M teachers	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.9	3.5	3.4	3.1
F teachers	4.0	3.3	3.8	3.2	4.0	3.2	4.2	3.4	3.8	3.2
housewives	4.3	3.3	4.2	3.2	4.0	3.3	4.3	3.6	4.3	3.2
men out of work	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
M decision-makers	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.9	3.2	4.2	3.6	3.9	3.3
F decision-makers	4.1	3.5	3.8	3.1	3.6	3.1	4.1	3.3	3.5	3.0

M - male; F - female; A - actual distribution; I - ideal distribution

Figures are means calculated for each category.

The domestic chores included in the table 1 appeared to be feminine tasks , but especially cooking, washing dishes and washing. Male decision-makers did domestic chores less frequently than other men. While female decision-makers did them as often as females from other socio-occupational groups.

The burden of household work also changes to some degree with age. In older families, with older children and higher incomes where domestic help can be hired, even if only on a very limited basis, working women have a somewhat smaller range of chores to do. In younger families between 21 and 34 years of age somewhat more frequently men do such chores as making breakfast or supper, everyday cleaning, washing windows, making beds than in the families of older working women.

An estimated 30 per cent of families outside the rural areas, where the mother holds down a job, have their parents or other persons, most often relatives, looking after their children during the daytime (Sokolowska, 1980:71).

FAMILY PATTERNS ACCEPTED BY POLISH SOCIETY

The proportion of employed women in Poland raises the same question that is posed in other countries in similar circumstances, i.e. what is the role of the family in society? Studies (Jasinska and Siemienska , 1975; Siemienska, 1983) carried out in 1972 and 1981 on national samples of respondents aged 16 to 60 and over showed that Poles, both men and women, put in first place among preferred life goals and desires " a good, happy family life" in 1972 and in second place in 1981 after "clear conscience" what reflected a moral aspect of recent crisis (Jasinska, and Siemienska, 1983).

The results concerning ideal distribution of domestic chores (see table 1) showed that both males and females tend to attribute the performance of domestic chores to wives,

However, the study showed that men and women believed (an ideal distribution) that wives should look after children but not very much more than husbands. This can be considered as an element of more egalitarian model od family.

It is interesting that in situation in which married women are working, elements of a "traditional" model of the family are more often accepted than elements of a "modern" one (Jasinska and Siemienska, 1975 b). In the study carried out in 1972 and also in the study conducted in 1981 respondents chose between " "traditional" and"modern" pairs of opposite behaviours and relationships inside the family. It was assumed that the following is characteristic of a model of the modern family: companionship between wife and husband with equal prominence given to their respective jobs; a way of sharing housework; freedom for each family member to express different opinions; and acceptance of individual decisions regarding how to spend part of his/her earnings and how to use part of his/her leisure time. The model of the traditional family assumed in the research included such characteristic as patriarchal relationships in the family, a clear and stable division of roles between the employed husband and the housewife taking care of home and children, and the priority given to the family as a whole over the individual interests of its members.

The "most unacceptable" features of the modern family model for respondents were independence in spending part of one's income and freedom in using one's leisure time. The most acceptable attribute of the modern family was the relationship between parents and children in which parents' authority is limited and children enjoy some autonomy in having their own opinions. The highest level of readiness to accept the model of the modern family was among the youngesr respondents ;inhabitants of the largest cities, and among the higher educated.

This preference for traditional relationships in the fa-

mily by respondents which was found in the studies in the seventies was congruant with results of different studies conducted in the same time concerning the real patterns of families.

The early eighties brought even stronger orientation (or reorientation) on family.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THE EARLY EIGHTIES? INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

The deep multidimensional crisis which is experienced by Polish society during last few years also influenced the relationships within the family and its role in the society. In a study (Jasinska and Siemienska, 1983) carried out in fall of 1981 on a national sample of respondents aged 16 to 65 respondents emphasised again that the family is considered by Poles as one of the most important life goals. Even in 1981 the family was chosen by more respondents than 9 years earlier. The results can be seen as proof that in crisis people consider small groups like the family to be more important because of growing dissapointment and distrust towards existing institutions (Jasinska and Siemienska, 1983). Besides, in the early eighties high inflation and a falling standard of living effected families in different ways. In March 1983 in a national sample more than half of respondents replied that they had much less leisure time (especially women) than before. This had occured because of difficulties in shopping and because services became very expensive and their quality worsen . A large portion of people do now different kinds of work at home by themselves , like renovation of apartments (40 per cent) and also larger numbers of people, than before, repair clothes and home appliances(Zycie Warszawy, November 19-20, 1983).

One of the demands raised by "Solidarity" to extend paied maternity leave (to 3 years) which was later met by the government affected the decisions of young women about having children and

giving up their jobs. In 1983, 30.8 per cent of women in the age group from 18 to 59 were not studying and not working. This was because many of them received paid maternity leave, and others resigned from work accepting early retirement. This phenomenon of large occupational deactivisation is something new. We can cosider it as a "kind of revolution" in the model of Polish women's life.

Many young women decided to have more children than before (two or even three), when before many families limited number of their children to one or two, and postponed their porfessional careers. Therefore in the last years the highest work occupational activity among women has moved from age 24 to 29 before 1980 to 40 to 49 since then. In the total of working women only 14 per cent is the young generation in the age 18 to 29.

The growth in birth rate which has been observed in the last years is partially determined by extended maternity leave, at least partially too by general uncertanity, scarcity of goods and inflation which makes plans of such investments like an apartment, a car or furnitures difficult.

Despite conflicts and tensions within couples and a higher divorce rate than previously (0.5 per 1000 people in 1960, 1.1 in 1978; Rocznik Statystyczny 1980:L, LI) the family plays a very important role in the life of Polish society, especially now.

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Migration, remittances and the family: a theory

by ODED STARK

Urban-to-rural remittances by rural-to-urban migrants, along with migration itself, are elements in a migrant-family's inter-temporal contractual arrangement. Reasons are given for the migrant and his family voluntarily entering into a mutually beneficial contractual arrangement with each other - rather than with a third party - and conditions are identified under which the contractual arrangement is self-enforcing. Transfer of remittances is seen as a manifestation of the contractual arrangement being in force. Both parties can usually benefit from a number of Pareto-optimal mutual contractual arrangements (in comparison with the alternative of "each going its own way"). This gives rise to an indeterminancy problem, solved through a bargaining process between the parties who consequently converge to a contractual arrangement implying a specific flow of migrant-to-family remittances. The chosen contractual arrangement reflects the relative bargaining powers of the parties, and variables impinging upon these powers thus bear upon remittances. Hence the approach furnishes theoretically derived predictions about remittances, e.g., that a variable enhancing the bargaining power of the family (such as a loose urban labour market) positively influences the magnitude of migrant-to-family remittances.

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I. Introduction

Urban-to-rural remittances are one of the most important - realized or potential - correlates of rural-to-urban migration in LDCs. The accumulated evidence of numerous studies documenting the phenomenon[1] gives the impression that in one way or another it non-separably shadows at least the modal rural-to-urban migrating unit in LDCs - a young, single individual - a member of a family but not a family.

The importance of remittances in the development process is due to a number of factors. First, the scale and pace of rural-to-urban migration. Second, the magnitude of urban-to-rural remittances - urban-to-rural remittances are usually transferred over quite a considerable period of time and amount to 10-30 percent of migrants' income.[2] Coupled with the previous factor they must therefore constitute a significant proportion of national income. Third, the widespread interest in transfers of incomes and in mechanisms generating changes in the distribution of income by size. Fourth, the impact of remittances on the resource constraint in the economy at large where savings are sub-optimal and, in particular, in the agricultural sector - especially with respect to technological change in agricultural production.[3] Fifth, the role of children-generated returns to bearing and rearing of children, hence - the derived asset demand for children and desired fertility.[4]

In spite of these and probably several other factors, no comprehensive theory of urban-to-rural remittances exists. The need for at least some analytical clues regarding observed phenomena has partly been met by a number of recent studies which provide useful

descriptive evidence and regression analyses.[5] But these endeavours fall short of a complete theory generating testable hypotheses. We have no rigorously derived answers to basic questions such as: Why do migrants remit? Why do some migrants remit much more than others (in proportion to their earned urban income)? Why do some migrants remit for a long period of time, others for a relatively short one? Why do remitting migrants stop remitting?

The theory developed below views remittances as part of, or one clause in, a migrant-family self-enforcing cooperative contractual arrangement. Indeed, the act of migration itself is an element in this contractual arrangement. It thus immediately follows that it is impossible either to predict the magnitude of remittances or their prevalence, or to design effective interventionist policies with respect to them, without gaining familiarity with the nature and contents of the postulated contractual arrangement.

The underlying argument of the proposed theory is as follows: A migrant remits because he has entered into a contractual arrangement with his family to do so. He continues to remit because he adheres to the contractual arrangement. And he adheres to the contractual arrangement as long as it is self-enforcing, which implies that the migrant is better off doing so. The migrant stops remitting in spite of his undertaking to do so when the contractual arrangement is no longer self-enforcing or if the contractual arrangement itself provides for the cessation of transfers at a given point in time.

(That the migrant may stop remitting because the contracting parties mutually agree to release each other from their obligations - "Eodem modo quo oritur, eodem modo dissolvitur" - or that an unforeseen contingency - e.g., some catastrophic event - renders its performance impossible, is of no particular interest to us and therefore will not be dealt with in this paper.)

In order to understand urban-to-rural remittances it is necessary to understand the migrant-family contract and its properties. In Section II the migrant-family contractual arrangement is taken as given and the main interest is in issues of self-enforcement. Once agreed upon, will a contractual arrangement be observed? What requirements should be satisfied for a contractual arrangement to be stable? The topic of what determines the precise contractual arrangement the parties eventually strike and, in particular, what determines its remittances provision is taken upon in Section III. Concluding remarks are offered in Section IV.

II. Rural-to Urban Migration and Urban-to-Rural Remittances as Elements in a Self-Enforcing Cooperative Contractual Arrangement

The relationship between the modal rural-to-urban migrating unit in the LDCs - a young, single family member, and the rest of his family are modeled through a cooperative contractual arrangement. The migrant and the family enter into a voluntary contractual arrangement with each other because they expect to be better off with the contractual arrangement than without it. Furthermore, the migrant expects to be better off by covering a given set of transactions or contingencies through an agreement with his family rather than with a third party. Likewise from the family's point of view. This assumes that both the migrant and the family have information concerning the set of alternative partners. Obviously, this set may be empty.

The assumption here is that the contractual arrangement involves a series of transactions which may be explicit or implicit, as well as coordination of strategies which do not require direct exchange between the parties.[6] It is the presence of the latter in the contractual arrangement which accounts for its being labeled cooperative. Below we shall refer both to transactions and to joint decisions on what course of action each party will adopt as "transactions," but the reader should recall the metals which went into the making of this coin.

Parties that voluntarily bind themselves to a contractual arrangement cannot ordinarily both be assumed, at the outset, to intend to violate it all since if this were the case they would not have entered into the contractual arrangement in the first place. However, since the

assumption here is that the contractual arrangement covers a series of exchanges that stretch over time, the migrant or the family may find it worth their while to breach the contractual arrangement after it has run its course for some time. In principle, two mechanisms can deter violation: (a) An institution other than the two parties to the agreement, e.g., the legal power of the state. (b) A calculation that the loss (e.g., due to reprisal) entailed by such a breach outweighs the benefits. We shall rule out the first deterring device for the problem at hand and identify conditions under which, at any point in time, a migrant-family contractual arrangement will be self-enforcing.

Before delving into this, let us illustrate how the approach outlined so far captures some important features of migration. In modeling migration through a two-party intertemporal contractual arrangement we assume that members of the family other than the head of the family - and, of course, the migrant - are passive parties. This need not assume away too much of the relevant analysis since the behavioral patterns of family members who stay behind (other than the head), can reasonably be taken as given. The other family members are thus assumed not to attempt to independently influence the "policy" of the head; they delegate decision-making to the head of the family and accord his decisions with a priori complete agreement.[7]

We assume that each party faces an income-earning time profile such that a higher risk has to be incurred first, whereas the increased benefit accrues subsequently. Each party can adopt an income-generating expected income-increasing technology but is deterred from doing

so by the high degree of the initial subjective risk associated with generation of income through that technology. We thus assume that each party is risk averter.

Consider the migrant. Upon migrating, risks are at first very high: entry attempts into high-paying sectors may fail; entry into low-paying sectors, which may be relatively easy, entails high probability of discontinuity of employment due to the high sensitivity of these sectors to market fluctuations; and there is, of course, the distinct possibility of involuntary unemployment. But risks (variability) associated with urban employment and future urban earnings typically diminish with time as the migrant establishes himself, obtains more secure employment and accumulates location-specific capital.[8] Next, consider the family. We assume that its desire to adopt a new production technology in agriculture (say, of the high-yielding varieties type) is strong, but that the high subjective risk content of this technology acts as a deterrent. To facilitate technological transformation it is thus necessary to resolve the familial aversion to risk intersected with pursuing an initially risk-increasing strategy.[9]

Assume that urban and rural incomes do not move in tandem, that both the head of the family and the migrant are unable to (sufficiently) self-insure, cannot make insurance-type arrangements with a third party and, in particular, cannot insure against the increased risk in the market place; provision of the necessary insurance by absent or incomplete markets is impossible and/or the transaction costs of purchasing it on the open market are prohibitive. We thus assume prevalence of risks that, as far as futures and insurance

markets are concerned, are unhedgeable and uninsurable. It is beyond the scope of the present illustration to explore the reasons why insurance markets for particular risks do not come into existence, but it is likely that the very nature of the particular risks described here (association with future earnings) contributes to this paucity.[10]

Given this assumption (this is what was meant by saying that the set of alternative partners may be empty), can the parties turn to each other and act, in turn, as insurer and insuree? Consider the following arrangement. In the period immediately following migration, the migrant - the insuree - receives a less variable set of outcomes; the head of the family, who acts as the insurer, a more variable set of outcomes. (That is, in comparison to what each party would have received in the absence of such an exchange.) In the next period, when the migrant has relatively established himself in the urban sector, he acts as insurer. The head of the family - now the insuree - introduces technological change on the family farm, a risk-increasing venture, but through the migrant acting as the insurer, receives a less variable set of outcomes. The parties can have identical attitudes towards risk, but because of the difference in their time profile of risks their behaviour is analogous to what it would have been had they differed in their attitudes towards risk. Thus, in the period following migration, the head of the family offers to pay the migrant, say, a certain amount - often revealed through rural-to-urban remittances - in a certain state (the event of unemployment), such that once established, i.e., in the second period, the migrant receives a lower expected payoff due to his remitting to his family in the rural sector, but a less variable expected payoff in the first period. Urban-to-rural remittances can thus be

interpreted as delayed payment of a premium for the insurance taken up by the migrant in the first period and/or as a transfer of the insurance payment to the head of the family once the rural bad state of nature had indeed occurred.[11]

Whereas none of the parties would have been able to bear the risk of failure alone, exchange of risks (shift of income variabilities) permits the parties to engage in activities which are highly risky in the short run, which would not have been undertaken otherwise. Although each party has first to incur the higher risk in order to be able to reap increased benefit in the future, it incurs the higher risk while the other party is in a relatively less risky state. This is what we have in mind when we refer to a mutually advantageous cooeprative agreement.

Note that this example illustrates the unusual flexibility and resourcefulness of the family unit--not only in overcoming market deficiencies but also in overcoming inherent scale deficiencies. The family whose capacity to spread risks is constrained by its limited size enlarges scale via broadening the relevant space; inability to realize scale economies is thus ameliorated via ability to realize space (scope) economies. Migration of a family member facilitates effective pooling of risks and insurance in both alleviating the size constraint and bringing in independence of risks. Perhaps we can even look at the relationship between migration and the family upside down: because, as our example illustrates, the family is effectively and uniquely placed to handle the migration associated risks, if an entity engages in migration, it is highly likely to be a family.[12]

The obvious difficulty the reader may encounter in following this example has to do with the issue of adherence. Once reached, will the contractual arrangement be binding? Will it be worth one party's while to deviate from a contractual arrangement even if the other immediately detects the violation, interprets it as a "fundamental breach," and terminates the agreement, inflicting a cost upon the violater (loss of all future gains from continuous observance of the contractual arrangement)? In our example, once supported by his family, pursuing the short run risky urban employment strategy and succeeding, the migrant may decide to retain all urban-earned income or even withdraw his commitment to act as a reliable insurer. Will he?

Since our interest in this paper is in the migrant fulfilling the remittances provision of the contractual arrangement, we shall try to identify conditions under which he will find it advantageous to adhere to his commitments. The argument that the family will find adherence a rewarding strategy is symmetrical.

Let $f(\tau)$ be the probability density function of a contractual arrangement being of duration τ where $\int_0^\infty f(\tau)d\tau = 1$. The probability that the contractual arrangement will last for τ or less than τ is thus $F(\tau) = \int_0^\tau f(t)dt$; that it will last longer than τ - $[1-F(\tau)]$. The (post discounting) utility accruing to the migrant from adhering to the contractual arrangement in time t that is, from being involved in a transaction with his family is $U(t)$. The total expected gain from the contractual arrangement being pursued without interruption is thus $\int_0^\infty U(t)[1 - F(t)]\, dt$. The expected gain from pursuing the agreement from τ onwards is $\int_\tau^\infty U(t)[1 - F(t)]\, dt$.

For a contractual agreement to be violated by the migrant at time τ two (necessary) conditions must hold: (a) That it is still in force (the probability of this is $[1 - F(\tau)]$). (b) That violation will bring about some positive benefit $b(\tau) > 0$. The expected gain from violation at τ is therefore $b(\tau)[1 - F(\tau)]$. This has to be compared with the expected loss - the foregone expected gain from pursuing the contractual arrangement from τ onwards - assuming that violation by the migrant leads to termination of the contractual arrangement by the family (here taken to be the "maximal punishment" strategy). The contractual arrangement will therefore be violated by the migrant iff $b(\tau)[1 - F(\tau)] > \int_{\tau}^{\infty} U(t)[1 - F(t)]dt$ and will be self-enforcing otherwise.

When the migrant violates the contractual arrangement at time τ then, since according to (a) the contractual arrangement is still in force, the migrant inflicts a loss on the family. To see why, note that had the family expected a net gain from violation, it would have chosen to breach the contractual arrangement. Since the family chose to abide by it, its expected gain from pursuing the contractual arrangement at time τ was larger than its expected benefit from terminating at that point in time. Utilizing a prime for the notations applying to the family we thus have, for the family, $b'(\tau)[1 - F(\tau)] < \int_{\tau}^{\infty} U'(t)[1 - F(t)]dt$. (Clearly, the utilities accruing to the migrant and his family are assumed to differ.)

It is reasonable to assume that the migrant cares about the well-being of his family, and it is convenient to capture the presence of such an altruistic attribute through a function $V(\tau)$; the migrant attaches a weight $V(\tau) > 0$ to the utility received by the family at time τ. Then, the migrant will violate the agreement at time τ iff

$$b(\tau)[1-F(\tau)] > \int_{\tau}^{\infty} U(t)[1-F(t)]dt + V(\tau)\{\int_{\tau}^{\infty} U'(t)[1-F(t)]dt - b'(\tau)[1-F(\tau)]\}.$$

Since the second term on the right-hand side of the inequality is positive, altruism reinforces a self-enforcing contractual arrangement.[13]

This is a convenient point of a moment's reflection. When the nature of the transactions the parties wish to enter into is such that intertemporal transfers and intertemporal contracts must be involved, the parties will be duly concerned about the issue of enforcement. This concern should lead to preference of a partner with whom a contract will be (more) self-enforceable. Both migrant and family are endowed with a high specific asset: mutual altruism. The value of this asset is realized when they trade with each other but would be lost if they were to enter into an exchange relationship with a third party. As it enforces a self-enforcing contractual arrangement, altruism reduces the need for costly contractual safeguards. Other things being equal, it thus renders a migrant-family contractual arrangement more cost efficient than alternative contractual arrangements. By enhancing "common interest," altruism reduces the incentive of the trading parties to "go their own way."[14] In creating an effect similar to "trust" or "loyalty," altruism assists the parties in solving problems which emerge when legally-enforced property rights and contingent contracts cannot be written.[15]

But since both migrant and family gain more from a contractual arrangement with each other than from one with a third party, they should be willing to give more to each other than to a third party. Hence the migrant furnishes his family with more remittances, the family furnishes the migrant with more insurance, etc. Thus, in terms of our trade in risks example, we now clearly see that the migrant and the family have an incentive to turn to each other even when the set of alternative parties is not empty. By entering into an exchange agreement with each other they are relatively ensured about fulfillment of the provisions of this exchange. And, as we have just argued, these desirable provisions, in turn, are likely to dominate those constituting an alternative contractual arrangement.

Now that we have noted the reinforcing effect of altruism we could briefly check how crucial it is in generating the continuity properties of the exchange relation, how stable it is as an inter-temporal self-enforcing device.

We have not yet said much about $V(\tau)$. It is reasonable to assume that $V(\tau)$ is smaller than unity (we rule out "excessive altruism"). It is, perhaps, also reasonable to assume that, in general, $\frac{dV(\tau)}{d\tau} < 0$. Together with our earlier assumption that $V(\tau) > 0$, this could have implied that the waning of the migrant's altruistic motive weakens the self-enforcing property of the migrant-family contractual arrangement. However, the contribution of altruism to the reinforcement of the contractual arrangement must not be captured through $V(\tau)$ alone but through the full (composite)

second term of the right-hand side of the last inequality. Since, as in our example, the value of the insurance benefits to the family may rise over time, the altruism-generated reinforcement mechanism will not break down even if the altruism factor itself declines (by which the family's utility is counted by the migrant).

III. Striking the Migrant-Family Contractual Arrangement

The underlying reason why a migrant enters into a contractual arrangement with his family which intertemporally binds him to deliver goods and/or services is that he expects to intertemporally gain from such an arrangement (a symmetrical argument applies to the family). Let us expand a bit our trade-in-risks example in order to illustrate the possible gains. First, urban labour markets, though immune to the vagaries of weather which strongly affect agriculture, are often subject to upheavals brought about by economic cycles. Some urban sub-sectors (e.g., construction) are more vulnerable than others. It is fairly likely that for quite a long period of time the migrant will belong to these, rather than to sub-sectors which, employment-wise, are highly secure. Familial support when the downswing hits hard could be quite important. Intertemporally porivded familial insurance to hedge against the not-too-steady, sometimes even turbulent, urban labour markets is invaluable, thus worth paying for. Moreover, the migrant may wish to reduce his vulnerability through induced labor mobility which could involve voluntary layoff, intensive job search, and lapse of unemployment. Engagement in such an attempt may crucially depend on tacit or explicit familial support.

Second, there are numerous indications[16] that for quite a long period of time after moving to the urban sector, migrants retain a strong degree of identification, allegiance, and social connectedness with their village of origin. Their social status and prestige depend on their standing in their home village over which a migrant's family

exercises great power. It may even hold a natural monopoly position in determining the migrant's standing. This empowers the family to provide the migrant with, or deny him possession of, an asset, albeit an intangible one. With the desire for reputation being long recognized (at least since Adam Smith) a strong driving force in people's behaviour, such an asset is a valuable one.

Third, the family--or more precisely, the head of the family--usually keeps tight control over the family's rural property. Bequests are normally deferred to a very late stage in life. The deed to the family land is usually not passed on before the head of the family dies or becomes too old to support himself. Claims by a migrant to family property rights are even likelier when the family farm is subjected to technological advance which, as intimated in the example of Section II, may have been facilitated by the migrant himself.

We thus see how the family may continue to be a source of economic security, emotional satisfaction, and tangible assets to the migrant long past his departure for the urban sector; there is a set of reasons why the migrant should, in principle, be willing to commit himself to the transfer of remittances. However, there seems to be more to these reasons. They provide an explanation of the intertemporal nature of the transfer and also bear upon the self-enforcement issue. For example, it can be easily seen why the family would prefer to receive remittances as soon as this is feasible--and for a long period of time. But will the migrant agree to make such transfers and stick to his commitment given that rights to the familial property are sufficiently important to him? Note that with

respect to disposition of familial property the head of the family has the last word--he "controls the last action taken in a temporal sequence." Realizing that if he acts in a certain way in one stage the head of the family will react at a later stage, the migrant will be induced to "behave himself." A similar point has been made, although in a different context, by Becker (1976, 1977, 1981) and Hirschleifer (1976).[17] However, what they both capture is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition. For suppose that--in terms of our problem--the migrant knows with certainty when the head of the family will pass away and that bequests--assumed throughout to be conditioned on behaviour--are made by the head of the family immediately before his death. The migrant may decide not to remit until a short while prior to that date and only then make up for his "rotten" behaviour. The threat of a reprisal under full certainty concerning the timing of bequests cannot guarantee conduct which is intertemporally favourable. What does ensure such conduct is that the migrant does not know in advance when bequests are going to be made. In every period there is a positive probability that the decision concerning bequests will be made in the subsequent period. Therefore, in terms of the contractual arrangements reached between himself and his family, in each and every point in time, the migrant is bound to be "in the black," so to speak. Note that ex ante what is required here is not an infinite horizon, only an uncertain horizon.[18]

In principle, several contractual arrangements could be Pareto optimal. How then do the migrant and the family converge to one? We assume that the two-dimensional Euclidean space of all these contractual arrangements is compact (i.e., it is bounded and closed).

We draw axes that measure the parties' utilities. We can think of the point in this plane representing the parties' failure to strike a contractual arrangement as a (fixed) "conflict point." Through the use of classical economic theory we can rule out not only contractual arrangements represented by points that do not lie to the north-east of this conflict point but also contractual arrangements that are not represented by points lying on the boundary of the enclosed area (which is assumed to be convex) north-east of the conflict point. But this still leaves the parties with many efficient (Pareto-optimal) points in the subset of the plane to choose from. Standard economic theory does not furnish a guide for invoking the choice; this, and the nature of our problem, naturally lead us to utilize bargaining equilibrium analysis. The choice between the many feasible equilibrium points is a matter of bargaining between the migrant and the family: The parties use their bargaining power in pursuit of their self-interests. There is absolutely no contradiction between this and our mutual altruism assumption of Section II. Each party prefers the contractual arrangement that best suits its interests which include anything - both selfish and altruistic - to which its utility function assigns positive utility. This implies that in some sense the outcome of the bargaining process is a reflection of the relative bargaining powers of the parties.

The bargaining power of each party depends, in turn, on the utility with which it can provide the other, on the cost it will incur in providing this utility, and on its willingness to risk a "conflict" - the parties departing without striking a contractual arrangement with

each other. This ties in nicely with our trade-in-risks example. If the migrant considers his entry into the urban labour market highly risky he would attach a high value to the family-provided insurance and would be less willing to risk a conflict with - or more willing to make concessions to - the family. Likewise, if the subjective risk associated by the family with the new technology is high, it would be willing to go quite a long way towards the migrant in order to ensure his agreeing to act as insurer.

Consider the following case. Assume there are two contractual arrangements to choose from: $A_1(20,15)$ and $A_2(15,20)$ where the bracketed numbers represent, respectively, the utilities the migrant and the family derive from a contractual arrangement. C(1,14) represents what they will get should they fail to secure a contractual arrangement among themselves - "the conflict payoffs." A_1 could stand for a contractual arrangement involving little transfer of remittances to the family; A_2 - for one involving larger migrant-to-family remittances. Whereas for the migrant $U_M(A_1) > U_M(A_2) > U_M(C)$, for the family $U_F(A_2) > U_F(A_1) > U_F(C)$. Both parties are perfectly informed about all U_i's; the dictum that "all remains in the family" should normally imply that family members know what is of value - and of how much - to each of them. For each party, agreeing to its second best contractual arrangement is a concession. Both know that should none concede, they will all end up at C.

We can predict that in this case, the migrant will make the concession. The reason is that for him, the difference between

$U_M(A_1)$ and $U_M(C)$ in relation to the difference between $U_M(A_1)$ and $U_M(A_2)$ is larger than the analogous magnitude for the family:

$$\frac{U_M(A_1) - U_M(C)}{U_M(A_1) - U_M(A_2)} > \frac{U_F(A_2) - U_F(C)}{U_F(A_2) - U_F(A_1)}$$

In comparison to the family he stands to loose more from failing to reach a contractual arrangement, he is less willing to risk a conflict. Thus, the migrant must yield and A_2 will constitute the contractual arrangement. Note that if we were to measure each party's willingness to risk a conflict rather than accept the agreement preferred by the other party by a probability π_i $i = M,F$, the inverses of the above magnitudes will do. (The ranking of the U_M's and the U_F's ensures that $0 < \pi_i < 1$). Thus

$$\pi_M = \frac{U_M(A_1) - U_M(A_2)}{U_M(A_1) - U_M(C)}$$

is the cost of conceding to the family divided by the cost of provoking a conflict with it. This is a plausible measure of the migrant's bargaining power, of the strength of his incentive to risk a conflict, and of the probablity that he will do so. The interpretation of

$$\pi_F = \frac{U_F(A_2) - U_F(A_1)}{U_F(A_2) - U_F(C)}$$

is analogous. Since in our case $\pi_M = .26 < \pi_F = .83$, it follows that the migrant will make the concession and that the parties will settle for A_2.

The procedure outlined above is similar to that known to solve the indeterminancy problem in bargaining situations that characterize games between rational players in which payoff dominance does not suffice to yield a solution. Indeed, approaching migration through a two-person, almost-noncooperative game framework generates some interesting insights and hypotheses, but it will not be pursued here.[19] The bargaining situations to which the procedure seems closest are those explored by Zeuthen (1930, Chapter IV), Nash (1950), Luce and Raiffa (1957, Chapter 5), Harsanyi (1956) and especially Harsanyi (1977, Chapters 8-10, 14).[20]

It is now easily seen how our approach also furnishes specific, theoretically derived predictions about remittances. Since the outcome - the contractual arrangement the parties strike - reflects their bargaining powers, variables enhancing the bargaining power of the family or weakening that of the migrant will positively influence the magnitude of migrant-to-family remittances and variables enhancing the bargaining power of the migrant or weakening that of the family will affect them negatively. Highly valued familial property, untight or unstable urban labour markets, and close social cohesion illustrate the former. Tight rural insurance (financial) markets, great dependence of the new agricultural technology on specific and indivisible investments, high subjective and objective risk associated with the new technology provide illustrations of the latter.

IV. Concluding Remarks

We shall first provide a summary of the argument.

Urban-to-rural remittances by rural-to-urban migrants, along with migration itself, are elements in a migrant-family intertemporal contractual arrangement. Reasons for the migrant and the family voluntarily entering into a mutually beneficial contractual arrangement with each other - rather than with a third party - are given. Conditions under which the contractual arrangement is self-enforcing are identified. Transfer of remittances is seen as a manifestation of the contractual arrangement being in force. Both parties can usually benefit from a number of Pareto-optimal mutual contractual arrangements (in comparison with the alternative of "each going its own way"), raising an indeterminancy problem which is solved through a bargaining process between the parties. They eventually converge to a contractual arrangement implying a specific flow of migrant-to-family remittances. The chosen contractual arrangement reflects the relative bargaining powers of the parties. Variables impinging upon these powers thus bear upon remittances. Hence the approach furnishes specific theoretically derived predictions about remittances, e.g., that a variable enhancing the bargaining power of the family such as an untight urban labour market positively influences the magnitude of migrant-to-family remittances. [It is the family's strength (its power to request), not its weakness (needs and demands) which positively affects this magnitude.]

We end with three complementary remarks.

First, capturing urban-to-rural remittances and rural-to-urban migration through an intertemporal, mutually advantageous contractual arrangement opens up new territory for exploration. Migration might be fruitfully viewed as an intertemporal proposition generating streams of various benefits to both migrants and their families rather than an ad hoc, once-and-for-all adjustment to intersectoral wage differential so often taken to be the explanatory variable of rural-to-urban migration in LDCs. This piece of theory demonstrates the efficiency, flexibility, and what we might call the dynamic comparative advantage of the family - rather than serving as an indication of the family splitting apart as the independence aspiring young move away in an attempt to dissociate themselves from familial and traditional bondage regardless of the negative externalities thereby imposed upon their families. It shifts the focus of migration theory from individual independence (optimization against nature) to mutual interdependence (optimization against one another). And it views migration as "a calculated strategy," not as an act of desperation.

Second, it seems to me that the proposed theory warrants close confrontation with data and that the predictions to which it gives rise should be subjected to careful testing and empirical verification. I am not aware of existing data sets to fully facilitate such an undertaking. Recent "recipes" for generating remittances related data are devoid of mahy of the considerations, and do not capture many of the variables, identified by our theory.[21] It would be interesting to see how fruitful will be an attempt to base a data collection and analysis endeavour on an underlying theory rather than on eclectic sets of propositions. In a related paper just completed--

see reference in footnote 7--we have succeeded, in spite of some data limitations, to test the theory proposed here--along with competing theories. We concluded that for the case at hand, viz. that of Botswana, patterns of remittances seem to lend support to the theory and to refute competing theories.

Third, although the issue addressed in this paper is that of urban-to-rural remittances and, along with it, that of rural-to-urban migration, our analysis has a bearing on a wider area of social study: Do individuals, motivated by self-betterment, undertake actions that improve their own welfare as well as that of others? By modeling the observed behaviour of migrants and their families in a Pareto-optimal cooperative contractual arrangement schema, we exposit a special, yet an important case, where such favourable result holds. The burden of proof that rural-to-urban migration with its related attributes result in a welfare loss to anyone affected by rural-to-urban migration except for the migrants themselves, is thus shifted upon those who so believe.

Footnotes

1. See Oded Stark, Economic-Demographic Interactions in Agricultural Development: The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration (Rome: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1978), Chapter III and the many references cited therein; Oded Stark, "On the Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in Rural Development," The Journal of Development Studies 16, No. 3 (April 1980); A. S. Oberai and H. K. Manmohan Singh, "Migration, Remittances and Rural Development," International Labour Review 119, No. 2 (March-April 1980); James C. Knowles and Richard Anker, "An Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing Country," Journal of Development Economics 8 (1981).
2. See references cited in footnote 1.
3. See Robert E.B. Lucas, "Emigration, Employment and Accumulation: The Miners of Southern Africa," Harvard University, Migration and Development Program, Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 4 (December 1983); Oded Stark, Economic-Demographic Interactions in Agricultural Development: The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration.
4. See Oded Stark, "The Asset Demand for Children During Agricultural Modernization," Population and Development Review 7, No. 4 (December 1981); Eliakim Katz and Oded Stark, "Desired Fertility and Migration: Signing the Connection" mimeo (February 1984).
5. See, for example, James C. Knowles and Richard Anker, "An Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing Country."

Footnotes (Cont'd)

6. Loans and repayments over time illustrate "explicit" transactions, insurance arrangements with contingent transfers illustrate "implicit ones." Lumping them together hinges upon their inter-temporal nature as well as on them having a positive shadow price for both parties involved in the exchange.

7. We are aware that in empirical situations, what is the family unit becomes very messy, at least in Africa, where there is much support from the anthropological literature and some from the empirical work on migration (particularly recent work on Botswana) suggesting complex household arrangements that have different composition and decision-making structures for different kinds of decisions. Coalition formation and composition with respect to control of specific resources cannot then be assumed away. (See, for example, Robert E.B. Lucas, "Migration Amongst the Botswana," mimeo (1982); Robert E.B. Lucas and Oded Stark, "Motivations to Remit," mimeo (March 1984).) The approach adopted here is guided by analytic convenience: simplifying the analysis into a two-person game.

The reader should note, however, that we can sustain the approach in the text by assuming endogenous formation of a coalition: the family members excluding the migrant decide to act together, as one unit, relative to the migrant. The head of the family then assumes the role of a "representative agent." The said decision is fueled by the expectation that by committing

Footnotes (Cont'd)

themselves to act together (rather than separately), the members are in a much better position when bargaining with the migrant on how to divide the maximal amount made available through pursuance of the migrant-family contractual arrangement. (See Sergiu Hart and Mordecai Kurz, "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica 51 (July 1983).)

8. This stylized version of how migrants enter the urban economy is assumed to hold irrespective of whether "formal" employment or "informal" employment is preferred. See Oded Stark, "On Modelling the Informal Section," World Development 10, No. 5 (May 1982).

9. For a theoretical exposition of the impact of rural-to-urban migration on technological change in agricultural production as well as for evidence that technological change has been facilitated by rural-to-urban migration, see Oded Stark, Economic-Demographic Interactions in Agricultural Development: The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration. See also A. S. Oberai and H. K. Manmohan Singh, "Migration, Remittances and Rural Development"; and Henry Rempel, Rural-Urban Labour Migration and Urban Unemployment in Kenya (Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1981) whose regression analysis led him to conclude that "the results appear to support the set of hypotheses associated with the Stark theses" (p. 145).

10. Incompleteness of futures markets implies that economic agents are typically "unable to realize on the current set of markets

Footnotes (Cont'd)

the full potential value of [their] future economic wealth." Roy Radner, "The Role of Private Information in Markets and Other Organizations," in Werner Hildenbrand (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Migration can be seen to constitute a particular form of investment in human capital. It is usually impossible to trade this type of capital even in competitive markets.

11. A simple possible explanation now coming to mind as to why urban-to-rural remittances which usually follow some rural-to-urban remittances are often comparatively large is that the familial implicit discount rate is fairly high. Hence, the deferred payment made by the migrant to compensate his family for earlier support must be large.

12. Here we differ from Robert A. Pollak, "A Transaction Costs Approach to Families and Households" mimeo (1983), who, not considering migration, attributes too great an importance to the small size of the family as a critical technical disadvantage in a familial insurance provision capacity.

13. What renders bringing in altruism and reciprocal altruism even more appealing is the repetitive nature of the migrant-family relationship (while, at the same time, allowing a multitute of degrees of altruism across families and across cultures). On the great multitude of altruistic equilibria in the repeated economy and attempts to narrow down the set of these equilibria

Footnotes (Cont'd)

see Mordecai Kurz, "Altruism as an Outcome of Social Interaction," American Economic Review 68, No. 2 (May 1978).

14. The analogies with production theory and organization theory are self-evident. In the former, specific assets cannot be redeployed without sacrificing productivity. In the latter, common ownership is a device reducing the incentive of the component units to pursue "local goals."

15. Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

16. See, for example, Joseph Gugler and William G. Flanagan, Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Gordon F. DeJohn and Robert W. Gardner (eds.), Migration Decision Making (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). This property is analytically exploited in Oded Stark, "Rural-to-Urban Migration in LDCs: A Relative Deprivation Approach," Economic Development and Cultural Change 32, No. 3 (April 1984).

17. Gary S. Becker, "Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociology," Journal of Economic Literature 14, No. 3 (September 1976); Gary S. Becker, "Reply to Hirshleifer and Tullock," Journal of Economic Literature 15, No. 2 (June 1977); Gary S. Becker, "Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market

Footnotes (Cont'd)

18. Two colleagues made helpful observations in this context. Michael Intriligator suggested that a strong "demonstration effect" could account for "proper" behaviour by the migrant. A migrant who is aware that his children are likelier to adhere to a contractual arrangement with him if they observe him adhering to a contractual arrangement with his own father is induced to behave accordingly. Imitation and recurrent behaviour are often critical elements in the formation of preferences and the evolutionary emergence of social norms of conduct. Reinhard Selten pointed out that he can see no compelling reason why the head of the family, on his death-bed, should be expected to adhere to the contractual arrangement even if the migrant has duly fulfilled all his remittance obligations. Since this is the moment of the last word, fear of reprisal cannot influence behaviour; bequests can be made and reapportioned absolutely freely. I tend to disagree with this argument. To see why, assume the alleged behaviour does take place. Yet the head of the family cannot assume that only he will break the arrangement whereas everyone else will not; so it follows that everyone has to be assigned the freedom of choice--to fulfill or not to fulfill. But then, the milieu giving rise to contractual arrangements of the nature discussed here will collapse and, along with it, the existence of a contractual arrangement such as the one from which the head of the

Footnotes (Cont'd)

family derives much benefit. Suppose we have two types of groups: one which has a "culture" or "norm" of abidance, another which does not. By the argument in the text, the former group will be better off and therefore its survival capacity will be higher. The said "culture" could even provide the first society with superior fitness in competition with the other society thus underlying a process of social evolution. To the extent that such "cultural traits" become embodied in the genetic material transferred across generations, a "social biology" type of causality might operate with abidance becoming an evolutionary stable trait. Thus, a mutual interaction between genetic material and types of cultural traits is set in motion whereby "the genetic material determines what kinds of culture traits can develop, while at the same time the culture traits that are present at any given moment are influencing the fitness and consequent survival of variations in the genes." Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). Since this need not guarantee unifrom abidance, only abidance on average, it is possible that extreme deviations from socially optimal cultural traits, viz. the head of the family on his death-bed brutally reneging on his contractual obligation--will evoke contravention by the village elderly and chiefs.

Considerations of social dynamic equilibrium may thus imply effective adherence by the head of the family to the

Footnotes (Cont'd)

contractual arrangement and its bequests clause even at the very end of his life.

19. Oded Stark, "Migration Theory, Game Theory and the Family: Towards a New Theory of Rural-to-Urban Migration in Less Developed Countries" (mimeo, 1981).

20. Frederik Zeuthen, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Welfare (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930); John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 18 (1950); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957); John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

21. Guy Standing, Income Transfers and Remittances: A Module for Migration Surveys (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981).

Youth protest in western Europe: four case studies

by HELMUT WILLEMS & ROLAND ECKERT

1. Selection of Cases and Data Basis

This paper presents four conflicts out of a multitude of cases of social unrest, protest, and social movements, all characterized by a high rate of youth participation, emerged in Western Europe in the early 80's (for a survey see: HALLER 1981 /BRAND 1983): the Zürich youth riots, the squatter movements in Berlin and Amsterdam, and the conflicts around runway-west in Frankfurt.

We concentrate on these conflicts for several reasons:

(1) The conflicts are confined to certain regions or cities so that it is easy to describe them (compared with the peace or ecology movement).
(2) The conflicts are also temporarily confined.
(3) The conflicts are related to concrete (political) targets and can therefore be analyzed in terms of success and failure.
(4) We have not considered conflicts between ethnic groups (the riots in Great Britain) or between social groups withoug explicit political targets (such as football fan clubs).
(5) We concentrated on conflicts with images that have been determined by youths.

These restrictions reduce the variety of variables and facts and thus facilitate comparative analysis. We want to demonstrate that these youth protests show some similarities and regularities in their origins, their structure and their dynamics, even when concrete causes, political and legal conditions as well as reactions of the respective political authorities differ greatly (see: CILIP 1981, p. 125-135). These common characteristics provide a meaningful basis for the effort to combine theories, which, thus far, have been used seperately and even competitively to explain social movements: "The "emerging norms" approach (TURNER/KILIAN 1972, p. 104; for the notion on illegitimacy see BLUMER 1978, p. 1-54; TURNER 1981, p. 8; with the theory of "relative deprivation" (GURR 1972, p. 31) and the "resource mobilization" theory (ZALD 1980, p. 61) with the theorem of differential "interpunction" (WATZLAWICK 1969, p. 57).

Data for these case studies have been taken from different sources:

(a) The reconstruction of the conflict processes is based on the analysis of different documentations containing media reports, reports of official authorities (police, political institutions, political parties), and of the protest factions (initiatives, young activists, sympathizers).

(b) In order to describe the divergent perspectives of young protesters, politicians and police, we have refered to documents in which the conflicting parties portrayed their experiences (self portraits, interviews, etc.).

(c) Data on the social structure and on political background have been taken from official statistics (such as voting statistics, police statistics, etc.) and from expert estimations.

To this date, we could not find any representative empirical study on the social structure of young protesters. The difficulty of such research project is demonstrated by KRIESI's recent study (1984, p. 243-244).

2. Background and Chronology of Events

2.1 The Zürich Youth Movement

Background

In 1980, the Swiss city of Zürich experienced the most violent youth protests in more than ten years. Political parties, politicians and police, to whom the youth had always appeared well-adjusted and apolitical, were taken by surprise. Consideration of the events leading up to the violence and of the immediate situation at its start, however, shows that this appraisal did not coincide with the social conditions and perspectives of the youths. Rather, it demonstrates the low capacity of these public institutions to perceive problems. (For

the perspective of youth see: GRUPPE OLTEN 1980; SP ZÜRICH 1980; LINDT 1981; a first interpretation of the Zürich youth conflict is given in EIDGENÖSSISCHE KOMMISSION FÜR JUGEND-FRAGEN 1980; a documentation of a more conservative view of the conflict is presented by BÜTLER / HÄBERLING 1981).

The youth protest and riots can be traced back to the student movement of the late 60's. At that time, young people in many West European cities demanded autonomous youth centers as a means for creating "Freiräume" - places free of the "authoritarian" structures of society. Although these demands were met by the leaders of other Swiss cities (Bern, Lausanne, etc.), similar attempts in Zürich were unsuccessful.

Chronology of Events

In the late 70's, the youths still lacked a place in the city where they could organize their own concerts and events and which could be used as a meeting place and provide overnight accomodations free of the controls and pressures of school, work and home. Citizens initiatives and youth groups (such as "Rock as Revolt") continued negotiating with the city over accomodations for their center. (KRIESI 1984, p.42; CILIP 1981, p.5). After having repeatedly and unsuccessfully presented their demands to the city parliament, which, during the same period, had planned and finally passed a resolution to provide a 60 million (SF) subsidy for the renovation of the Opera House, different youth groups, organized in the "Action Group Red Factory" (KRIESI 1984, p.42), planned a demonstration in front of the opera. By these means, they hoped to bring to the public's attention how traditional bourgeois culture was supported through stupendous financial aid while the youths were allowed to exist without their own center and their culture was left out on the streets.

The planned demonstration was prohibited by the city (demonstrations require a permit in Switzerland). Nonetheless, on May 30, 1980, a group of approximately 200 demonstrators gathered before the Opera House and attempted to block the entrance. The police then secured the entrance and ordered the demonstrators to leave premises. Their subsequent attempts to force the

demonstrators to leave resulted in violent clashes, the looting and ransacking of stores and a number of arrests. The ultimate result, however, was a rash of further illegal demonstrations (CILIP 1981, p.8; KRIESI 1984, p.44).

Within two days the number of demonstrators had increased to 1,500; now demanding the release of those arrested and protesting against the "brutal" methods of the police. The confrontation between youths and police intensified during the following weeks. A negotiated solution to the problem seemed impossible. Only after the Social Democrats declared their willingness to assume sponsorship for a center and granted the youths full autonomy, did the city offer a vacant building for use as a youth center.

Two months later, however, the center was closed after a police drug-raid. The youths feld robbed. More violent clashes with the police ensued. While the police had orders to prevent any and all demonstrations by "nipping them in the bud", the number of youths increased who considered street-fighting the only appropriate response to the closure of the center (CILIP 1981, p.14/15).

At the same time, popular support for the movement continued to grow. The movement was able to mobilize 5,000 to 8,000 people for a number of large demonstrations in the following autumn and spring. Through the mediation of a sponsor association, comprised in part by church groups, the youths succeeded in negotiating a new contract with the city for the re-opening of the youth center. The center was re-opened in the spring of 1981, but despite the improved financial conditions, was closed once again in the fall of the same year. This time, however, by the youths themselves. (A short overview on the chronology of events give ZÜFLE / JÜRGMEIER 1982, p. 10-16).

The constant conflicts with city authorities and police (more that 1,000 people had been arrested by October 1980) caused the resignation of a large proportion of the formerly committed personnel and a shift in the social structure of the movement. Few youths remained active in the Autonomous Youth Center (AYC) and were willing to commit themselves to its cause.

In contrast, the number of those who were not willing to devote their time to the construction of the AYC grew: drug-addicts, alcoholics, runaways and other marginal groups (punks, rockers). The problems with which they were confronted proved to be too much for the youths.

The AYC was demolished in March 1982. The struggle of the Zürich youths for a self-governed youth center had once again failed. A number of arrests and court investigations (145 by 1980 according to CILIP (1981, p. 20)) as well as a large number of injured comprise the negative balance of the youth disturbances (according to KRIESI approximately 4,000 persons have been arrested in connection with the Zürich youth protest; KRIESI 1984, p. 216).

2.2. The Squatter Movement in Berlin

Background

Between 1980 and 1982, squatters occupied almost 160 apartment houses in Berlin. Scientists and artists, sections of the media and churches, and politicians sided with the social experiment of "Instandbesetzung" (occupation as renovation) (KLEIN/POZ: 1981, p. 108).

Looking back, few can deny the relationship between the Berlin riots in 1980 and 1981 and the municipal urban renewal and housing policy of the past 20 years. Large-scale urban renewal (slum clearance), the demolition of whole old sections of the city and the construction of new high-rent apartments on the outskirts of Berlin were typical of a municipal development policy which transformed the architectural and social structure of complete districts. Old low-rent accomodations were demolished while real-estate speculation kept thousands of apartments vacant. New and renowated apartments, however, usually cost considerably more to rent than the old tenements. Apartments, especially cheap apartments, were in short supply (SPIEGEL 3, 1981; RIESE 1981, p. 94-106).

This situation was all the more dramatic for a city such as Berlin. Starting in the 1960's, it had grown to become the center of the West German "alternative" movement and youth subculture. It was and is the gravitating point for thousands of students and refuge for many draft-dodgers, unemployed youths and young drop-outs.

An old proletarian district, Kreuzberg, soon became the locality and symbol for this nascent subculture. This section was especially affected by large-scale urban renewal and by a planned motorway (CILIP 1981, p. 25). While the former residents of this district moved in increasing numbers into the newly constructed sattelite cities, Kreuzberg became the gathering place for those social groups whose members couldn't afford the rents in other districts (such as the Turkish immigrants) or were looking for inexpensive accomodations as "Freiräume" for cooperatives: from communes to alternative businesses.

The first squatting actions (initially involving young runaways and homeless youths) and politically motivated neighborhood initiatives (involving mostly students and social workers) began in the early seventies. Protest and resistance against urban renewal, which in this phase was carried out by isolated groups, met with no success. Youth centers, cooperatives and residents were quickly evicted from the squatted houses and the buildings were demolished (CILIP 1981, p. 28).

Chronology of Events

First contacts and coordinated efforts among the various initiatives opposed to the urban renewal policy of the city arose after the concept of large-scale urban renewal was declared a failure. The government therefore began looking for a new renewal concept for Kreuzberg. The "Strategies for Kreuzberg" project initiated by the Senate in March, 1977, strengthened the hopes of concerned residents for public participation and consideration of their interests (CILIP 1981, p. 28; ARCH+ 1977). Their consternation was thus all the more pronounced

when more tenements were torn down. Disappointed with the failure of negotiations with the city, the various groups coalesced into one citizens initiative and organized the first coordinated squatting actions in 1979.

Many more houses were taken over by squatters towards the end of 1979 and in early 1980. These latter actions, however, found an increasing amount of support coming from youths out of other parts of the city and West Germany (TAZ 2.7.1980). Although the squatters were evicted from only a few houses, and the police administration itself had called for a political solution to the squatting problem, the Senate didn't offer any concrete suggestions until the end of 1980. Contracts were to be drawn up with the "Instandbesetzern" (squatter-renovators), and in those cases where modernization plans had already received official consent, the squatters were to be relocated. The police were solely to prevent further squattings (SPIEGEL 52, 1980, p. 31-32).

In December 1980, the first violent confrontations between police and squatters (two to three thousand youths) erupted in connection with this policy. Over 100 people were injured and about 50 arrests were made. Mass demonstrations (15,000 participants) against police tactics and demanding the release of those in custody were staged during the following days (CILIP 1981, p. 34).

The squatters decided not to take part in any further negotiations until the jailed demonstrators were released. A series of demonstrations and riots in protest against the arrests and sentencing of demonstrators occurred during the ensuing weeks. The Senate reacted by announcing an emergency-program to provide a political solution to the squatting problem. This program was to be based on the "Berlin Line of Reason" (SONNEWALD/RAABE-ZIMMERMANN 1983) already practiced by the police. According to this plan, squatters were to be evicted only when the owner of the building filed a criminal complaint and could prove that the building was to be modernized in the immediate future.

Unlike the police and the Senate, however, the District Attorney's Office pressed for a police-enforced legal solution to the squatter problem. On the grounds of suspected criminal conspiracy, the district attorney ordered the police to evict squatters from some houses and conduct raids in others (TAZ 6.2.1981). The ensuing rash of violent demonstrations and riots increased public pressure on the SPD/FDP-governed Senate and their "Berlin Line".

In the Senate elections of May 1981, held after the Social Democratic (SPD) Government had resigned (following a construction scandal), the Christian Democtatic Union (CDU) became the most powerful party. They promised to continue with the SPD-line. At the same time, however, they declared that they were no longer going to tolerate the existence of extralegal enclaves. The dual-strategy of the CDU in Berlin had unfortunate consequences: while the Senator of Construction conducted negotiation with the squatters and property owners, the Senator of the Interior and Police ordered further evictions, even when contracts were about to be sealed (TAZ 24.6.1981; TAZ 21.9.1981).

The squatters felt as if they had been cheated out of their political solution. They reacted with mass demonstrations, street battles with the police and the looting and ransacking of stores. These events, in turn, were used as a justification for further evictions. The squatters split into two increasingly polarized groups: one willing to negotiate and a radical group (TAZ 8.7. 1983).

One militant group of squatters considered street violence the only appropriate answer to the evictions. A political solution to the squatting question seemed to be impossible after an 18-year-old was killed in one of these actions. The squatters' distrust of politicians was too entrenched. The militant actions of the squatters increased (TAZ 25.9.1981).

Finding itself under increasing public pressure, the Senate considered the squatters more and more as just a question of security. In a report submitted by the Senator of the Interior in 1983, the appx. 5,000 squatters identified by the police

were accused of committing 9,322 crimes. Most of the crimes, however, were directly related to the squatting actions: for example, the theft of water and electricity, trespassing etc. Police eviction was thus considered to be the sole possible alternative. Of the 165 squatted buildings in 1981 only 56 were still occupied by squatters in mid-1983; 47 had been cleared by the police, and 45 legalized through contracts. The squatters gave up 19 voluntarily (DIE ZEIT, No. 33, 12.8.1983).

2.3. The Kraker Movement in Amsterdam

Background

The Kraker movement in Amsterdam began during the sixties as a self-help initiative composed of youths and young families to whom the municipal housing authority could provide no living quarters. Many of these people had been on the waiting lists of the authority for a prolonged period of time. According to a law from 1947, the city had the power to dispose over the inexpensive living quarters of private owners and distribute them as they saw fit. But the bureaucratic distribution resulted in chaos. In 1979-1980, appx. 60,000 residents were listed as looking for living quarters, as opposed to appx. 10,000 vacant apartments, uninhabited because of real estate speculation and luxury modernization (DER SPIEGEL, No. 18, 1980, p. 148).

Under these circumstances, Kraken - or squatting - was the last chance for many apartment-seekers. Although a number of apartments and houses were being squatted by the mid-seventies, the Kraker movement had not made much of an impact on the political scene at that time.

This may have been due to the legal situation: according to a criminal court decision from 1971, trespassing is only then a criminal offence when the squatted apartment was still in use at the time of its occupation. Thus, police and property owners were denied access to a squatted apartment that had previously been vacant. Owners could assert their property claims only through protracted civil court proceedings (CILIP 1981, p. 47).

Chronology of Events

The dispute between the Kraker and the authorities first assumed the contours of a public political conflict during 1975 in connection with the planned construction of a subway through an old district of Amsterdam (Nieuwmarkt District) (CILIP 1981, p. 47). A number of action groups opposing the urban-renewal policy of the city were formed. They squatted apartment houses which were to be torn down, staged demonstrations and barricaded the houses against police eviction.

When city authorities continued their subway plans, the police took their first massive measures against the squatters. The result was a series of violent clashes between police, squatters and demonstrators during the following weeks. The Nieuwmarkt conflict intensified the Kraker's and many Nieuwmarkt residents' distrust for city policy (CILIP 1981, p. 50).

The number of squattings increased rapidly during the following years. Many young people became involved who did not consider squatting solely as a cooperative means for fighting the housing shortage, but also as a form of political protest and demonstration of "alternative" life styles. This increase in the scope of the movement can be traced in part to the influx of youths coming from the alternative subculture, with its long tradition dating back to the "Provo" movement in the early sixties and youths who shared with the Kraker the belief in political protest.

According to estimates of Amsterdam's housing authority, more than 10,000 apartments were illegaly occupied in 1980. The Kraker movement had created its own infrastructure: organized information and consulting offices for apartment seekers, maintained cafes and offices where complaints concerning police "brutality" were filed and organized neighborhood committees for the discussion of strategy and public information actions. Mass actions were planned by a municipal committee (TAZ, 18.7. 1980; TAUBER 1981).

Although the Kraker could look to a growing number of sympathizers in the general public - mostly church and social

groups and some politicians - opposition came from those groups demanding a legal, police-enforced solution to the Kraker problem.

The number of evictions based on trespassing charges and the demands for an "Anti-Squatting" Bill increased after 1977. Early in 1980, the debate surrounding the "Groote Keyser" developed into an open conflict. After negotiations had failed and the owner had succeeded in obtaining an eviction order through civil court, the house became the meeting place and symbol of resistance for the Kraker movement. They barricaded themselves in the house and prepared for possible eviction. The discussion of the use of violence in case of police eviction intensified.

Meanwhile, a house in Vrondel street which had already been cleared by police was reclaimed by the Kraker. There ensued the largest outbreak of violence up to that date. Streets were barricaded, demonstrators arrested. Negotiations in which the removal of barricades was offered in return for the release of jailed demonstrators brought no results. At the same time, public pressure on authorities and police mounted.

In early March, 1980, authorities resorted to the largest use of police force up to that date to evict the squatters. Extreme riots and street fights were the results (DER SPIEGEL, No. 11, 1980, p. 155). The Kraker responded tc the police action with further rioting on Coronation Day, April 30, 1980. Although the police were given clear orders to act only in defense, a Kraker demonstration developed into the confrontation whith police desired by some of the demonstrators. Looting and the ransacking of stores followed. More youths from the suburbs were drawn into the battle during the course of the day by the reports broadcast over the Kraker radio station.

The Kraker's readiness to resort to violence took the police and the public by surprise. They believed that instigators, and not the Kraker alone, were responsible for the new potential for violence. The police were provided with improved technical equipment and a new strategy.

At the same time, public opposition to the Kraker movement grew. During late 1980, the parliament discussed new laws intended to prohibit squatting (Vacancy Bill) and to grant the police more powers (TAUBER 1981, p. 134). Even a committee, "Citizens Support Police", was formed which called for a more severe treatment of the squatters.

Differences of opinion, however, also revealed themselves within the Kraker movement. Besides the question of violence, questions concerning political goals and strategies of the movement formed the principal focus of debate. The role of the autonomous faction, with its violence-oriented action forms of protest, was discussed and criticized, primarily in terms of their effect on the public.

In spite of further squatting action, evictions and occassional disputes, there have been fewer confrontations between the police and the Kraker. Even though the housing situation has worsened since 1980, the Kraker movement has quieted down. The struggle in the streets has been brought to a temporary halt. Authorities as well as squatters try to avoid violent confrontations.

2.4. The Conflict over Runway-West (Frankfurt)

Background

In April 1984, a new runway was put into use at the Frankfurt airport. This runway has been the subject of legal and political conflict for more than 15 years (see KESSEL's Chronology 1982, p. 9-26). During the period from 1978 to 1982, it became a focal point for the West German ecology movement in its struggle against the destruction of the environment and against established environmental policy.

First opposition to the runway project arose immediately after the Frankfurt Airport Authority announced its planned construction in 1961. Petitions addressed to the Hessian Par-

liament, more than 10,000 private objections and more than 100 complaints filed among others by surrounding cities and communities characterized this first phase of opposition. No demonstrations were staged during this phase. Protest occurred in the form of public debate, poster actions, information rallies and court litigation.

The supporters of this opposition were a sort of provincial political elite: besides numerous county and local authorities and local party factions (mostly from the SPD), conservation groups and local dignitaries were primarily involved with concerned citizens in the organization of various initiatives (for detailed analysis of the opposing factions see RUCHT 1984, p. 209 f.). The common denominator at that time was the trust in the powers of democratic decisions: especially after these groups had succeeded in affecting a court-ordered stay of plan realization until the grounds of their complaints had been clarified.

Towards the end of the seventies, when it had become apparent that their interests were receiving only insufficient consideration by the courts, the initiatives increased their publicity work and attempted to find support for their cause by mobilizing the local population.

Many citizens had been sensitized by the legal discussion of the runway and the publicity actions of the various initiatives. During this period, the runway-west opponents had access to the infrastructure of the German ecology movement, which was organized on national and regional levels. Lastly, they could mobilize a complex heterogeneous youth subculture, already existing in Frankfurt.

Chronology of Events

Although the courts had reached no decisions, the Hessian State Government sold the land to the Airport Authority in November 1978 and thus rendered possible the start of construction (KESSEL 1982, p. 11).

The various initiatives then united into one "Citizens Initiative Against Airport Expansion" and increased their information and mobilization activities among the resident population. Many information and protest actions were staged between 1978 and 1980 (TAZ, 12.4.1984; KESSEL 1982, p. 10-15).

The runway plans received court consent in the autumn of 1980: construction could begin. The conflict took on new forms and, for the first time, active forms of resistance: bicycle demonstrations, hunger strikes by local politicians, mass demonstrations with more than 10,000 participants, and non-violent actions such as reforestation. A "Hüttendorf" (hut village) was built in the woods which was to be cleared as a symbol of resistance and expression of determination. (KARASEK (1981) gives a description of the every-day life and the organization of active resistance in the hut village).

The growth of the movement and the media's sympathy for its cause put the SPD/FDP government under increased pressure to justify its actions. The clearing of the woods was suspended and the situation became less volatile. In February 1981, a public hearing was held in the Hessian Parliament: it brought no concrete results and the initiatives viewed it as a legitimation tactic of the government (IMSF 1981, p. 171).

The consequences of the uncompromising attitude of the politicians were borne out in the local elections in March 1981. In Mörfelden-Walldorf, a community located in the approach path of the proposed runway, the Greens won 25 % of the vote, the SPD lost 13 %, and the CDU lost 8 %, compared with the last community elections: a clear rejection of the established parties (source: IMSF 1981, p. 201).

Clearing work at the runway site was suddenly resumed in the fall of 1981, taking the runway opponents by surprise and making clear the possible failure of their resistance. For the first time, internal rifts developed in the movement over the question of future perspectives. Thereafter, resistance continued on two distinct levels. An action was initiated in May 1981 to collect signatures for a petition in support of a referendum (KESSEL 1982,

p. 15). This gave the movement the impulse to expand beyond the region and to affiliate with other similarly oriented groups.

At the same time, the inhabitants of the hut village became more resolute in their resistance. The village, as a symbol of resistance and instrument for the defense of the threatened area, was the gravitating point for many urban youths. These groups preferred active forms of resistance and saw the only hope for success in the fight against the state and its representatives. They prepared themselves for the impending raid and guarded the entrance to the site. Alarm plans and telephone chains were expanded and the defense of the woods organized (see KARASEK 1981).

The conflict escalated following the unexpected clearance of the village: the ensuing battle in the Flörsheim Forest between demonstrators and police gave rise to solidarity demonstrations in many German cities.

The first large demonstration against the runway took place on November 14, 1981 (KESSEL 1982, p. 20). 150,000 runway opponents gathered in the state capital, Wiesbaden, to present signatures in support of a referendum. The supreme court denied the proposition as unconstitutional. In view of the impending construction of the runway, the movement's failure seemed near.

After that, the movement entangled itself in debate over future strategies while the violent confrontations at the construction site continued. Only the spectacular jail sentences given demonstrators could keep the movement temporarily together.

3. Size and Structure of the Protest Movements

Data on the size and socio-demographic composition of youth protest movements is very unsystematic and incomplete. Since we lack representative polls as well as total lists of protest participants, our analysis is restricted to the estimates found in available studies and official statistics. Thus, the size and structure of protest movements can only be deduced from the number of demonstration or direct action participants, or people arrested in connection with the protests.

According to Kriesi's estimate, the Z ü r i c h youth movement consisted of a total of 20,000 people. 4,000 people (other estimates give 1,500 to 3,000 people; see HALLER 1983, p. 143), who were arrested in connection with the youth protest, are termed "active participants". Finally, another 500 people who were arrested several times represent the active core of the Z ü r i c h youth movement (KRIESI 1984, p. 246).

For the squatter movement in B e r l i n , the estimated number of squatters is between 2,000 and 3,000 people (CILIP 1981, p. 27; HALTER 1981, p. 102), and according to police statistics, almost 5,000 people (source: Official Statistic of the Senator of the Interior in Berlin 1983). Estimates on the size of the total movement (including sympathizers and active participants) range from 10,000 to 15,000 persons (CILIP 1981, p. 27).

The number of participants in the protest movement in A m s t e r d a m shows even a higher range: appx. 10,000 active squatters and 30,000 sympathizers constituted the movement (CILIP 1981, p. 49; TAUBER 1981, p. 116-117).

The estimation of the size of the runway-west movement in F r a n k f u r t is even more difficult. With respect to the kind of action, there were 220,000 supporters of a referendum (FR, 16.[illegible]981), 150,000 demonstrators at a large demonstration in the state capital, 10,000 to 20,000 participants in a variety of demonstrations at the construction site, and finally 1,000 to 3,000 active opponents who even participated in direct actions (including violence) against the construction of the runway (for these figures see: TAZ 12.4.1984; RUCHT 1984,

p. 234, 236). The figures vary according to source and with respect to the stage of the conflict, and have to be differentiated according to the kind of activity.

For these reasons, we have to be very careful in deducing the rate of young people participating in protest movements from these figures. Kriesi interpreted the age structure of those Z ü r i c h protesters that were prosecutet in connection with the unrest as indices of the demographic structure of the total movement. (See table 1)

Table 1

PERSONS PROSECUTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ZORICH YOUTH UNREST

Age structure	total: 754 = 100 %
under 18 years	24 %
18 - 19 years	21 %
20 - 25 years	32 %
more than 25 years	23 %

source: KRIESI 1984, p. 213

This figure can be compared to the demographic structure of B e r l i n ' s squatters: 24,5 % of 4,954 people, registered as squatters by the police, were under 21 years of age; 40,2 % between 21 and 25; and 35,3 % were over 25 (see table 2). Both statistics show that youths and young adults (up to 25 years) are the dominant age groups: this is more significant in Z ü r i c h , with 77 %, than in B e r l i n (64,7 %). This difference is even more striking if we consider just the lowest age group: 45 % of the prosecuted protesters in Z ü r i c h were under 20 years of age, in B e r l i n only 24 % (under 21 years). Comparable figures are not available for the Frankfurt and Amsterdam movement.

The here presented youth protests of the 80's show a greater social heterogenity that their forerunners in the 60's and 70's. Although students participated in a great number (22 % academics and students in Zürich (KRIESI 1984, p. 216); 36 % students in Berlin and even 40 % students in Amsterdam (CILIP 1981, p. 47)),

their dominance in shaping the protest image has been weakened by the increasing participation of a) workers and employees, especially in Zürich (69 %) and in Amsterdam (39 %) and b) marginal groups (38 % unemployed or with unknown job in Berlin).

Table 2

AGE STRUCTURE AND RATE OF EMPLOYMENT OF BERLIN SQUATTERS

Squatters		
total number		4954
age	under 21 years	24,5 %
	21 to 25 years	40,2 %
	more than 25 years	35,3 %
job/ education	employed	26 %
	student	36 %
	unemployed/unknown job	38 %

source: Official Statistic of the Senator of the Interior, Berlin, 1983

4. Subject of Conflict and the Participation of Youth

The conflicts presented here are defined as being both political and youth conflicts. The political aspect refers to the question to what degree political decisions or political facts have been the triggering factors or subjects of the conflicts. The concept of youth questions the role of youth in these conflicts.

4.1. Subject of Conflict

In two of the cases presented, problems specifically related to youth and a deficiency of youth policies have been subject and starting point of the conflicts. In Z ü r i c h , some young people lacked a place in the city where they could realize their own alternative culture and their ideas of different ways of living.

Though the release of an empty factory was decided in a referendum in 1977 (SCHÄR 1981, p. 25), politicians have not been prepared to meet the needs of those young people who don't feel at home in the conventional bourgeois culture and world and therefore demand their own living space, free from the authoritarian structure of society. At the same time, the expansion of the city was threatening exactly those areas in which the alternative scene and youth subculture had found cheap accomodation for their "Wohngemeinschaften" (communes), their alternative enterprises, etc. (KRIESI 1984, p. 207).

While the emergence of a youth subculture in Z ü r i c h was perceived neither by the general public nor by politicians, the background of the B e r l i n youth conflicts of the early eighties was characterized by the immense increase of a youth subculture (students, those still at school, drop-outs, spontis, those avoiding conscription) with a great need for cheap accomodations in the city. The contraction of the market for cheap accomodations was increased by an urban renewal policy that tried to replace old low-rent accomodations in the city with new apartment blocks on the outskirts of the city.

The same is true for the situation in A m s t e r d a m . In this case, the town administration itself had produced a large marginal group of people looking for a place to live by monopolizing the distribution of cheap accomodation without insuring a continued supply through their planning.

In these three cases, it has been a lack of political foresight that has preceeded the unrest:

(a) Social and cultural changes of parts of the population, here specifically youth, and with this changing needs and demands which have not been perceived or taken seriously;

(b) political decision and planning are too rigid to react on short notice to changing needs.

In contrast to these cases, the conflict around runway-west in F r a n k f u r t has developed as a conflict between

local (resident) and supra local (transport) interests, and broadened into a confrontation around basic principals of decision-making in modern societies.

4.2. The Participation of Youth in Conflicts

Even in Z ü r i c h , the classic example of contemporary youth protest, there were at first relatively small, politically and culturally active nuclear groups of young people and young adults as well as some older activists who set the themes of the conflict and formulated its contents, before youth protest as a public conflict became concrete in the opera-house riots (KRIESI 1984, p. 42 f.).

The mass participation of youth was absent at the beginning of the conflict, but arose with its transformation into a fundamental public confrontation.

Likewise in B e r l i n : Here, citizen-initiatives, neighborhood groups, local politicians and politically active students were the first to conserve inexpensive accomodations. That youth participated in such large numbers, and for their part saw a chance for participation and self-regulation, is unthinkable without the initiatives of the aforementioned groups and the transformation of the conflict into public protest and self-help movements (CILIP 1981, p. 28).

The development of youth participation in the conflicts in A m s t e r d a m appears to be similar: houses have been occupied again and again for more than ten years; not primarily by young people, but by different minorities in the housing market (foreigners, large families, drop-outs and those on limited incomes; TAUBER 1981, p. 114-134). Young people could first be won over as a resource for neighborhood and self-help initiatives, after the protest against the passing of a drastic sanitary measure had changed to a thoroughly, public and exemplary conflict (CILIP 1981, p. 50).

The confrontation around runway-west in F r a n k f u r t first also developed without the dominant participation of young

people. It involved mainly local politicians, conservationists, worried citizens and communities who had been trying for years to push through their interests in legal confrontation (TAZ 12.4.1984; BI GEGEN FLUGHAFENERWEITERUNG 1982, p. 10; IMSF 1981, p. 136 f.).

It was only when they became aware of the failure of legal means, and when the conflict moved out of the court-room and onto the streets, that the conflict became attractive for young people (with different ideological orientations). For many of them the struggle around the runway and the direct confrontation with state agencies became the crystallization of a common eco-political way of thinking and living. Although young people could determine the image of the runway movement in this phase of mass protest and active opposition, they were not the initiators of the movement. They could, however, be mobilized as a resource and gave their stamp, especially through their attention attracting actions, to the conflict.

4.3. Implications Concerning Resource Mobilization

(a) Youth can appear in conflicts as both initiators of protest, specifically related to youth problems, and as a resource or recruits for conflicts, with no specific youth-oriented themes.

(b) The mobilization of youth as resource of social movements, that is,the mass participation of youth in conflict, initially appears with the transformation of the conflict: from a legal level to the public level; from discussion, complaints, and petitions to forms of unconventional political participation such as protest, demonstrations, blockades and riots.

5. Success and Failure of the Protest Movements

Youth protest of the eighties could only have a minimal influence on political decisions.

In Z ü r i c h the demands of the youths for their own youth center have yet to be fulfilled. Instead, many of them are now even more aware of their predicament. The distance and mistrust in relation to established parties is most likely greater than it was before the conflict. On these grounds, the representatives of the movement succeeded in receiving 7,000 votes in the municipal elections in the spring of 1982 (see ZÜFLE/JÜRGMEIER 1982, p. 14).

The public was polarized with respect to the disturbances in Z ü r i c h . Proponents of the hard line, who won the election, considered themselves to be proven correct. The Social Democratic Party, which had acted on behalf of the youths, turned out to be the biggest loser in the elections.

The "hard line" received further blessings through a decision of the Federal Supreme Court: the law concerning breach of public peace was amended. Thereafter, anyone can be arrested for breach of the peace in Switzerland who "willfully remains in a crowd, assembled with the basic intent of threatening the peace" (ZÜFLE/JÜRGMEIER 1982, p.14). The politicians apparently don't consider the possibility of a political solution to the youth problem.

In B e r l i n , squatting was no longer a problem for city authorities by the end of 1983. The majority of squatted houses had been cleared out and the resistance to "police clean-ups" had subsided. The squatter movement in Berlin seems to have fallen apart. Arisen from the immediate protest against the housing shortage and urban renewal policy, it had become the crystallizing factor of a social movement which soon turned to other themes. The failure of political solutions and the uselessness of violent conflict caused many squatters to acquiesce. At the same time, the movement had provided hope and refuge

for many youths who had been forced on to the margins of the labor and housing markets. There is thus a large number of voluntary or involuntary young drop-outs standing by as a personel resource for future demonstrations.

Only few attempts are being made to develop political solutions to the youth, housing and thus the squatting problem. Instead, many youths find themselves confronted by the executive powers of the state. The radicalization during the last conflicts were results of this policy (CILIP 1981, p. 35). Even those youths who were willing to negotiate consider themselves to be the victims of political delaying tactics. They are sceptical of the Senate's aid program for cooperatives (7.5 million German marks in 1983) because of the senate-controlled method of distribution. Many initiatives are only willing to resort to this financial source after they have already created their own sponsors (e.g. "alternative" construction companies). These beginnings of an institutionalization within the movement demonstrate that the B e r l i n squatting movement has also had positive effects. The movement succeeded in negotiating contracts for a number of apartment houses and thus created living quarters for some of its members. At the same time, it built up a social and organizational infrastructure which functions and will continue to function as a basic for cooperatives and for the protest and participation of the population.

At its peak, the squatter movement had many sympathizers and received support from political, cultural and clerical groups. They entered public discussion and thereby initiated a critical reconsideration of the social and political roots of the conflict. The B e r l i n squatters were copied in many other West German cities and thus brought traditional urban renewal policy under broad attack.

There have, however, been few concrete political results or changes as a result of the squatting conflict. The election results from May 1981, in which the Alternative List was voted into the

Berlin Senate as advocate of the squatters' cause, demonstrate the political effects of the movement. Appx. 25 % of the 18-29 year olds voted for the Alternative Liste. Among the 24-29 year old males, the Alternative Liste received even more votes than the CDU, the strongest party. While the SPD/FDP (Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party) coalition lost the most votes in the 18-29 age group, the Alternative List gained the most votes (14.7 %) (figures from: Representative Voters Statistics, Berlin 1981). Many youths and marginal social groups considered themselves to have parliamentary representation for the first time.

In terms of housing and urban renewal policy, nothing has changed. Large-scale real estate speculation is still permitted. According to conservative estimates, more than 5,000 apartments in renewal districts were still empty in June, 1983, and appx. 1,000 subsidized apartments were vacant because the rent was too high.

The squatter movement was at most only partly responsible for the increased orientation of urban renewal policy towards a more selective instead of a district concept. The financial failure of the traditional concept was surely an important factor in bringing about this change.

In spite of all the conflicts, the authorities and the general public in A m s t e r d a m have shown understanding for the problems of the mostly youthful apartment seekers and their special forms of self-help. In many cases, the city has purchased squatted houses and thus avoided conflict between squatters and owners. Unlike Berlin, where squatting as such was the goal of police eviction, the Dutch have adopted a more differentiated strategy. The city accepts the squatters and supports them, sometimes financially, not only because they provide a temporary solution to pressing housing problems, but moreover because they perform important social work with marginal groups (drug addicts, alcoholics) in the squatted houses. The objects of police evictions were always individual squatted houses.

The Kraker movement, however, has not succeeded in affecting new concepts in urban renewal policy. Nor has it succeeded in bringing in new legislation for the prevention of real estate

speculation. Existing possibilities for citizen participation have also not been improved.

The runway-west in F r a n k f u r t was completed in 1984. The movement against runway-west has thus failed to achieve its goal. Nevertheless, there have been some results and political effects that deserve to be noted.

The anti-runway-west movement was a new element for the West German ecology movement in at least two respects: moreso than almost every other protest against a large-scale technical project, the movement was initiated and supported by the residents of the region; the social and age composition of the movement as well as its permanence and continuity are unique in the history of the ecology movement. The protest against runway-west could be organized as a mass movement within the immediate region. The interests and concerns of the opponents and those affected by the runway had long been the subjects of public discussions. Questions concerning the ecological and political limits to large-scale technological projects became permanent themes in the media and had affected voter behavior. The established parties lost votes on the local and state levels, whereas the Greens are now capable of directly representing the interests of many runway opponents in the political decision making process. The movement has thus gained a foothold in Parliament (see table 3).

Table 3

ELECTION OF HESSIAN PARLIAMENT, September 1982:

Results on state level, city level, county level and in a village near runway-west

	Hessen	Frankfurt	Groß-Gerau-East*	Mörfelden-Walldorf**
CDU	45.6 %	44.8 %	39.2 %	34.3 %
SPD	42.8 %	40.3 %	39.6 %	27.8 %
FDP	3.1 %	2.9 %	2.2 %	2.1 %
GRONE	8.0 %	11.3 %	18.2 %	33.5 %
Others	0.5 %	0.5 %	0.8 %	2.2 %

* county in which runway-west is located
** village adjaccent to runway-west

from: Frankfurter Rundschau, 28.9.1982

Conclusions

The new (youth) movements have been successful in the media: with their specific kinds of action (mass demonstration, rule breaking, fantasy, violence) they could attract the media's attention and thus could create new issues in public discussion. Thus, they could influence public opinion.

They have not, however, been successful in directly influencing political decisions with respect to their goals. So, as the German journalist Spoerl put it: "Movements have achieved nothing, but they have changed a lot".

6. Theoretical Propositions

6.1. Emergent Norms and Relative Deprivation as a Product of Youth Subcultures

Concerning Z ü r i c h , Kriesi (1984, p. 205) writes: "The scene formed the center of what, in the summer of 1980, had constituted a movement, although it did not form the whole movement. This had been supported by sympathizers from the counter-culture already in existence in Zürich and more importantly by its infrastructure. Lastly, during the course of the disputes, new young people had been mobilized and radicalized, who up until that point in time had been apolitical ..."

The same applies to the other conflicts. In all cases youth subcultures with hedonistic orientations, anarchistic ideologies and their own legitimacy beliefs formed the main recruiting ground, independent of whether the young people had initiated the protest movements themselves or they had just been mobilized as a resource during a specific phase of the conflict. Subcultures are held together by the existence of informal communication networks and personal relationships. In these, individual and collective biographies can be reinterpreted and reconstructed. Common patterns of construction and interpretation of reality and events can be developed; and political as well as personal ideas, needs and targets can be redefined.

The theory of emerging norms (TURNER/KILIAN 1972; BLUMER 1978) tries to deal with these internal dynamics of group specific production of the interpretation of reality, of normative codes of behavior, and of expectations and hopes. The espectations and norms do not only arise out of the conflict dynamics, but are partly already formed in groups and networks of the subcultures. According to the subjective experience, it seems to be possible to generalize and make them enduring. The success in gaining public attention and support of other social groups and the authority's loss of confidence produces rising

expectations with respect to an immediate realization of the youths' goals and lifestyles.

This dynamic can be demonstrated with an example: The success of youth in other Swiss towns with regard to their own youth centers was certainly a sign for the youth of Z Ü R I C H that their demand was legitimate and could be realized. Kriesi pointed out that positive exeriences of youth in other illegal actions preceeded the opera-house riots in Zürich (KRIESI 1984, p. 43-44). The experiences that the city sometimes tolerated the illegal actions of youth, and that youth could reach their goals under certain circumstances, can be interpreted in terms of the theory of rising expectation as a decisive psychological impulse for the opera-house demonstration. Similarly, the first success of squatters in B E R L I N encouraged further squatts. The squatters' inability to understand and their feeling of illegitimacy of the authorities' reactions were all the greater when these new squatts were prevented or the squatters were evicted (CILIP 1981, p. 28). These newly emerged norms finally find opposition in society. With this arises the experience of deprivation and, at the same time, the loss of legitimacy of state authorities. (For the notion of illegitimacy see BLUMER 1978, p. 1-54; DAVIES' J-curve of rising and declining satisfaction is described in: DAVIES 1969; see also TRAUGOTT's emphasis on positive solidarity in: TRAUGOTT 1978, p. 38).

It is only this interdependancy of emerging norms and rising expectations that makes the meaning of certain events understandable that have often been causes or triggering factors of protest. These events, therefore, symbolize and make concrete the experience of deprivation: e.g. the 60-million-Francs-subsidy for traditional bourgeois culture in Z Ü R I C H compared with the procrastination in providings for a youth center; the demolition of old accomodations in B E R L I N and A M S T E R-D A M and at the same time the tolerating of real estate speculation; the policy of facts in spite of public protest and still ongoing legal struggles in F R A N K F U R T (TAZ 5.10. 81).

6.2. Differential Interpunction and Escalation

Differences in the construction of reality between youth subcultures and protest groups on the one hand and reacting state agencies on the other, lead to differential interpunction of sequences of events, as Watzlawick and others (1969, p. 57) have shown for interpersonal perception. This differential interpunction is not only a basic condition for comprehension and action, but can also be of strategic importance, especially when one's own behavior has to be legitimized for oneself or a third party, or when the behavior of the opponent of a conflict can be discredited or critizised in the eyes of a third party. Differential interpunction, that is the attribution of guilt and cause, can be used to mobilize support. This is true for conflict situations, in which the main groups are dependent on support from third parties.

In the conflicts presented here, it was above all the question of who first resorts to violence or breaks the rules of conflict management (promisis, agreements, legal norms) that led to a spiraling of reactions which often ended in violent clashes. In the case of Z Ü R I C H , Kriesi has demonstrated the differential interpunction of events: "Depending on the point of view, the start of the sequence of events and the actions and reactions are defined in a different way. The one maintains that the violence of the movement is merely a reaction to police provocation .... the others see in police violence a legitimate reaction to the disturbing violence of the 'Chaoten'" (KRIESI 1984, p. 39).

The same can be shown for the conflict in B E R L I N , A M S T E R D A M and F R A N K F U R T . What is cause and what is effect can only be determined from the specific perspective of the acting party and of their image of their opponents. Given a situation that can be characterized by mistrust, such as conflict, the process described above will initiate other processes of self-fulfilling prophecies. The anticipation of

the behavior of the opponent in one's own behavior will be experienced by the other as confirmation of his own image of the opponent, according to which he must now react. Some examples: The experience of policemen, who have been the object to violence in demonstrations, announced as being non-violent, has strengthened the police's image of demonstrators as being "Chaoten" and riot makers, and has led to technical rearmament and changed police strategies. Conversely, the experiences and interpretations of the demonstrators: When "ringleaders" were taken into preventative custody in Z Ü R I C H ; when squatts had been cleared in B E R L I N , although the Senate had promised contracts to legalize the squatts; when a referendum about runway-west in F R A N K - F U R T had been rejected by the courts; when in Z Ü R I C H , B E R L I N , A M S T E R D A M and F R A N K F U R T it was experienced that the behavior of the police during protests depends not only on legal regulations but also on the strength of the protest parties: then all these experiences produced for many young people the image of politicians and police who do not keep their promises or even keep to the law, but on the contrary use agreements and the law for their own purposes. This has led to a radicalization of the protest scene, which now legitimize their own, even violent actions by pointing to the example of the actions of the opponent.

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Mothers, fathers and 'big brother' in New Zealand: change in New Zealand families and the policy response

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At the turn of this century, changes in the family were being identified and explained by theorists within an evolutionary mode. The effects of industrialisation on the family became the focus in the 1950s, while more recent analysis has focussed on the inter-relationships between family change and a capitalist economy.

The social policy response to these changes has similarly been constrained or facilitated by the industrialisation of society and the form of its political economy. Yet most analysis of, at least, the policies of the western world shows that there is neither a consistent ideological policy response to such family changes, nor that other influences form a consistent influence on policy formulation.

Current debate has also encompassed the search for the underlying principles of social policy, so that policy can more adequately address the continuing changes in the family. The extent of state intervention and the focus of such, be it the individual, the family or the household have become issues of importance in efforts to more appropriately match family change and social policy.

In this paper, broad changes in New Zealand families this century are described, along with the social policy response to these changes. Trends in state policies are then considered in reference to Heclo's formulations, followed by the identification of the continuing issues: the focus of policy, and the underlying principles of equity, rights and independence. Directions for future policy are suggested focussed on the unit of dependency.

RECENT CHANGES IN THE NEW ZEALAND FAMILY

It is debatable as to whether changes in the New Zealand family this century have been any different to those in other industrial and capitalist societies. Detailed comparative analysis including New Zealand has yet to be undertaken. It is suggested that such research might find few unique

characteristics or changes. A few might be based on the influence of the British through migration. This influence probably maintained the norm of marriage at a relatively late age until the 1920s, despite pressures of economic necessity and an unequal sex ratio to marry earlier. New Zealand's patriotic involvement in numerous overseas wars has also led to increases in marital instability and divorce on the return of servicemen. The second world war saw the necessary participation of women in paid employment, and although they were later abruptly replaced by returning servicemen the experience was probably to influence the type of socialisation these women later gave their children. The realities of a frontier society have also been reflected in the termination of many marriages by widowhood or desertion, where husbands were killed by accidents or left their wives and family for the lure of gold, coal, or more exotic lands. Solo parent families have a long history in New Zealand. A final example of potentially unique aspects of the New Zealand family might be the establishment of the Plunket Society (more properly called the Royal New Zealand Society for the Health of Women and Children) in 1907, which grew to have jurisdiction over the health and welfare of all mothers and their children, and meant an almost monolithic system of child rearing for over fifty years.

Changes in the New Zealand family have more importantly been influenced by events effecting all other industrial and capitalist societies - the 1930s depression saw the separation of family members for economic reasons, the affluence of the 1950s and 60s brought a normative status to the nuclear family with its traditional role specialisation, and the international rights movements helped to establish legislative changes in the rights of minority groups, including women and children. More specific changes in New Zealand this century are now s out.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Writing in the 1950s and 60s, structural-functionalists identified a number of now very familiar changes in the family: the nucleation of the family, the functional specialisation and the isolation of families. Nucleation of the

family, through any 'breakdown' of the extended family is hard to establish in New Zealand. Rarely did the early British migrants migrate as extended families, so that the norm of the nuclear family was established early. The migration of Polynesians during the 1960s and 70s has however often involved chain migration, whereby ever-widening kin networks migrate and usually live together. Extended family households are, for example, common among Samoan New Zealanders, but with increasing urbanisation of their life-style, and as children born and raised in New Zealand marry and establish households (MacPherson, 1978; 122), the nuclear rather than the extended family is likely to become more frequent. Similar changes have occurred in Maori extended families with their internal migration to urban areas over the last few decades (Schwimmer, 1968; 316).

New Zealand families have however changed structurally through having fewer children - and parents. During this century the birth rate gradually dropped until 1935 (total fertility rate 2.25),[1] but with the exception of a major drop during the second world war, rose steadily to peak in 1962 (at 4.3). This period saw a marriage boom involving a shift towards earlier marriage, similar to the pioneer marriage patterns of the 1870s. Since the 1960s the total fertility rate has fallen to just below replacement (1.9), so that those New Zealand families which include children are likely to have 2.08 children (issue born to existing marriages in 1981). This recent decline in family size has been due in part to changes in the timing and spacing of marriages and births, including once again a shift back to traditional European marriage and family formation patterns, involving delayed marriage, and childbearing (Population Monitoring Group, 1984:10).

While it is doubtful if nucleation of New Zealand families has occurred through the decline in extended families and increases in nuclear families, nucleation is clearly occurring with the increasing number of solo parent families. Early data are not available, but in the period 1971-1981 there has been an increase from 7.5% to 11.4% of the households with children being solo parent families (see Table 1).

Table 1 New Zealand household types, 1971–81

With children	1971 Number	1971 %	1971 % of those with child(ren)	1976 Number	1976 %	1976 % of those with child(ren)	1981 Number	1981 %	1981 % of those with child(ren)
Parents with child(ren)*	365 989	45.65	73.24	399 797	43.30	74.03	391 161	38.99	71.14
One family with unrelated persons	83 981	10.47	16.80	74 731	8.09	13.83	78 534	7.82	14.28
One parent with child(ren)	37 652	4.69	7.53	47 917	5.18	8.87	63 111	6.29	11.47
Two or more families	12 040	1.50	2.40	15 578	1.68	2.88	16 983	1.69	3.08
Subtotal with child(ren)	499 662	62.31	100.00	540 023	58.25	100.00	549 789	54.79	100.00
Without children	**Number**	**%**	**% of those without child(ren)**	**Number**	**%**	**% of those without child(ren)**	**Number**	**%**	**% of those without child(ren)**
Husband and wife (childless or post-parental)	153 592	19.15	50.85	187 638	20.32	48.70	207 150	20.65	45.69
One person	104 943	13.09	34.74	143 896	15.58	37.35	184 992	18.44	40.80
Two or more persons**	43 489	5.42	14.39	53 700	5.81	13.93	61 191	6.10	13.49
Subtotal without child(ren)	302 024	37.66	100.00	385 234	41.71	100.00	453 333	45.19	100.00
Total households	801 686	100.00		923 257	100.00		1 003 122	100.00	

Note Parents with children*
Also includes spouse, child or all children temporarily absent
**includes related and unrelated adult persons

Source: Koopman-Boyden and Scott, 1984:33.

Furthermore recent analysis of longitudinal data show that while 16% of the 4 year-olds born in 1977 had at some time been living in a one-parent household, it is estimated that this number will increase to 38% by the children's age of 16 years (Christchurch Child Development Study, 1982: 62).

The decline in family formation, along with the increasing divorce rate have contributed towards a general decrease in the proportion of households with children: in 1971 62.3% of the households included children, in 1976 58.2%, and in 1981 54.7%. The increasing divorce rate has also significantly contributed to the rapid increase in one person households: from 13.0% in 1971 to 18.4% in 1981 (See Table 1).

In summary, structural changes in New Zealand have been:

a) insignificant change from the extended family to the nuclear family among Europeans;

b) extended family to nuclear family change in Maori and Polynesian families;

c) smaller family households through:

   i) increased incidence of divorce and subsequent numbers of solo-parent and one-person households,

   ii) fewer children;

d) overall decline in number of households including children.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGES

The decline in the number of children in the New Zealand family and the associated lessening of caring responsibilities has been at least partially offset by the extended period of child dependency arising from longer schooling. In 1976 the number of pupils in their 5th year at secondary school as a percentage of the 17 year-olds was 13.6% compared with 16.1% in 1981. [2] Such children are being forced to stay at school, dependent on their families, because of the difficulty in finding jobs.

New Zealand has no systematic record of the numbers of disabled and the dependent elderly, but a general increase in their numbers can be observed along with the extension of the family's responsibility for their care. Since 1980 approximately one thousand families have supported a handicapped child (and been eligible for the Handicapped Child's Allowance; 954 in 1981). The number of disabled adults unable to support themselves through work, has increased over the last ten years, from 8,842 people on the Invalids' Benefit in 1973; and 12,272 in 1979;to 18,757 in 1983. Such an increase reflects the impact of unemployment, and also involves greater responsibility for the family.

Similarly with the ageing of New Zealand's population (12.2% over the age of 60 in 1961 to 14% in 1981) families have extended their care to elderly members. Families expect to give support to the elderly and the elderly expect this support: among a sample of people heavily involved in supporting old people, almost nine-tenths (88.4%) expected children to assist elderly parents, and eight-tenths (80.7%) of a sample of elderly people held a similar expectation (Koopman-Boyden, 1978:5). The actuality is that between 18%-25% of the elderly live with family members, and among the dependent elderly, 87.9% of their chief supporters are family members ((Koopman-Boyden, 1978:65).

In summary, functional changes have been:

a) extension of child rearing function in duration;

b) extension of care to include greater number of disabled and elderly family members.

CHANGING BASIS AND ROLES IN MARRIAGE Shorter (1977) argues that the emergence of capitalism broke down local and community economic systems and freed family and community life from traditional constraints. This 'freedom' allowed emotion to flourish, and wage labour encouraged not only the economic independence of young people from their kinfolk but also promoted individualistic values, and eventually rising affluence. The immediate result was a sexual revolution which began with pre-marital experimentation among young people, followed later by a search for sexual fulfillment in married life.

The 'surge of sentiment' and invividualism which Shorter suggested was associated with capitalism meant greater individual freedom in pre-marital and extra-marital sexual relationships. In New Zealand indications of such phenomeon can be drawn at least to some extent, from the level of ex-nuptial births. There is evidence of a widely fluctuating ex-nuptial birth rate in New Zealand throughout this century, with the current upward trend reaching 22.5% of live births in 1981. Associated with this has been a small drop in the marriage rate in recent years (from an all time high of 67.2% in the population over 16 in 1971 to 61.6% in 1981). Both phenomeonon can be seen as indicators of a lifestyle less embued with the traditional societal obligation of sexual relationships being contained within marriage.

Individualism and 'the wish to be free' (Weinsein and Platt, 1969) emerged not only as a wish for self-fulfillment through greater sexual freedom, but also through romantic love. In New Zealand the basis of marriage became romantic love rather than material or economic considerations, or religion. Property and inheritance gave way to personal happiness and individual self-development as the criteria for choosing a marriage partner. The precariousness of such a basis has become reflected in

increasing rates of marital breakdown with the divorce rate per 1,000 existing marriages rising from 5.3 in 1973 to 13.4 in 1983. Currently 35.3% of all divorces occur in the firstten years of marriage. While the romantic and highly individualistic view of marriage may have encompassed a greater desire to leave a personally unsatisfying marriage, it has also resulted in an associated increase in the re-marriage rate. Currently 1 in 5 New Zealand marriages is a remarriage, a ratio which is increasing proportionately.

Along with changes in the basis of marriage, roles within marriage are also changing. The early twentieth century norm for women to give up paid employment upon marriage, was replaced by women continuing paid employment into marriage until the birth of the first child. More equalitarian values became established, as women maintained their economic independence within marriage, not only before having children, but also in the post-parental stage. The phenomena of having fewer children closely spaced, and earlier in adult life, along with increased longevity has meant that the period spent living as husband and wife without children has become a significant proportion of adult life, as opposed to the situation early in the century where marital roles were subsumed by parental roles for most of adult life. Married women in middle age freed from the daily pressures of caring for dependent children used this time to undertake community work. Not only did these women provide assistance to returned servicemen and their families through Patriotic Clubs and Repatriation Societies, but they were also instrumental in establishing and staffing voluntary organisations such as the Aged People's Welfare Council, Parents' Centre and church groups undertaking community work. Such unpaid work has traditionally been excluded from labour force statistics, so there is unfortunately no means of estimating the size of this workforce and its economic value to the country.

Since the 1950s however, married women have also significantly

increased in numbers in the paid workforce, particularly at the post-parental stage of the life cycle. 1981 figures show that labour force participation of women reaches a peak not only in the 20-24 year age group (at 48.4%) but also in the 40-44 year age group (53.2%), with the overall participation rate of married women in full-time employment being 34.2% in 1981, compared with 26.1% in 1971.

In summary, changes in marriage have been:

a) freer sexual relationships not always sanctioned by marriage;
b) romantic love basis of marriage;
c) as consequences, of (a) and (b), there has been an increasing ex-nuptial birth rate, divorce and remarriage rates;
d) increased labour force participation of married women especially in the middle-aged group.

CHANGING BASIS AND ROLES IN PARENTHOOD The transformation of family values has been clearly shown in changed attitudes towards parenthood. Whereas earlier in this century, marriage was inextricably connected with parenthood, the last few decades have seen increasing numbers of children born outside of marriage, marriages without children, and various forms of biological and social parenthood. With technological advances in conception and contraception, the decision to have children has become a real one. Many couples are choosing to remain childfree (estimated at 20.8% of couples after five years of marriage in 1972, Swain 1978), while others can plan the size and spacing of their family and having achieved such, ensure further security by being sterilised: one-third of a recent sample of ever-married partners had been sterilised (Trlin and Perry, 1981:47). Until the mid-1970s those who were childless were able to adopt children but the current limited availability of children for adoption, means that childless couples are opting for artifical insemination by donor and other facilitating solutions.

Biological parenthood by choice has been matched by changes in social parenthood. The choice by a large proportion of divorces to remarry has meant that social parenthood, through stepfamilies, has

become a common phenomenon, whereas previously fostering and adoption were the only significant forms of social parenthood. It is impossible to estimate the number of social parents who become such through stepfamilies, but given the knowledge that almost two-thirds (63.8%) of all divorces involve children under 18 years (10,965 in 1981) and that a fifth of those who marry are marrying for the seond or subsequent time, it is clear that family arrangements involving social parenthood are no longer rare.

While couples can now more confidently plan if and when to have children, the decision often revolves around the willingness of one parent to leave the workforce. The labour force participation rate of married women may have equalised the economic contribution of women to a marriage, but upon the birth of a child traditional role specialisation usually occurs in that the father becomes the sole, or major, economic provider and the mother the family carer. Change towards more egalitarian roles in childcare among parents has been slow, being most starkly reflected in the number of mothers who work while still caring for the children, compared with the small number of men who undertake both roles. Men may help with the domestic arrangements of childcare, cooking and cleaing, but they rarely share them equally, or take full responsibility. The situation is not likely to change rapidly - a 1979 survey of engaged couples revealed that none of the men expected to undertake full-time care of their future children (Abbott and Koopman-Boyden, 1981).

In summary, changes in parenthood area -

a) Parenthood by choice rather than obligation;
b) increasing incidence of social parenthood (through stepfamilies);
c) continued unequal sharing among parents of economic support and nurturance, exaggerated by women undertaking economic support.

POLICY RESPONSE TO FAMILY CHANGES IN NEW ZEALAND

In the early part of this century, the state's role was very much a 'residual' one. Intervention was deemed to be required only when the family failed to provide adequate care to its dependent members. The state supported the patriarchal family system, where women and children had few rights in law, and were regarded as the property of the husband/father. Men were deemed to be the breadwinners and responsible for the economic support of both women and children,while the women cared for husbands, dependent children and destitute relations.

Structural changes in this model brought a policy response in the form of income maintenance - a Widow's Pension was established in 1911, though support was income tested and confined to widows of good character and with dependent children. Earlier theinability of the family to support the elderly, and the elderly to support themselves, had resulted in the establishment of the Old Age Pension (1898).

Support to solo-parent families was not to be extended until the 1938 Social Security Act established an emergency benefit. The benefit came into prominance when, as the Domestic Purposes Benefit, it became a statutory benefit (1973), and was seen to cause the subsequent growth in the population of solo parents.

The declining size of the family has not however been a consideration for many other policy changes, e.g. state housing policy still equates family housing with nuclear family housing, while the fall in the number of children in each family and the below replacement level birth rate has yet to spur any pro-population policy, or any significantly higher investment in existing children. Instead the government has recently used the opportunity of falling primary school rolls to limit government expenditure by cutting the intakes of students to teachers' colleges and closing retraining course for teachers wishing to re-enter teaching. Such moves have proved unpopular, for many educationalists had seen the changed circumstances as an opportunity to reduce class sizes and allow for more specialist teaching.

The introduction of the family benefit and increases to it, have been seen by some commentators as a pro-natalist policy (Kirkwood,1979:283),

and while this may have been part of the reason for its establishment in New Zealand in 1926 (Family Allowances Bill) when the New Zealand birth rate was dropping rapidly, there seems to be no subsequent demographic relationship. Increases in the family benefit, and more lately, the introduction of tax rebates of various forms for families with children (1976 young family rebate; 1978 single income family rebate; 1981 low income family rebate; 1982 new family rebate) have been introduced, not in an effect to encourage larger families but in the interests of political opportunism, coupled with efforts to equalise families of different incomes. Attempts at the latter have been largely unsuccessful, as indicated by the recent substitution or addition within a six-year perod of four different types of rebate.

The extension of the family's economic support and caring obligation to the disabled and the elderly, has been offset to some extent by the state's shared responsibility. As well as providing income maintenance for the disabled and the elderly, the Domestic Purposes Benefit has been extended to provide economic support for a full-time carer for a disabled or elderly person (but excludes spouse). Extra finance is also provided by the state for additional medical and related expenses. An annual four weeks relief for the carer of a disabled or elderly person is also paid for by the state (under the Disabled Person's Community Welfare Act, 1975).

Changes in sexual mores leading, at least partly, to a rise in numbers of children born to unmarried mothers, have been recognised by the state in its provision of the Domestic Purposes Benefit. While some have argued that such provision has encouraged unmarried women to become mothers, the reality of reasonable economic support has at least encouraged such mothers to keep their babies. This is illustrated by the dramatic drop in the number of children available for adoption since the mid-1970s. The alternative, and presumably less expensive, policy of providing sex education in schools, and easier access to abortion or contraception for those under 16 years has not been a policy option.

Changing expectations of marriage have been reflected in the state's gradual acknowledgement that marriage should be regarded as a contract

between two individuals with little if any control by the state (or the church) in terms of is dissolution.

Beginning with the 1867 Act to Constitute in New Zealand a Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, divorce proceedings were first removed from the jurisdiction of the church and parliament in England, and through successive acts came to be allowed on a variety of grounds, along with equal application provisions for the husband and wife. The most recent legislation established that a marriage in New Zealand can be dissolved on the no-fault premise of irreconcilable breakdown and two years separation (1980 Family Proceedings Act). The privacy of any contested cases is further ensured by the 1980 establishment of Family Courts (Family Courts Act 1980).

The policy response to the increased labour force participation of women has been one of the most inconsistent. On the one hand the equal Pay Act, 1972 and Human Rights Act, 1976 gave women equal rights in the labour force market place, but on the other failed to provide a 'network of child care facilities' as proposed in Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. Similarly, while maternity leave was introduced in 1980 (Maternal Leave and Employment Protection Act), it is unpaid and there is no similar provision for paternity leave.

The changing basis of parenting has similarly brought an ambivalent response from the state. State control over divorce has lessened particularly with the most recent legislation, but has simultaneously enforced greater controls over the care of the children affected by divorce. In the past, patriarchal priviledges have extended to the evasion of paying maintenance payments in the knowledge that rarely would the state or the custodial spouse initiate court proceedings. However with the Social Security Amendment Act, 1980, if the custodial parent applies for the Domestic Purposes Benefit, he/she must identify the liable parent for each dependent child. The liable parent must then make direct maintenance payments to the Department of Social Welfare, to offset the cost of the benefit. Liable Parent Scheme Units within the department have been charged with enforcing contributions, resulting in the collection rates rising from 25% in August 1981 to 42.6%

in March 1983. On the surface such legislation appears to incorporate a philosophy of greater parental sharing and equalitarianism in the care of children. In practice, the great majority of custodial parents are mothers (83% in 1983) and joint custody is relatively rare.

Similarly, while government policy has made endeavours to ease the entry of women into the paid workforce, there have been few policy reponses facilitating a greater share in family reponsibilities by men, or other means of easing the dual responsibility of working mothers. Job sharing and part-time work alternatives have become available but have almost completely been undertaken by women. Similarly, the provision of childcare at home, or outside, has largely remained the full-time responsibility of women. State policy has not included any major efforts to fund the establishment and management of childcare facilities, nor has it endeavoured to change employers' attitudes to the provision of childcare facilities for its employees who are parents of small children.

The change in the basis of parenthood from a situation where significant numbers of homeless children required foster or adoptive parents to that of childless parents using technological innovations to facilitate conception has brought stringent state controls in the former instance, and a laissez faire position in the latter. The Infant Amendment Act, 1950, and subsequent amendments saw a transiton in the adoption process from being a simple means of facilitating arrangements for the care of deprived children by adoptive parents, to a state controlled system involving bureacratic procedures (Webb, 1979:6). As a result, adopted children have no right to information of, or access to, their birth parents, giving their adoptive parents the ability to control even the knowledge that the child was adopted. In the last few years this policy has been criticised, and currently there is a bill before parliament to allow an adopted child, access to its heritage after 18 years. Until the debate is resolved, it is difficult to see in what way policy will endeavour to systematise the process of artificial insemination by donor, or access to the identity of the donor.

The protection of children's rights has nevertheless become an avenue of state intervention in the last decade, albeit still a minor one. Policies have, for instance, provided for the independent representation of children in court and the removal of the the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children with respect to inheritance (Status of Children Act, 1969). However, most policies continue to assume that the child's interests and rights are recognised and pursued satisfactorily by the child's parents or guardians.

TRENDS IN THE POLICY RESPONSE

Many reasons have been advanced for the New Zealand government's longstanding involvement in economic and social policies. Because of the country's smallness and isolation, the government played a major role in early development and associated economic and financial institutions. The New Zealand approach bore little resemblance to the British philosophy of laissez-faire in which the government 'created' an environment where private enterprise and markets could operate undisturbed.

Early efforts were mainly concerned with moderating sectional conflicts, while later involvement included public sector tax and expenditure policies which were concerned with maintaining minimum levels of income and redistributing incomes. Government influence and controls over prices and wages and the exchange meant that it had wide scope to alter the level of economic rewards, and tax and expenditure policies provided further means for adjustment to take-home pay.

While New Zealand colonists quickly accepted an expanded role for the government in the economy, there was an initial reluctance to allow it an active role in social welfare policies. This reluctance can, to a certain extent,be explained in terms of the desires held by many colonists to moderate the rigid British class system so as to achieve self-respect and a higher standard of living. The vision of classless society (in which all were middle class) can explain the early use of public employment schemes as a form of relief and the emphasis on family and comunity as natural avenues for meeting economic and social distress. However, the absence of a wealthy upper class to finance voluntary welfare systems meant that state involvement was required. Government funding of hospitals

in 1846 was a significant break with tradition at that time, but provided an early lead by the state in providing hospital and welfare services.

If there is a theme which pervades much of the analysis of New Zealand's economic and social history it is the dominance of pragmatism over ideology as an influence on economic and social policies. As early as 1910 Andrew Siegfried and Albert Metin observed in New Zealand an absence of political theorising in matters relating to social welfare, while half a century later the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security stresssed that 'a pragmatic approach continued to characterise the New Zealand response to social welfare problems' (p44). More recently, Easton has suggested that, 'Social security development in New Zealand has been a pragmatic response to social needs ... and the outcome has been shaped by circumstances more than ideology' (1980:22,28).

In a review of the economic role of government, Hawke gives emphasis to the practical approach adopted by colonists in setting the role for government, but links this to the needs of a small pioneering society.

> "Central government was always accessible, and the colonial instinct was to use its powers and institutions wherever they were likely to be useful, irrespective of European ideas of propriety. European observers thought that New Zealanders practised socialism without doctrines, but they thought in European terms. New Zealanders simply found new roles for government in a pioneering society." (2982:7)

Hawke (1980:40 also suggests that the active role of government in the economy prior to World War II made it easier to adopt wartime controls and a movement from government resonsibility in hard times to responsibility for economic management.

External influences on New Zealand social policy were obviously important. The invention and diffusion of income maintenance programmes were not random and New Zealand's experiences in the timing and sequencing of income maintenance programmes covering major sources of insecurity fit broadly into the international trends observed by Heclo (1974). In comparison with experiences in other countries, the introduction of the old age pension (1898) and workers' compensation (1900) were very close. Later recognition was given to the problems of widows (1911) war orphans (1915), invalids (1924), the blind (1937, and the sick, the unemployed and orphans (1939). Family benefits made a relatively early appearance in 1926 and the family benefit capitalisation scheme (1958) and no-fault accident-

compensation system (introduced in 1974) provide examples of social policies which have earned New Zealand a world-wide reputation as an innovator in social policy.

Heclo (1981) has suggested that there have been four stages in the welfare state's development, with each stage being characterised by a dominant trend in state policy; the first stage between the 1870s and 1920s being marked by experimentation in welfare provision; with consolidation of these programmes being undertaken in the 1930s and 1940s; further expansion in the 1950s and 1960s; and in the fourth stage, during the 1970s and 1980s, a period of reformulation.

In general, the establishment of New Zealand social policies have followed a similar trajectory to that suggested by Heclo, with some modifications. With respect to family policy specifically, a stage preceding Heclo's stage of experimentation can be identified: until the 1890s a stage of enforced family responsibility occurred where the state took the ultimate step of legislating for the family's responsibility for the economic support of its members.

Following this, Heclo's first stage of experimentation fits the New Zealand situation from the 1890's to the mid-1930s. The period, was marked by fundamental debates over the state's role in the relief of the poor. The social values of family responsibility and obligation were seen by some to be undermined by state intervention and the provision of income maintenance. Others saw moves to dispensate the poor through the Old Age Pension and the Widow's Pension as attempts to champion humanitarianism, equality and security. Long public and political debates attempted to reconcile these values, along with the more technical questions as to whether provision should be universal or selective, or through social insurance or government taxes. The precedents were established that income maintenance be selective (to the 'deserving' only), and be paid from government revenue. A social insurance basis has never been popular in New Zealand.

Heclo refers to "policy volatility" during this stage, where programmes were marked by frequent changes in boundaries and/or methods of funding. Such volatility was evident in New Zealand only in so far as the boundaries tended to be slowly extended. The family benefit did however originally exist as a tax allowance, before its establishment as a selective benefit. Experimentation

with this form of family support continues today with frequent policy changes among tax rebates allowances.

The growth in the state's role in social security was constrained by the poor economic conditions of the late 1920s and 1930s. Many social security benefits were reduced, along with salary cuts for public servants. High rates of unemployment spurred an even greater involvement by the state in job creation. The principle of no welfare without work was maintained. However, as work became even more difficult to create, an unemployment fund was established which provided sustenance without work to some workers.

Given these social and economic conditions, the basis of a more interventionist policy for families had been formed. Support to families was to be no longer restricted to selected crisis situations. Instead preventive policies for intact families were to be established. Thus, consolidation of policy occurred in the 1930s and 1940s through the widening of selective policies. A major extension of the government's control over resources occurred during the first Labour government (1935-1949) through its direct involvement in the affairs of the economy and society.

In this period of consolidation, the principle of universal entitlement was to become an important feature of social policy over the next 40 years. The Social Security Act of 1938 introduced more comprehensive forms of cash and medical benefits. The Act also replaced the family allowance with the family benefit and liberalised conditions for receiving the benefit. By 1946 this benefit was no longer income-tested and was paid in respect of each child. Age had replaced income as the criterion for the granting of a universal family benefit, a principle already established with regard to the payment of a universal superannuation benefit.

The government provision of economic support to families with dependent children was complemented by major extensions in health, education and housing services. While New Zealand did not model the national health insurance system established in Britain, it nevertheless provided substantial public support for hospital and medical services. Education services were improved and extended and the first Labour government established an active housing programme for rental housing.

The third stage of the development of the welfare stage is seen by Heclo as occurring in the 1950s and 60s as a stage of expansion. However, in New Zealand, provision in the 1938 Social Security Act for an emergency benefit meant that no new benefits were created during this period. Expansion came more in the form of wider social policies, including family law. There were notable changes to the divorce laws during this period. The war provided a stimulus and eased the transition to the concept of no-fault divorce while giving further encouragement to reconciliation, where possible. The church had lost control over access to divorce in the ninteenth century and the state gradually relinquished its contol also. By the early 1980s irreconcilable breakdown had become the only grounds for divorce, and one that could be proven by two years separation.

Other areas of family law were also liberalised, particularly with regard to the rights of women. Married women gained additional rights to personal property acquired during the marriage. The 1963 Matrimonial Act was a forerunner to the 1976 Matrimonial Property Act which made provision for the equal assignment of assets following a divorce. However, since the state did not enforce similar protection for women with regard to wills, the financial fortunes of a non-earning homemaker were more secure following divorce than widowhood. Women gained the right to equal pay, which was introduced in the public service in 1960 and extended to all women in 1972. Increased access to divorce and employment gave women opportunities for greater independence.

The expansionary phase in New Zealand extended into the 1970s, and in fact some very far-reaching additions to social policies were introduced in the first half of the 1970s, despite the increasing instability of the New Zealand economy. While in other countries a period of reformulation was entered into at this time, New Zealand continued expanding its welfare provisions. In this late expansionary phase, New Zaland even bordered on a new stage of experimentation, where policies were established according to new philosophies and were altered and adapted until agreement was reached on their appropriateness. The Domestic Purposes Benefit became a statutory benefit and widely used as the means of economic support for unmarried mothers, the separated and the divorced; the Old Age Pension became National Superannuation available to all over 60 years with no income test; an

Accident Compensation Scheme was established which provided community responsibility for accidents in the form of rehabilitation allowances and a regular income; and the law made greater provision for human rights including equal pay.

The debates surrounding the introduction of these new measures (and others) carried over into the late 1970s and early 1980s when a stage of reconsideration and reformulation occurred. Questions began to be asked about the role of the state and the grounds for its intervention. It was inevitable that the debate should focus around the four most recent foci of policy, for not only did these programmes form a major part of government expenditure on income transfers, but they served as a concrete example of the 'tragic choices' that policy had to make: the high government expenditure on National Superannuation raised the issue of equity in relation to other benefits which were income-tested and the right of people to be eligible for a benefit solely on the grounds of age; the Domestic Purposes Benefit raised questions as to whether those made dependent through divorce or the birth of a child were to be classed as "deserving enough"; Accident Compensation brought the concept of social insurance and social compensation to income maintenance, and established a clear inequity between the income of those disabled through accident and those through sickness or birth; while the introduction of equal pay raised again questions relating to the focus of policy - a wage for the family or for the individual.

THE CURRENT ISSUES IN NEW ZEALAND POLICY

Thus, significant changes have occurred in the state's support of the family in New Zealand. Measures to reinforce family responsibility in the early colonial period gave way to experimentation and the establishment of policies on a selective basis up to the 1930s. Consolidation of these policies then occurred, but the continuation of such expansionary trends became difficult in view of the poor economic climate in the 1970s and early 1980s. Efforts by the state to shift the balance of responsibility again towards the family and the community became evident. Pressures to cut and retrench the growth of public expenditure have stimulated a questioning of the state's role as to its focus and the underlying rationale for intervention. These questions are now addressed.

The focus of policy - The focus of social policies for the family is difficult to delineate for there has been no integrated family policy in New Zealand

with explicit goals and objectives. The term 'family policy' has had little useage, although social policies affecting the family have been in place in New Zealand since the early colonial period. Such policies have masqueraded under a host of other labels including women's policy, children's policy, tax policy and employment policy.

Despite the implicit and piecemeal approach to family policy it is possible to follow through several changes in focus that such policies have undergone. The discussion will be limited to examples from income maintenance and tax policies. Among the first legislation with respect to the family was the 1846 Destitute Person's Ordinance, which made 'near relatives' of destitute persons liable for family support. Later, the 1877 Destitute Person's Act allowed the court to recover from relatives any debts incurred by the government or local bodies in maintaining a destitute relative (with an 8% interest rate). At this time the focus of a 'no policy' was clearly the extended family in so far as the state legislated for its own non-intervention by obliging the extended family to assume all responsibility.

By the early years of this century through the Old Age Pension Act(1898) and the Widow's Pension Act (1911) the state had recognised the necessity for intervening in family support. It also moved to use the nuclear family as its criteria for intervention. The widow's pension supported the notion that males were the breadwinners, and women made dependent through no fault of their own had a right to state support. Men who became solo parents of dependent children through the death of their wife were not eligible for the benefit.

A further significant indication of the use of a nuclear family model as the target of state support came with the provision of the family allowance in 1926, to be provided to a married couple supporting three or more children. Previously the Court of Arbitration had ruled that a 'family wage' was to be paid to workers to cover the adequate support of the wife and two children (1907). The combination of these policies also indicated a move from crisis policy to policy in a preventive mode.

Benefits were phrased in 'family' terms, and taxation policy used the married couple as the target. From 1939 there was compulsory aggregation of married couple incomes if they exceeded a certain minimum level in aggregate. Changes in taxation

policy in 1962 saw all workers taxed as individuals. The measure was not established in the interests of equality between men and women, nor marrieds and singles, but was a limited measure to assist married women without young children to return to teaching for the rapidly growing school rolls at that time demanded the high retention of teachers. While these women teachers and other members of the public service received equal pay from 1960, for other working women the change in taxation policy meant that they were taxed as individuals, but worked for an unequal wage, the assumption being that their wage was supplementing the 'family wage' of the husband. While policy which focussed on the individual might be administratively simpler, it raised questions about the status of family obligations and responsibilities.

Overlapping this move from the nuclear family to the individual as focus, has been a policy concern for solo-parent families, as reflected in the provision of the Domestic Purposes Benefit. It is perhaps the provision of this benefit more than any other, that has served to fan the debate about the focus of policy. Focussed on this benefit, questions have arisen as to the need to support both the mother and the dependent child when the mother lives with a man (whether or not they have a relationship 'as in marriage'); whether the focus of policy should be the dependent child alone, with the mother being expected to support herself; or whether once having parented a child, responsibility falls on the parents until the child is independent, and the state intervenes only in crisis situations.

With respect to income maintenance policy and taxation policy, there has been a trend from the extended family as the policy focus to that of the nuclear family and the individual. Nevertheless, other foci do exist. The recent income maintenance policies assisting with the family care of the disabled and the elederly have a nuclear family and extended family focus. Indeed, it is interesting to see how the state in its push towards more community care in social welfare, has invoked the nuclear and extended family models. It may be that we are seeing a turnaround in the focus of policy with even the extended family receiving more attention.

Targetting of policies within the family has also altered, from legislated "father-right to mother-obliga ion" (Brown, 1981:258). The early orientation of the law towards the dominance of the patriarch meant that fathers were specifically held responsible for the protection of their children and held the automatic right to the custody of all infant children, as is shown in the following judical statement,

> 'This Court holds this principle - that when, by birth, a child is subject to a father, it is for the general interest of families, and for the general interest of the particular infant, that the Court should not, except in very extreme cases, interfere with the discretion of the father, but leave him the responsibility of exercising that power which nature has given him by the birth of the child (Re Agar-Ellie, 1883 - quoted in Bromley, 1974:489).

Men also owned their wives with respect to their property and their limited access to divorce. With policy set within a patriarchal system, women were expected to care for their husbands and children (along with destitute relatives) and were given no means of escape.

Subsequent state gradually changed the position of women. But, the focus on the care of children as a women's problem solved through women's policies continues, rather than seeing improvements in the social and economic relationships among family members as the key to the attainment of the goals of individual family members, and long-term societal change in human relationships.

New Zealand policies for the family have also largely taken a parental perspective, as opposed to a children's one, a situation which is now being challenged by the children's rights movement on the premise that children have a right to be consulted on their own future, if not to determine it themselves. Past policies however have automatically assumed that parents know best. Thus adoption laws protect the interests of the adoptive parents over the adopted child, allow foster children to be moved at bureaucratic convenience, and even return children to long absent parents should such parents suddenly take an interest in them. A child's perspective would show more concern for the inherent discontinuities within these policies. Similarly discrimatory practices towards unmarried mothers and de facto marriages penalised children for being born

to such parents. Such policies have now been revoked.

Broadly, the focus of policies shows trends from the extended family to the nuclear family and individuals; from male ownership of family members and state non-intervention to greater equality among adult family members but with state intervention seeing many family problems solved through women's policies; from systematic discrimination against de facto relationships as a family base to the almost equal standing of de facto and de jure relationship in policy; and with a parental perspective continuing to overwhelm a child's perspective. Such a diverse foci of policy makes it difficult to unravel the principles on which government policy have been based.

Issues of Principle - In Heclo's discussion of the stages of the welfare state (1981:387) he suggests that since the early1970s during the stage of reformulation, there has been a 'new recognition of thetragic choices' to be made among the various values underlying social policy, and that governments have endeavoured to 'search for positive-sum relationships' among these values. The values of liberty, equality and security are those identified by Heclo. The following discussion critically considers the success of these values or principles defined as rights, equity and independence in orienting New Zealand policy and examines the 'tragic choices' which have been made among these values recently.

Equity - The issue of equity concerns what is considered to be just and fair as regards the distribution of resources and opportunities among individuals in society. In the design of an equitable tax system, problems involving vertical and horizontal equity are a common feature of debate. Horizontal equity requires that people in similar circumstances be treated the same, by establishing individual income, family income or some basis as a similar tax unit. Vertical equity suggests that those in different economic circumstances be treated differently,and requires a decision as to what consitutes 'different econmic circumstances', for example, whether tax-payers on higher incomes should be taxed at a higher rate per dollar of income earned.

Concern over matters of horizontal and vertical equity are seen in New Zealand's continuing debate over eligibility for universal and selective benefits. In fact, since 1938, the social security system has always included

both universal and selective benefits, with many different reasons being given for the varying targets of equity. Universal provison in the area of health and hospital services has been justified on the grounds that need could be assumed to exist for most people. The Royal Commission on Social Security (1972:66) suggested that provision of the non-taxable universal family benefit 'can be regarded as an investment in people rather than relieving need'.

Questions concerning the equity between the level of benefits and the standard of living and income of others in the community also continue to be raised. The Royal Commision's desire to give beneficaries 'a sense of participation and belonging to the community' implied a concept of relative rather than absolute need, but the level of relative need varies. Most social security benefits are flat-rate income-tested benefits ($91.22 per week), but there are two important exceptions: National Superannuation, paid at the single taxable rate of ($97.06) per week to everyone over the age of 60 regardless of their work status; and Accident Compensation paid at the rate of 80% of previous earnings (to a maximum annual salary of $45,500, or maximum compensation of $700 per week). While the standard benefit is adjusted regularly in line with the Consumer Price Index, superannuation is linked to the average wage after tax, and accident compensation to one's previous wage. Thus in both setting the level of income maintenance and in relating this to other incomes in the community, various inequities have been allowed.

Family circumstances have been recognised to a limited extent in setting the level of benefits, with supplements for each child being given ($6.00 per week), or the tax waived as in the case of the unemployment benefit. However the family benefit does not vary according to the age of the child, and is adjusted so irregularly that levels have declined in terms of purchasing power (in 1946 at $1 per week per child the family benefit represented 7-8% of the average weekly wage; in 1981 at $6 per week it was less than 3%). Since 1976 tax rebates have been used to more selectively target benefits, but whether the goal is to assist those on one income, a low income, or with young families has still to be decided,

judging by the frequency with which the target of the rebate changes.

In the context of family policy, the important issue arises as to whether one's tax liability should be measured in relation to an individual's income or should be adjusted to account for the number of dependants and other family circumstances. In the interests of horizontal equity, families of similar size and income should presumably pay equal amounts of tax. Yet these two objectives are incompatible in a tax system which has a progressive tax structure. Marriage neutrality implies that the tax of one partner should not be affected by the other, whereas taxing according to family circumstances suggests the opposite. The presence of children in the family introduces further issues such as whether to make allowances for expenditure on them, including child-care costs incurred in the process of earning incomes.

Rights - The issue of family rights has usually been taken to mean the rights of individual family members, that is the individual rights of children and parents, as opposed to the rights of the family as a group. While almost all of our family laws and declarations are enacted to protect the interests of individuals, the responsibilities that these laws engender are usually undertaken within families. An immediate tension arises - between a person in his/her own right (as a child, woman or man) and a member of the family (as a daughter, mother or father). Furthermore, the rights of one family member may be in conflict with the rights of another - our ideal view of children's rights is not necessarily compatible with a similar view of women's rights, for instance. The 1959 United Nations Charter of Children's Rights declared that 'a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances be separated from his mother' (Principle 6). Many women would challenge this clause, claiming, that their right to work is of at least equal importance, and that the principle is in any case based on false assumptions about the needs of the young child (Packman, 1979:11).

The issue of children's rights is complicated by the customary dual orientation that society has to children: a nurturance orientation which stresses the provision

by society, through the family, of supposedly beneficial objects, enviroments, experience, etc, for the child, based on the assumption of the vulnerability of children, and the need to protect them; and a self-determination orientation which stresses the potential rights of children to exercise control over their enviroment and decide what is good for themselves, based on the assumption that the child has a right to fair treatment and to its own autonomy (Rogers and Wrightsman, 1978:81).

In New Zealand, as elsewhere, there is disagreement over the balance of the two orientations. Within the nurturance orientation, concern is shown for the lack of rights accorded children confronted by violent parents. The Crimes Act 1961 (sections 209 and 210) ensures that no parent can be convicted of kidnapping or abducting a child if the parent believes in good faith that he/she has a right to the possession of the child. No protection is therefore given to a child who is kidnapped by a violent father after school, or is enticed by him to live away from the child's home. Children are also accorded little protection from violence or maltreatment within their own homes, for the 1961 Crimes Act (Section59) allows any parent to use reasonable force to correct a child. Such a law infringes both the United National Declaration on Children's Rights and the United Nations International Covenant on Human Rights. The extent to which children should be allowed similar rights to adults is an issue only beginning to surface in New Zealand.

The broadest issue of rights in family policy concerns the rights of the family itself. While women's policy and children's policy can be based on their own 'bills of rights' be they the Working Women's Charter or the United Nations Declaration of Children's Rights, family policy does not have such a focus. Does the family have an identifiable set of rights? The right of family members to expect a long-term commitment and loyalty from other family members to the family itself is often seen as undermined by the increased partime care of children and marital breakdown. Do children have a right to a commitment (or 'maintenance') from both their parents, at least until they are independent? Or can one or both parents abdicate such a responsibility upon entering new marital

or familial contracts?

A discussion of the social rights of individuals and the family inevitably leads to the inclusion of the notion of responsibilities. Such responsibilities usually involve an obligation to care for, or 'be responsible for', other members of the family. In so far as the extension of social rights usually allows for further independence of an individual, the pursuit of such independence can come into conflict with the obligation to be responsible for dependents. A conflict of interest between the rights and responsibilities of individual family members, or between the family and other institutions, can result.

The conflict between the individual rights of individuals in the family and the rights and responsibilities of those individuals to the family, is seen clearly with respect to the role of women in the workforce. The tension between family and work roles and responsibilties is evident to the individuals involved, and is also embedded in legislation: for example, while the government legislated for the individual rights of women (Matrimonial Property Act 1976, Human Rights Act 1978), at the same time it has proclaimed the family as 'the basic unit of our society' (National Party Manifesto, 1978:48). For women, the obligation to develop both their own abilities and those of other family members produces a conflict not only for those who opt for one of the alternatives, but also for those who undertake both. To do both successfully is to undermine the traditional female role as well as threaten the male breadwinner role.

The tension between familial and individual rights and responsibilities is also reflected at a community level. The first community based Plunket-Karitane Family Support Unit was established in 1979. During the previous five years several women's health centres were established. While family support units aim to support the family as a group, the health and refugee centres aim to give support and encouragement primarily to women. The New Zealand approach to refugee centres is in direct opposition to Erin Pizzey's more family-based approach in England. The abortion debate of 1978 was between the pro-life campaigners who argued along familial lines, and the pro-abortion groups who took an individual approach.

The conflict between the obligations, rights and responsibilities of the family

and those of its individual members will continue to be an important issue in the 1980s. It also points to the interrelationship between rights and responsibilities and dependency, for, in the pursuit of individual social rights, family members are forced to consider the implications for their family responsibilities, which are essentially concerned with the support of dependants.

The issues of equity and rights have been discussed primarily in terms of their relevance to economic and social policies. The two are closely linked; for example, under John Rawls's theory of justice people must 'understand the need for, and....(be) prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-operation' (1972:5). What is intriguing is that, as yet, little attention has been addressed to the broad issues of equity and rights within policies for the family. The concern with the rights and responsibilities of different family members has, for example, yet to be translated to a broad concept of family rights which delineates some equilibrium among competing family members.

Dependency - As with the debate over the delineation of equity and rights in social policy, there is no firm agreement on what constitutes a state of dependency. While most would accept the legitimacy of the dependency of small children, there is still little agreement as to the age, circumstances and conditions under which children become independent and no longer reliant on parental support. Over the whole of the life cycle, periods of dependence and independence cannot even be identified by a single criteria such as age, for family responsiblities, the onset of a physical or mental disorder, access to paid employment and a host of other considerations determine a person's ability to function independently. Such circumstances may establish the need for support from within the family, from the community or the state. There are therefore two central issues with respect to dependency: in what circumstances should dependency be allowed, and on whom should such people be dependent?

New Zealand policies allow dependence on the state in cases of physical and/or

mental disability, childhood, sickness, injury through accident, unemployment, family responsibilities, and age. While those over 60 years are allowed to be dependent on the state regardless of their income, all other recipients of income maintenance (except family benefit) are income-tested, not only on the individual's income, but also on the spouses's income,Dependence on the state is thereby discouraged, while dependence on the family is seen as obligatory.

The independence/dependence conflict can be seen more specifically in taxation policy. New Zealand's personal tax scale is based entirely on the individual unit, a recognition that everyone has a right to an independent income and taxation assessment, regardless of their family circumstances. However, it can have a discriminatory impact on women because of their familial roles as housewives, child-minders and secondary-earners. Where a husband with a non-earning or low-earning wife receives a rebate, this provides a discouragement to undertake paid employment, thereby facilitating continued dependence on the husband. Proposals mooted by the Task Force on Tax Reform (1982) for income-splitting would have provided further disincentives for both mothers and fathers to seek employment. Similarly, while women in the paid workforce can be expected to have some economic independence from their family, if they become unemployed they are normally not eligible for the unemployment benefit, for their dependence on their husband is immediately expected.

In recent years however, there has been concern over the extent that dependence on the state has substituted for dependence on the family. The increasing numbers of solo parents on the Domestic Purposes Benefit led to such a debate in the mid-1970s, the outcome of which was a government review of the policy and a subsequent cut in the benefits provisions. As a short-term administrative cost-cutting exercise the measure may have succeeded, but the incidence of solo-parents on the Domestic Purposes Benefit continues to rise. Subsequent research revealed that of those eligible for the Domestic Purposes Benefit, 'roughly one in two of those who could take up the Domestic Purposes Benefit do not do so' (Wylie, 1980:15).

Yet while the availability of benefits may not encourage dependency on such benefits, the state implicitly encourages dependency through the poor provision of transitonal measures towards independence. In Wylies's study many of those on the Domestic Purposes Benefit felt that the exemption of $25 a week or $1300 a year was low: they gained little by working if at the same time they lost all or part of the additional benefit, and had the added expenses of child-care, transport and working-clothes costs. Many suggested that while the benefit gave the family financial support, it 'does not help you to help yourself' (Wylie, 1980:53). Such a position is further reflected in the number of widows who even without dependents are unable to support themselves: 66% of the women on the widow's benefit in 1981/82 had no dependent children. It seems that while the state has been prepared to assist in a crisis situation by providing a benefit, appropriate supportive or rehabilitative policies encouraging independence have rarely been provided.

The dependence of women on men under no-fault divorce has, however, almost disappeared. Liability to maintain a partner is now more circumscribed and a distinction is made between maintenance during marriage and mantenance after dissolution. Liability to maintain depends on the ability of the spouse to meet his or her reasonable needs, making allowances for the circumstances surrounding the division of labour within the marriage while the parties were together, arrangements for the custody of any children, and the need for a period of education or training designed to increase earning capacity. After dissolution, circumstances arising from any physical or mental disability or an inability to obtain reasonable and adequate work do not provide grounds for the continuation of maintenance.

However, given a period of dependency arising from child-rearing responsibilities, most women do not have the job-skills to attain a level of economic independence equal to that of men. The average (ordinary time) male wage was $351.73 gross in November 1983, and for females $231.92 (76.8% of the male wage).[4] Thus while the law may now give women access to economic independence, their job skills have not been established or maintained in the expectation of such independence.

A concern for dependency has also invoked the question as to whether particular social strata in society have become more dependent because of today's social policies. The dependency of women and children is an historical fact, but certain policies have at least implicitly perpetuated this dependency, e.g. present-day levels of unemployment effect women more than men, yet there are few compensatory programmes. In so far as there is now considerable evidence that the middle class take a disproportionate advantage of social policies, can it be argued that they have also become increasingly dependent on the state for economic and social support?

A concern for dependency is in fact central to public policy. While it manifests itself in family policy through the state's support for the privacy and independence of the family, other social and economic policies are based on similar concerns: for example, since 1978 the New Zealand government has subsidised farmers through the supplementary minimum prices scheme in an effort to maintain farmers' incomes and independence. The state also supports a vast number of caring organisations in an effort to continue their support of the independence of others. In maintaining the independence of such diverse groups, it can be asked, however, whether such independence is at the price of dependence on the state.

CONCLUSION

The 1980s in New Zealand have seen a poor performance of the economy challenging the financial viability of exising social programmes and the potential of the state to sustain benefits in the longer term. Fears concerning the 'overexpansion' of the public sector are not new, yet there is little in the way of objective limits or guidelines to judge when resources have become overcommitted. Attempts to establish limits to sector spending expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product are less useful than is the guideline that public budgets should be expanded to the point where marginal social costs equal marginal social benefits. Certainly there has been considerable evaluation of social policies in the last five years, with the establishment of various select committees, a Department of Social Welfare evaluation unit and commissioned reports, all endeavouring to measure and ultimately curtail government expenditure.

Such evaluation would be far more beneficial to social policy in the long term if it took into account not just the need to cut costs, but also the need to reaffirm belief in the effectiveness of policy provision for greater social rights, equity and independence. It is contented that the role of the state in economic and social policy should be seen within these three principles.

While the principles of equity and rights (or equality, justice and liberty) have underlined major philosophical debates for centuries, the principle of independence (or security as Helco calls it) is one which has only recently been considered. In a capitalist society where dependence on others is seen as an area of concern, where dependence on the state has increased to high expenditure levels, and yet where the family is still obliged to undertake the care and support of most dependents, the principle of independence and autonomy has often been overlooked. Yet it could be contended that the basis of state support is to maintain the

independence of people and to prevent dependency on others (be it through unemployment, ill health, etc). State intervention in family policy can be seen then as predicated on the principle that all people have a right to economic and social independence or autonomy and that the pursuit of this objective also involves the principles of equity and rights.

The use of independence as an objective of policy would necessitate the explicit delineatin of the strategies required by idividuals, the community and the state to facilitate individual or group independence. While such strategies may not differ significantly from those which would be considered under an explicit family policy, the orientation of many programmes would need to be altered. Tax rebates would continue to be used to offset the costs for those supporting dependents (for example, children and the handicapped), but tax abatement would be used wherever possible to allow people to move from social security support to market wage support, or to move from dependence on one's spouse or family to independence through equal opportunties.

While it may be possible to establish various principles on which future family policy could be based, the focus of such policy still needs to be considered. Feminists have argued that a family focus subordinates the role of individual family members, especially women. On the other hand, policy with a totally individual focus, overlooks the reality of interdependencies and dependencies among individuals. A basic dilema arises in that policies which are derived either implicitly or explicitly from a focus on the family run the risk of either using a fairly narrow definition of the family and a categorisation of 'alternative' families or using the very widest of definition to cover all families (and indeed most individuals) - a situation which renders the definition meaningless. Future policies could well recognise these seemingly opposing bases of policy by adopting an intermediate focus of the relationship among dependent and independent persons, the unit of dependency. Whether policies

focus on the family or on the individual, both are concerned with the relationship of dependency. Through its policies, the state has already legislated for dependency to be shared in certain ways (adoption, matrimonial property, etc) and where necessary has increased its own responsibility for family support.

Thus the unit of dependency could be seen as the target of policies. Such a unit could be defined (within family policy) as, a grouping in which one or more adults are responsible, through a relationship by blood, law or by choice, for the economic support and nurture of one or more dependents.

A more explicit focus on the unit of dependency would make the goal of policies clearer: to facilitate the economic and social independence of individuals or groups of individuals. State intervention would be prefixed on the loss of independence at all levels of economic and social status, as well as the maintenance of independence through, for example, employment, good health, education, equal rights, child care and greater discretionary income.

The systematic targetting of policies towards facilitating independence may however prove too radical an expectation for future family policy. Traditionally we have seen the dependence of women on men replaced by their dependence on the state through the income maintenance system ("private patriarchy" has been replaced by "public patriarchy"). In order to allow women, women-headed families and other dependents greater independence, it may be that the state must become less of a patriarchy (by being less male-dominated and family free, with more women in influential positions). Future significant advances in family policy can only occur when the principles of equity, rights and independence are taken into account, the focus of policy becomes the unit of dependency, and the state itself becomes less of a patriarchy.

Footnotes

1. All statistics are from New Zealand Year Books or the Annual Reports of government departments in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives unless otherwise stated.
2. These figues must be interpreted in the knowledge that not all 5th year secondary school pupils will be 17 years old, and not all 17 year-olds at secondary school will be in the 5th year class (7th form).
3. See: Koopman-Boyden, P.G. and Scott, C.D. The Family and Policy in New Zealand, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin (in (press) for a detailed account of the establishment of government policies for the family since 1840.
4. These are provisional figures.

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Changing patterns of divisions of labour for paid work and child care

by GRAEME RUSSELL

Abstract

Considerable attention has been given recently in western societies to the increased participation by mothers in the paid workforce. Associated with this there has been a concern for the development and implementation of policies aimed both at ensuring equality of employment opportunities, and at providing more options for mothers to choose how to balance their commitments between paid work and family. In contrast, surprisingly little attention has been given to the small, but nevertheless significant changes that are occurring to men and to fathers' involvement in child care. And, this is despite the obvious critical nature of the interaction between these two changes in divisions of labour. This paper argues that policy makers need to place much more emphasis on the issue of father-involvement, and that greater recognition needs to be given to the interaction between family and employment policies. A proposal is put forward for a shift in emphasis towards the notion of shared responsibility for both breadwinning and child care, and more importantly, towards the presumption of shared parenting. This emphasis contrasts quite markedly with the current presumption that only mothers have any responsibility for children.

Most Western societies have recently experienced significant increases in female workforce participation rates, increases which have been especially high for mothers who have very young children. Paralleling these changes, there has been a concern by governments, but primarily by women's groups, for what have come to be called women's issues, issues such as discrimination against women and equality of employment opportunities. As a consequence, policies have been advocated, developed and/or implemented which aim both at helping women to enter and stay in the paid workforce, and at changing the gender structure of the workforce. High on this agenda has been a concern to increase women's participation in traditional male jobs (e.g., in the trades and technical jobs) and to increase the representation of women in positions of power and status.

Much of this attention on women's employment opportunities, of course, is well founded. Compared to men, there are fewer women in paid employment, there are more in lower paid jobs, and there are very few women in positions of power and authority. Nevertheless, the current almost exclusive emphasis on responding to, and actively facilitating changes in women's employment patterns has several limitations. It can be argued too that these limitations could reduce the possibility of significant and lasting changes occurring in women's options.

The present paper aims to evaluate critically current approaches to employment and family policies within the context of discussions about equality between females and males in Australia, and in the light of recent findings about divisions of labour for child care. In particular, it argues that current approaches are limited by: the emphasis on options for women; the lack of acknowledgement of the interaction between employment and family responsibilities; and by the continued neglect of the significance of the changes that have been occurring, or possibly could occur in father's participation in child care. Recent research findings are used to develop an

argument for the adoption of parallel family and employment policies which presume shared parenting (shared both between mothers and fathers, and between parents and the community).

Employment Options for Women?

Options for women only: The overriding emphasis in policies which have been developed in the employment area has been on increasing the opportunities and options for women. The recent Affirmative Action for Women paper published by the Australian Government states:

> "Neither sex discrimination legislation nor affirmative action contains any measure forcing women to participate in the work-force if they do not choose to do so. Both measures are designed to ensure equal opportunity for women who do want to work. They do not undermine or under-emphasise the many other roles of women in society". (1984, p. 14).

Such an approach appears to overlook the possibility that women might have some responsibility to provide financial support for others. Moreover, an argument that perhaps mothers should share in the responsibility for breadwinning is rarely heard in the current debate or in proposals for policy initiatives. An emphasis on choices for women, rather than on responsibilities, however, can be taken to imply that men have a greater responsibility for breadwinning. This approach could in fact help to limit women's employment opportunities by reinforcing traditional ideas about divisions of labour.

This lack of emphasis on responsibilities for family financial support is also evident in research studies. Researchers have paid very little attention to the extent to which recent changes in female employment patterns have meant significant changes in mothers' and fathers' perceptions of breadwinning responsibilities (cf. Russell (1983a) who found that changes in child care patterns and employment patterns did not result in a shift in parental perceptions about breadwinning). It could be argued,

for example, that employment patterns for families with very young children indicate that there has not been a fundamental shift in notions about responsibilities for financial support. Survey findings indicate that despite the generally high levels of employment for females (44% were employed in 1983), only 20% of those with pre-school aged children were employed full-time for the full year. A counter argument, of course, is that this reflects a lack of employment opportunities and a lack of adequate child care. Nevertheless, given the emphasis that many place on the apparent lack of responsibility that fathers take for child care and housework, particularly in dual worker families, the issue of shared responsibility for breadwinning deserves more attention by than it is currently given.

The Interaction between family and employment policies. Changes in female employment patterns have prompted some discussions about child care, with many community groups arguing that governments should increase their funding for high quality child care centres. Nevertheless, the critical nature of the interaction between family and employment policies (cf. Kamerman, 1983) has received very little attention at all in comparison to that given to expanding employment options.

The recent Australian document on Affirmative Action for Women provides a good example of this. While the possible critical nature of 'women's family responsibilities' is acknowledged briefly in several places, it is not given any prominence at all in the policy initiatives. Very little attempt has been made either to take account of the recent recommendations of the International Labour Office (ILO) on work/family issues. The I.L.O. Conference in 1981 proposed that:

> "With a view to creating effective equality of opportunity and treatment for men and women workers, each Member shall make it an aim of national policy to enable persons with family responsibilities who are engaged or wish to engage in employment to exercise their right to

> do so without being subject to discrimination and, to the extent possible, without conflict between their employment and family responsibilities."
> "The competent authorities and bodies in each country shall take appropriate measures to promote information and education which engender broader public understanding of the principle of equality of opportunity and treatment for men and women workers and of the problems of workers with family responsibilities, as well as a climate of opinion conducive to overcoming these problems." (Convention 156)

Australian proposals could be interpreted as encouraging increased conflict between work and family. The recent government publication builds up the expectation that affirmative action will produce even more committed employees, who will be absent for fewer days, and that this will result in an increase in an organisation's profitability (Affirmative Action for Women, 1984, p. 16).

There has also been a tendency for recent debates about family responsibilities to encourage an emphasis on child care as "just work", and work that can be easily transferred from one adult (female) to another with an exchange of money. This approach has ignored the very real problems, ideological, psychological, and practical, involved in sharing not only the tasks and responsibilities associated with children, but also in sharing affection and close relationships. Policies are not being developed which could help people cope with sharing their children with others.

Divisions of labour within the home: Another limitation of current approaches to policy is that little attention is given to the interaction between female workforce participation and male involvement in child care. Recent debates and policy innovations (e.g., maternity leave) appear to be based on the assumption that only mothers currently have, and will continue to have, the major responsibility for children, a policy strategy which it has been argued (e.g., Baldock, 1983; Russell, 1984a) could be counterproductive to increasing women's options.

> "However attractive in the short term, the long term effect of any policies emphasising the special obligations of women toward home and children is to act as a trap, keeping women forever locked in their dependent positions within an ever increasing sexual division of labour." (Baldock, 1983, p.48).

It might also be noted here that there is a possible interaction between the lack of emphasis on divisions of labour in the home and the lack of response by governments to the arguments of community groups for a substantial increase in child care funds. As has been noted elsewhere

> "... fathers' involvement in child care has significance for economic decision-making both in the family and in the political arena. While families, governments and employers continue to be dominated by men who hold traditional views, take very little responsibility for the day-to-day care of children, and who therefore have very little understanding of the needs either of children or caregivers, then there seems little hope of changes being made in social and economic policies relating either to child care and preschool education or employment." (Russell, 1980, p. 142).

The argument that there is an interaction between work and family options, and between the options available to men and women, of course, is not a new one (see Dahlstrom, 1962). These arguments have been acknowledged, and implemented at least in part, in some countries for some time now. In Sweden, for example, it was this argument which was behind the development in 1974 of a policy which permitted mothers or fathers to take leave from paid employment without penalty, to care for their newborns.

There is evidence, however, that this argument is now being accepted more widely within the international community. The Preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, states that State Parties are:

> "aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women."

Despite the early acknowledgement of this argument in Sweden, and despite it having been endorsed by the U.N. and the I.L.O., it has had very little impact either on the development or on the implementation of policies. This lack of impact is particularly evident in Australia.

Neither does it appear to have had much of an effect on researchers or policy analysists in the child care area. Many recent examples can be found of government-based and other research studies which have assumed that mothers have the primary responsibility for children. The Australian Bureau of Statistics, in its 1980 survey of Child Care Arrangements, and a Social Welfare Research Centre Study of Child care (Sweeney & Jamrozik, 1984), both **assumed** that the person responsible for a child aged 11 or under was the mother of the child when she was present in a household. This assumption is also implicit in other research studies which have examined divisions of labour within the home, but have asked questions about whether or not the husband/father 'helps' with childcare or household jobs (e.g., Glezer, 1983; Wearing, 1984), as well as in some recent policy analyses (e.g., Alexander, 1983; Brennan, 1983). Researchers and policy analysists continue to ignore or simply pay lip service to recent research findings relating both to the actual, and potential levels of father-participation in child care. It is these findings that I now want to examine.

Male Participation in Child Care

It could hardly be claimed that fathers have taken on additional family work at the same rate that mothers have moved into the paid

workforce. Nor could it be argued that the more common pattern today is for mothers and fathers to share equally in day-to-day child care. Nevertheless, research findings do indicate that there is a small, but significant group of fathers who are extremely highly participant, and that there is a trend towards fathers spending more time taking care of their children. Moreover, the evidence is very convincing indeed in showing that all things being equal, fathers are just as competent at caregiving as mothers.

Modal Patterns: Despite differences in methods employed, findings for the amount of time fathers spend each week at home and available to their children, and for the time that they spend on basic child care tasks (e.g., feeding, dressing) are remarkably consistent across several studies in different countries (see Russell, 1983a, and Russell & Radin, 1983 for reviews). Estimates for Australian and U.S. fathers for time spent on child care tasks, have ranged from 1.7 to 2.8 hours/week. And, a time budget study which was conducted in 13 countries (mainly European) reported the average figure to be 1.6 hours/week.

Differences between mothers and fathers, however, have been found to be quite marked. Estimates of time spent on child care tasks by mothers who are not employed, range from 9 hours/week (representing 85% of the total time spent by both mothers and fathers performing child care tasks) in the European study to 18 hours/week (89%) in an Australian sample (Russell, 1983a). Moreover, it is abundantly clear that these differences are not simply explained by differences in the amount of time spent at home. In one analysis it was found that if mothers and fathers had shared child care tasks equally when they were both at home, fathers would have been performing 35% of them (Russell, 1983a). The actual figure of 11% is well below this.

Another consistent finding from these studies is that the range of father-involvment is quite marked. Several studies (Russell, 1984b) have now reported that there is a significant group of fathers who are very highly participant in all aspects of childcare when they are at home. In a U.S. study (Kotelchuck, 1976) estimated that 7.5% of fathers shared child care responsibilities equally, whereas 14% of a sample of Australian fathers were found to spend at least one hour a day on basic child care tasks (well above the group averages cited above). And, in a more recent Australian sample of middle class families recruited from schools, it was found that approximately 7% of fathers shared equally in the responsibilities for basic child care tasks for their seven year olds (Russell & Russell, 1984). It should also be noted that the samples in these studies included families in which fathers were the sole breadwinners at the time of data collection.

Does Dual Employment Make a Difference? Whether or not having both parents in the paid workforce has an impact on father - participation has been one of the most vexed questions in recent family research. There is not time here to go into all of the arguments, and besides, there are many recent reviews (e.g., Bryson, 1983; Hoffman, 1983; Pleck, 1983; Russell, 1983a). One of the biggest difficulties in comparing findings, and reaching a reasonable conclusion is that the methods and samples used have varied quite markedly. A particular difficulty is that some studies report divisions of labour between mothers and fathers in relative terms (i.e., fathers' fequency of task performance relative to their spouses'), whereas others report them in absolute terms (i.e., in terms of the actual time spent by each person).

Studies that have reported figures in relative terms are consistent in finding that when both parents are employed, fathers are more involved in family tasks. Another finding is that this relative increase is greater for general household tasks than for child-care tasks. In contrast, studies

which have examined the actual time spent by fathers in family work, generally show that dual employment has a small, but statistically non-significant effect.

There are several limitations with most dual employment studies which are worth noting here. First, there has been little attempt to control for the ages of children in families. The pattern of findings might be entirely different in families with different aged children. In my own research, for example, there was a trend for dual employment to be associated with greater father-involvment when there was a child under three in the family.

A second limitation is the almost exclusive emphasis on the performance of specific child care and domestic tasks. As I have argued elsewhere (Russell, 1983a), there need not be a high correlation between task performance and the degree of responsibility taken for these tasks, nor for the degree of general responsibility taken for children. In my research, for example, although I found that dual employment did not have a significant impact on the time spent by fathers on child care tasks, there was evidence of it having an impact on the amount of time that fathers spent taking the sole responsibility for their children. This finding is supported by recent figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1980) which show that in approximately 14% of families in which both parents are employed, each parent takes care of the children when the other parent is at work.

A final limitation of this research is the absence of any well-designed longitudinal study which has examined the impact that dual employment has on individual families, and whether some variables are more critical than others in mediating the impact of dual employment (e.g., the hours worked; the type of job held by either mother or father; or parental attitudes to divisions of labour, or to the desirability of dual employment).

Are Fathers Becoming More Involved? Given the wide range of methods used and the scarcity of studies which have collected data from fathers themselves, it is difficult to be certain about whether or not there has been a trend over time towards greater father - participation in either housework or child care (apart from the very obvious increase in father - participation in antenatal classes and childbirth). Some recent studies (cf. Glezer, 1983) suggest that while there has been a significant shift toward egalitarianism in attitudes about divisions of labour for family work in the last 10 years, these "new" attitudes are not very evident in findings for the fequency of actual performance of household tasks. This is consistent with Bryson's (1983) conclusions after her comprehensive review of 30 years of Australian research into divisions of labour:

> "The more recent studies show that men are participating to a somewhat greater extent in certain household tasks which were previously carried out by their wives and possibly that they are taking a more active role in child rearing. However, men's participation in fathering has always been higher than in purely domestic chores. The research shows men's increased activity in household chores to be linked to women's greater participation in the work-force though this does not seem to be the case with fathering. The changes overall are not, however, great and, without some considerable alteration of women's subordinate position in the workforce and other spheres of power in the wider society, this could not be expected to have a significant effect on gender equality." (p. 125)

My conclusion after examining the critical variables associated with father - participation in a sample of 238 families recruited from shopping centres between 1977 and 1979, was that there was evidence of "a slow but nevertheless significant shift in father participation" (Russell, 1983a, p. 74). Also consistent with this conclusion is the finding by several researchers that there is a small group of families in which fathers either share equally or have the major responsibility for the day-to-day care of pre-school aged children (e.g., Harper, 1980; Russell, 1979, 1983; Radin, 1982; Sagi, 1982).

In my study of these families, which I have called shared caregiving families, fathers, on average, performed 45% of child care tasks, and spent 26 hours each week being the sole caregiver (the average for mothers was 16 hours/week). (Eighty-six percent of these mothers were employed full -time, and 14% part-time, whereas 48% of the fathers were employed full -time, 30% part-time, and 22% were not employed at all). It is difficult to know either, how typical mine or others' samples are of the group of families who are exploring these very nontraditional family patterns, whether these types of families are increasing in numbers, how common they currently are, or what their antecedents are. My estimate is that they constitute 1-2% of families with pre-school aged children which translates into a figure of around 5-10,000 families in Australia.

The question of the possible antecedents of fathers participating equally in child care is important, of course, because of the insights that it might offer about the likelihood of future changes occuring in patterns of divisions of labour. In my study of 71 of these families I asked parents why they adopted this type of family pattern. Four general types of explanations emerged: (i) Inability of fathers to gain employment; (ii) To increase family income; (iii) Career factors - mainly the strong desire of the mother to pursue a career; and (iv) Egalitarian beliefs about child care responsibilities and sex roles. Those who gave the first two types of explanations (31) usually argued that the change was an economic necessity, whereas the others (41) saw their change as being a matter of choice.

Additional analyses I have conducted suggest the following factors are associated with high father-participation: having fewer and older children; having a mother who is more highly educated and has a higher status job; having a father who has had more experience with children and who rejects traditional ideas about masculinity; having mothers and fathers

employed in jobs which permit some degree of flexibility in career structure and work times, and fewer demands to work long hours. It should also be noted that high father participation is not simply associated with professional middle class couples. Nor is there a strong association with fathers' levels of education or occupational status.

Another factor to emerge was that people were changed by the experience of shared caregiving. Some fathers became very positive about their relationships with their children and with time, emphasised this rather than economic factors as the reason for why they continued in this lifestyle. It was also true, however, that some families found this type of lifestyle difficult, both because of financial strains, a lack of social support, and individual problems experienced in adjusting to a non-traditional pattern. A two-year follow-up of 27 of the sample of 71 families revealed that 11 of these had reverted completely to traditional lifestyles (Russell, 1983a).

Fathers are competent too! Recent studies are consistent in showing that fathers can be just as competent as mothers at caring for children, and just as sensitive in responding to their needs. They also show that, under most circumstances, children from around six months of age display attachment behaviours to their fathers in much the same way as they display them to their mothers. This research has included highly controlled laboratory studies focusing on mother's and father's responses to infants, as well as studies of families in which fathers are the primary caregivers (in both two- and one-parent families). Lamb's (1981) conclusion after reviewing the evidence was:

> "We do know . . . that both mothers and fathers are capable of behaving sensitively and responsively in interaction with their infants. With the exception of lactation, there is no evidence that women are biologically predisposed to be better parents than men are. Social conventions, not biological imperatives,

underlie the traditional division of parental responsibilities." (Lamb, 1981, p. 479).

Conclusions: Recent policy discussions have tended to emphasise average differences between mothers and fathers in performances of child care tasks without acknowledging either the range of father-participation, or the findings that fathers can be just as competent in parenting as mothers. Findings about shared caregiving families have also been downplayed, often on the argument that they represent a small and select group. Yet, it could be argued that they represent a growing group of families who are exploring new ways of dividing up the responsibilities for parenting (even if for some it is only for a short period of time), and that this pattern represents an option which many others might like to have. Families like these form the basis of our knowledge about the possibilities that exist for changes in the balance of work and family commitments, and the difficulties that are likely to be encountered. More than that, they provide the best examples yet of the practice of shared parenting, a practice which I want to argue should be presumed in much the same way that our society currently presumes equal employment opportunities (presumed in the sense that it allows people to choose this as an option for parenting).

I am not proposing that shared parenting be presumed because I want to argue that father-involvement will cause a change in women's employment status. It is abundantly clear from my research into shared caregiving families that employment and economic conditions are instrumental in the adoption of this type of family pattern, and therefore, that there is an interaction between family and employment options. Indeed, the potentially critical nature of father-participation has sometimes been overlooked in debates which have emphasised cause and effect (cf. Bryson, 1983). Increased father-participation and shared parenting constitute part of a set of necessary (but not sufficient)

conditions for achieving more options for people to balance work and family commitments. As such, they could form part of a series of policies which parallel those currently being implemented or advocated to increase the employment options for women.

Shared Parenting: A New Direction for Policy

The first step in the development of a set of parallel family policies is that a critical analysis be made of parenting responsibilities, and of the theory and practice of shared parenting. As was noted earlier, the tendency in most recent analyses has been to emphasise only one aspect of parenting: either the frequency of, or amount of time spent on, performing basic child care tasks and traditional female-stereotyped domestic tasks. A more thorough analysis of parenting would include a much broader range of tasks, as well as dimensions such as responsibility and decision-making. While it has become more common for researchers and policy makers to talk in terms of responsibilities for children or for child care tasks, there has been little attempt at all to define or evaluate critically the concept of responsibility. What is presented below is the beginnings of the development of such an analysis, to help provide a better basis for a discussion of shared parenting and its implications for policy formulation. As a first step, we could broaden our concepts of parenting tasks and responsibilities to consider at least six dimensions.

1. *Family financial support and management:* Issues here would include, who is currently employed, as well as who is considered to have the overall or longer term responsibility for breadwinning. Also relevant is who manages family finances and what is the nature of the decision making process for family spending (cf. Edwards, 1981).

2. *Day-to-day child care:* Who spends the time taking care of or supervising children on a day-to-day basis? What happens when both parents are employed--who arranges alternative care and takes

responsibility for monitoring it, and who takes time off from their job when family needs arise? To what extent is this shared between parents and other caregivers outside of the immediate family?

3. ***Family work:*** What are the divisions of labour for basic child care tasks (including school related, and sport and social activities), housework and home maintenance (e.g., home repairs and renovations), and car maintenance. Who actually performs the tasks versus who takes responsibility for decisions relating to them, and monitoring their performance?

4. ***Family Management and Socialization:*** Who organizes family activities and anticipates family needs? Who disciplines children, organizes their activities, monitors their behaviour and feelings? Who makes decisions about approaches to child rearing, and who takes responsibility for carrying these decisions out? Who takes responsibility for actively monitoring different aspects of family life, family conflict or children's needs? How are these responsibilities divided up when both parents are at home?

5. ***Marital relationships:*** How are responsibilities divided up within the marital relationship? Who takes the initiatives and organizes couple activities?

6. ***Having the ultimate responsibility:*** Finally, a dimension which is often referred to in relation to mothers, concerns having the ultimate responsibility, taking and accepting blame when something goes wrong and being the person who has to remedy problems. In other contexts, having the ultimate responsibility has been associated with being the more committed parent, with being the psychological parent who is more likely to monitor children's behaviour and moods, and with feelings of not really having any choice about whether to have a high psychological investment and time commitment to children or not.

How to define shared parenting? Given the above analysis, how might we define shared parenting? At one level, we could talk about shared parenting within various contexts: between mothers and fathers living together; between mothers and fathers living apart; between parents and child care workers, or relatives and friends; and between parents and the community or government (e.g., through welfare or taxation benefits to families, or through maternity leave provisions). Any definition of shared parenting will, of course, depend on which of these aspects that we choose to emphasise. For the purposes of the present paper I have chosen to emphasise the first of these.

Perhaps the most obvious definition of shared parenting within a two-parent situation, and the one which seems to attract most community attention is when mothers and fathers share in both the breadwinning and the day-to-day child care. But, as has become clear from my own research, this type of arrangement does not necessarily lead to sharing other aspects of parenting. In particular, in some families the mother still retained the greater responsibility for child management and socialization, and performed more child care tasks than the father when they were both at home. She was also more likely to have the responsibility for planning, monitoring, and anticipating the needs of the children. As one mother said: "I am still the executive director of children." Equally, however, fathers were frequently seen as having more responsibility for breadwinning, with the mother's employment being considered a short-term option.

On the other hand, I have interviewed families in which the father is employed and the mother is at home, but all the decision-making for the children is shared, and child management and child care tasks are evenly divided when both parents are at home. These couples commonly considered breadwinning and child care as jobs which made equal

contributions to the family, and as jobs which had equivalent demands and rewards. Caring for two pre-school aged children all day, for example, was accepted as being stressful, and thus the need for relief from this was recognized. Emphasis was also placed on: attempting to achieve a reasonable balance between work/career, family commitments and personal leisure time, and on fathers being at home at critical times such as late afternoon and early evening.

When both parents are employed but the children are cared for during the day by someone other than the mother or father, shared parenting could, of course, take on a very different perspective. This could include sharing: responsibility for the decisions about child care and monitoring the child's reactions; transporting children to and from child care; as well as taking time off work to care for a sick child or attend to other child-related tasks (e.g., attending a parent-teacher meeting at school).

These situations obviously do not exhaust all possibilities for shared parenting. As I see it, however, the critical factor for the adoption of this pattern is the acceptance and implementation of shared responsibilities for child management and socialization, combined with a shared contribution to providing for family needs for support and nurturance. My family research also leads me to conclude that there is less chance of the responsibilities for child management and socialization being shared if there is not a continuing day-to-day involvement in child care and family work. Shared responsibility needs to be based on shared knowledge and shared experiences. Indeed, a common argument from fathers who shared the day-to-day child care was that it was only through taking the sole and extended responsibility for their children that they gained the knowledge and experience necessary for them to share the responsibilities for child management and socialization. I now want to consider briefly some of the

policy implications of the adoption of a presumption of shared parenting, of presuming that mothers and fathers have equal responsibility for children.

Policy Implications

There are two major ways in which shared parenting has implications for policy. The first is that there is a need for policies to be developed to take account of the increasing occurrence of shared parenting. The second is that there is a need to address the more widespread lack of shared parenting, both within the context of the debate about women's employment options and within the context of other already identified community needs.

1. Shared Parenting as a Problem

As has been detailed above, there are a number of families in which parents share either or both of the major aspects of parenting: day-to-day child care and breadwinning. There are also a significant number of children whose day-to-day care is shared between their parents and formal (e.g., pre-schools, family day care or child care centres) or informal (e.g., friends, relatives) caregivers, a pattern which is likely to continue to increase given the current policy emphasis on women's employment opportunities. Research studies already show that these two shared parenting contexts can present difficulties for parents and children.

Research on shared-caregiving families (Russell, 1983a) indicates that adjustment difficulties are common. This is reflected in reports of: poorer marital relationships during the early period of change; continuing tensions generated by dissatisfaction about the degree of responsibility taken for child care (this came both from mothers who wanted fathers to take more, and from fathers who felt their spouses were reluctant to allow them to take more); difficulties fathers had in adjusting to the demands of child

care and domestic life; and of mothers feeling guilty about leaving their children, having trouble in adjusting to the reduced contact and reduced influence that they felt that they had over their children, and in their problems in adjusting to being employed and maintaining a strong commitment to their family.

Many of the problems noted in shared caregiving families also surface when parenting is shared with caregivers from outside the immediate family. In a recent national conference of the Family Day Care Association (Canberra, 1984), the problematic nature of the relationship between parents and caregivers was a key issue. Problems noted included: conflicts of values and approaches to child rearing; parents feeling guilty, threatened by the caregivers and concerned that their children would develop stronger relationships with the caregiver; and from the caregivers's perspective there were concerns about a lack of communication from parents and a reluctance to acknowledge the responsibility that the caregivers had.

Similar issues were also taken up in The Community Child Care Newsletter (November - December, 1983) within the context of a parent's perception of the relationship between parents and child care professionals employed in long day care centres. Issues discussed included: staff making parents feel guilty about leaving children in long day care; the belief often held by staff that children are the responsibility of mothers and that they are better being cared for at home; the lack of communication between parents and staff.

Shared parenting as a problem has also been given increasing recognition within the context of family law. There has been a recent increase in interest by fathers to either have custody, or at least to have fairly liberal access to their children after marital separation or divorce, and there have been increasing moves to have shared-custody

arrangements implemented. This means that there are many more children who experience shared parenting from two parents who do not live together. Obviously there are special issues associated with such situations, and there is not time to go into all of these here. Nevertheless, any complete discussion of shared parenting must ultimately include this group of families, and single parent families as well.

2. Lack of Shared Parenting as a Problem

There are several contexts within which a lack of shared parenting has been noted as an issue or problem. The major thrust of the present paper has been on the argument that a lack of shared parenting is a critical issue for more global debates about expanding the workforce options for women. A lack of shared parenting has also emerged as a problem within discussions about other family issues (e.g., family conflict).

The research literature is consistent in its demonstration that divisions of labour for housework and child care are major issues in dual worker families. Pleck (1981), for example, reports that in the U.S. the percentage of employed wives indicating that they would like their husbands to do more, has increased consistently over the last 15 years. Pleck also concludes from his comprehensive study that "an employed wife's wanting her husband to do more housework and child care is a much more powerful predictor of poor family adjustment as well as overall well-being than is actual time spent by husbands". Research data are also consistent in showing that rigid divisions of labour are closely linked with higher family stress and lower self-esteem, poorer health, and poorer marital satisfaction for women.

There is also evidence which indicates that family stress and emotional disturbance in children are related to poor marital relationships and rigid divisions of labour in the home (cf. Patterson, 1982). With the increased emphasis on family as opposed to individual therapy for

emotionally disturbed children, the question of divisions of responsibilities between mothers and fathers has also become more critical in the context of therapeutic strategies. Family therapists are increasingly defining family problems in terms of a lack of involvement and support from the father, and are increasingly concerned with issues related to engaging fathers in therapy, and with the difficulties involved in having fathers take responsibility for the solution of problems. In a recent study by Detmering (1983) on parental attributions of emotional disturbance, it was found that mothers were almost twice as likely as fathers were to accept responsibility for their child's disturbance, and fathers were much more likely to hold their wife responsible.

The need for a change in divisions of responsibilities for child care and domestic work has also been raised within the context of community concern about incest, domestic violence (Schecter, 1983; Scutt, 1983), and violence directed at others (e.g., Family Court Judges) as a result of family conflicts. A consistent theme in these recent writings has been that there is a relationship between incest and domestic violence and the lack of responsibility taken by men for family work and nurturance. Scutt (1983) has emphasised the need to focus on shared responsibility rather than 'helping out', and argues that if a shift in responsibilities did occur, then:

> "Beating will not erupt out of disagreements over responsibilities for child care and child rearing: mother and father will recognize that caring for children is a responsibility and privilege for men and women equally, and the theory will become practice."

3. A Summary of Policy Implications

General strategies: More emphasis needs to be placed on developing policies and practices which assume parents have equal responsibility for children. There is a need for a greater recognition of the interaction between different policies, and an urgent need for more policy coordination through the development of parallel policies. In particular,

more account needs to be taken of the interaction between family and work responsibilities, and between the options of men and women. There is also a need for a more serious debate about increasing the status of family needs within the 'hierarchy' of policy decisions. Current approaches give these very low priority indeed. (It should also be noted that the present discussion about developing parallel policies needs to be expanded to more general economic, taxation and welfare policies).

Workforce Participation: As has been argued now by many people (but with apparently little impact), there is a need to take more account of family needs in workforce policies. High on the agenda should be policies which: expand the options for permanent part-time work for both females and males; introduce more flexibility into career structures and work hours; encourage greater recognition and acceptance by management and in personnel practices of work/family conflicts for both mothers and fathers; critically evaluate the widespread assumption of employees that work will or indeed, should, intrude into family life; expand leave provisions to take account of family needs (e.g., when a child is ill); introduce parental leave schemes which give mothers or fathers the option to care for young children on a full-time basis; expand the options for children to be cared for at their parents' places of work, both on a casual and on a full-time basis, by establishing work-based child care centres; develop 24-hour multi-purpose child care centres; and that employers be encouraged to develop alternatives to work-related skills/personal development courses for women, by offering programmes and services which might both, expand men's options to participate more extensively in their families, and help employees cope with the difficulties of balancing work and family commitments.

Some attention also needs to be given to a child's perspective of the segregation of the workforce, especially in relation to the lack of

availability of alternative (nurturant) models of males. This is especially an issue within the context of child care and early childhood services, counselling and social work. It was recently reported, for example, that the N.S.W. Kindergarten Union only employed one man out of 400 people. Despite their wanting to employ more men, they are not given any incentives to do so by current policies which are directed towards employing more women.

Skills and Knowledge: There are many current schemes which are aimed at increasing women's employment skills, or at broadening their options for future employment through programmes in schools (e.g., the computer education programme). There is little evidence, however, of attempts being made to broaden the options for boys towards traditional female occupations, or to help them to cope with the changing nature of male/female relationships. Further, little attempt is being made to prepare males or females to deal with the conflicts that they might experience between work and family responsibilities, or to explore the problems and issues associated with shared parenting. As has become evident from recent research, and in articles in the popular press (e.g., Sweet, 1984), it is not a simple matter for women to accept shared parenting, and to give up the idea that mothers should be the primary parent.

There is also a need for some affirmative action for males and fathers, to help encourage them to see child care as an option, and to change ideas about responsibilities for parenting. Critical attention could be given to the images and models portrayed of fathers and mothers in parenting books (most are still written with the assumption that it is only mothers with male children who read them (cf. Russell, 1983c)),children's books, and in the media (adertisements still assume that the mother is the primary parent). Special courses could be run for boys in schools, or for fathers in

hospitals or as community education programmes, to give them the opportunity to learn child care skills. More attention could be given to fathers in ante natal classes, to recognize the needs of pregnant fathers, and more emphasis could be placed on this as an experience for pregnant couples.

Services and Practices: More emphasis needs to be placed on developing policies, services and practices which assume that mothers and fathers have equal responsibility for children. The areas which could be given some immediate attention are: family law, particularly issues of maintenance, access and custody, and family court counselling; the approaches of medical professionals and groups which are concerned with child birth education; social work and family counselling practices (e.g., more effort might need to be made to involve fathers in these processes, especially by offering services at different times during the day); special initiative might need to be taken to develop support and information groups for men and fathers; and some attempt might need to be made to offer services, or at least to address the problems of the men who currently engage in incest and family violence -- it seems futile to continue to only attempt to patch up the *effects* by offering refuge and protection to the victims, while ignoring the underlying causes; and some effort could be made to change the approaches of schools and other institutions which interact with families, but which focus almost exclusively on mothers (maybe there is a need for some affirmative action here, for schools to take the initiative and look for ways to involve fathers more).

Responsibility for sexuality and intimacy: The question about the degree of responsibility that fathers take for their children, and the issue of shared parenting, has its beginnings in sexual development and ideas about the nature of male/female relationships. Critical analyses need to be made of the implications of shared parenting for earlier development

and for policies relating to sex education and the development of responsibility for relationships, reproduction and intimacy.

There is also a need to address a question which is being asked increasingly, especially by 'feminist' parents (e.g., McCarthy, 1984): "What about our sons?" There doesn't seem much future in continuing to pursue policies which attempt to broaden women's options and change their ideas about the nature of women, without taking a critical look at the other side of the equation. Perhaps it is time to advocate that we stop talking about balancing paid work and child care as a women's issue -- it is much more than that, it is an issue for men and children too. Indeed, while we continue to see this as a woman's probem, then that it what it will remain, a problem for women. Perhaps it is also time to consider whether there is a need for a radically new direction in the debate -- to encourage men to become involved too.

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